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DECIPHERING THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
The classification of certain acts as "acts of state"
with . . . their validity . . . beyond judicial review is a
pragmatic device, not required by the nature of sover-
eign authority and inconsistently applied in international
law .... The "continuing vitality" of the doctrine de-
pends on "its capacity to reflect the proper distribution
of functions between the judicial and political branches
of the Government on matters bearing upon foreign re-
lations." Consequently, there are "constitutional under-
pinnings" to the classification. A court that passes on
the validity of an "act of state" intrudes into the domain
of the political branches .... The act of state doctrine is
supple, flexible, ad hoc. The doctrine is meant to facili-
tate the foreign relations of the United States, not to fur-
nish the equivalent of sovereign immunity .... *
[I]f the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is a tangled
web of statutory ambiguities, the act of state doctrine is
an airy castle.**
JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA***
• Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1360-61 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations
omitted), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1933 (1989).
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•** Professor of Law, Villanova University; LL.M., Columbia University
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This article grew out of my work in preparing J. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOR-
EIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS (B.N.A. 1988), and reflects the
approach found in chapter 8 of that work. The present article is not simply a
reprint of that chapter, however; it incorporates new material, including deci-
sions handed down after January 1, 1987 (the cut-off date for the book) and a
new act of Congress modifying the act of state doctrine, and also further.analysis
of the material examined in the book.
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I. INTRODUCTION
THE act of state doctrine, while deceptively easy to state, has
proven extraordinarily difficult to interpret or apply.
Although verbal expression of the doctrine is virtually unchanged
from its classic formulation by Chief Justice Fuller in 1897,1 since
then jurists and scholars have completely changed the policies un-
derlying the doctrine, have ascribed numerous exceptions to it,
and have disagreed over such fundamental questions as whether
the doctrine is a jurisdiction-limiting rule, a choice of law rule or
something else. They also dispute whether the doctrine (or
something similar to it) is followed by the courts of other na-
tions. 2 As a consequence of this confusion and the resulting ap-
parent injustices from the application of the doctrine, for thirteen
years the Supreme Court consistently avoided opportunities to
address the ever growing confusion in the lower courts, and legis-
lators and scholars have recently called for the abolition of the
doctrine. 3
In the most recent act of state case, W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v.
Environmental Tectonics Corp. International,4 the Supreme Court was
1. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), is the earliest U.S. case in
which the Court unequivocally applied a concept of "act of state" distinct from
foreign sovereign immunity, and the earliest U.S. case in which the now stan-
dard verbal formula was announced. One commentator traced the concept in
English law back to 1674. E. MOONEY, FOREIGN SEIZURES 7-10 (1967). Others
believe the doctrine can be traced back to 1364. A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 48, n. 19 (1962); Note, Act of State Doctrine-Limitations
on Sabbatino: Non-Applicability of the Hickenlooper Amendment, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV.
243, 244 (1968). On the other hand, another commentator has reasonably con-
cluded that the concept, as distinct from sovereign immunity or other grounds,
was not actually applied in an English case until 1981. Jones, Act of Foreign State
in English Law: The Ghost Goes East, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 433, 434 (1982); see also
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964); Singer, The Act
of State Doctrine of the United Kingdom, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 283, 284-96 (1981).
2. Compare Annotation, Modern Status of the Act of State Doctrine, 12 A.L.R.
FED. 707, 712-13 (1972) (act of state doctrine followed in Austria, Belgium,
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom) with Wallace, Introductory Remarks, in ACT OF STATE AND
EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH 3, 5 (J. Lacey ed. 1983) (only Australia, Canada and
United Kingdom have act of state doctrines similar to that of United States).
3. In the one case during this period when the Supreme Court confronted
the act of state doctrine, the Court dismissed the issue in a single, inconclusive
footnote. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco para el Comercio Exterior, 462 U.S.
611, 634 n.28 (1983). For calls for the abolition of the doctrine, see Bazyler,
Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 325 (1986); Mathias, Restruc-
turing the Act of State Doctrine.- A Blueprint for Legislative Reform, 12 LAw & POL'Y IN
INT'L Bus. 369 (1980); Wallace, Comments on Abolishing or Changing the Act of State
Doctrine by Legislation, in ACT OF STATE AND EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH, supra note
2, at 25.
4. 58 U.S.L.W. 4140 (1990).
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unanimous-unlike the Court's two preceding act of state cases in
which it could not muster a majority for any theory of the doc-
trine, with the largest bloc ofJustices (four) in dissent. 5 Kirkpat-
rick involved the application of the act of state doctrine to alleged
bribery of foreign government officials in violation of the Racket-
eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. 6 The Court, per-
haps in order to sustain a majority, chose to find that Kirkpatrick
did not involve the validity of an act of a state without explaining
how it decided that question. The decision therefore resolved
none of the problems which have bedeviled courts, lawyers, and
scholars.
The rampant confusion surrounding the act of state doctrine
is well illustrated by two cases denominated Philippines v. Marcos.7
In the first, Marcos I, the Philippines sought a preliminary injunc-
tion against former President Marcos and his wife to prohibit
their disposition of certain New York assets. The current govern-
ment claimed that the defendants had obtained the assets through
fraud on the Philippines. The Second Circuit concluded that an
injunction was not barred by the act of state doctrine because the
acts of the former president were not acts of the state, because the
Marcos government was no longer in power, and because the for-
eign state itself had asked that the legality of the acts be deter-
mined by American courts." Therefore, Judge Oakes saw little
chance that the court's action could embarrass the executive's
conduct of foreign relations, and thus saw no reason to invoke the
act of state doctrine to bar judicial action.
In the second case, Marcos II, the current government sought
a preliminary injunction against the defendants disposing of their
assets anywhere in the world, grounded on the same claims of
fraud and on a convoluted jurisdictional allegation which started
with a claim under the Racketeeer Influenced and Corrupt Orga-
nizations Act, but sought the injunction for a legion of state and
foreign law claims brought in by pendent jurisdiction. A divided
panel of the Ninth Circuit concluded that each argument on
5. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); First Nat'l
City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972); see infra § II(D)(2).
6. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
7. Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1986) (Marcos I), cert. dis-
missed, 480 U.S. 942, cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987); Philippines v. Marcos, 818
F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1987) (Marcos II), rev'den banc, 862 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Marcos III), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1933 (1989); see generally Note, The Marcos
Cases: A Consideration of the Act of State Doctrine and the Pursuit of the Assets of Deposed
Dictators, 9 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. REV. 81 (1989).
8. Marcos 1, 806 F.2d at 357-60.
[Vol. 35: p. I
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which Judge Oakes in the Second Circuit relied pointed instead to
such intrusion into foreign relations that an injunction was barred
by the act of state doctrine. 9
Writing for the majority, Judge Kozinski considered the act
of state doctrine to be a sort of political question rule designed to
require dismissal of internationally sensitive cases.' 0 This deci-
sion was reversed in a rehearing en banc (Marcos III), on the
grounds that the defendants had not demonstrated an act of the
state, as well as hints of a "governmental extinction" exception
and a "waiver" exception." Three judges dissented on the
grounds that, because the doctrine does not address jurisdiction,
questions about its application should be remanded for develop-
ment at trial.' 2
These differing conclusions about the effect of the act of state
doctrine on the claims against Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos can-
not be founded on factual differences: the claims, and thus the
assumed facts, were the same in all three decisions. The discor-
dant opinions might be dismissed as simply a typical instance of
juridical disagreement about the law to be applied, but such disa-
greement is hardly suggested by the similar language used to ex-
press the doctrine in the opinions. Rather the differences stand
for a fundamental confusion over what the doctrine means and
how it is to be applied.
Examples of such conceptual confusion abound. Consider
the juridical dilemma posed in Liu v. Republic of China.'3 Helen
Liu alleged that agents of the Republic had killed her husband.
The Republic, in fact, had convicted and imprisoned several of its
officials for complicity in the murder of Henry Liu.' 4 District
Judge Lynch concluded that dismissal based on the act of state
doctrine was inappropriate because, according to the Republic's
9. Marcos H, 818 F.2d at 1481-88.
10. Id. at 1489-90.
11. Marcos III, 862 F.2d at 1360-61. This opinion is the source of the quote
cited at supra note *.
The ultimate outcomes in the Marcos cases hardly support former Senator
Mathias' conclusion that courts hide behind the act of state doctrine "at the
slightest suggestion of involvement of a foreign government." Mathias, supra
note 3, at 405. For a similar quick turn-around, but in the opposite direction,
see Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola, 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (action barred by act of state doctrine), aff'd, 733 F.2d Adv. Sht. 23 (2d
Cir. 1984), withdrawn and replaced on reh'g, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed,
473 U.S. 934 (1985).
12. Marcos III, 862 F.2d at 1368-71 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
13. 642 F. Supp. 297 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
14. Id. at 299-300.
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version of events, the acts were not acts of the state, even though
Judge Lynch could not uphold liability against the Republic with-
out finding that the acts were acts of the state!' 5
Again, consider the variety of views of the act of state doc-
trine embraced in a single opinion by Circuit Judge Goldberg,
writing for a unanimous panel in Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A. 16 He
described the doctrine as both an "issue preclusion device" and
as a "super choice-of-law rule,"' 7 although his first mention of
the doctrine had sounded as if it served to deprive a court ofjuris-
diction.' 8 Judge Goldberg also found that the act of the Mexican
government in question was commercial regarding the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act,' 9 and yet noncommercial for the act of
state doctrine. 20 No wonder he referred to the doctrine as "an
airy castle." 2' 1
Finally, one can easily cite series of decisions in which a sin-
gle court, within a brief span of time, applied the act of state doc-
trine based on a view that the doctrine precludes a court from
exercising jurisdiction,2 2 that it requires a court to exercise juris-
diction and apply a particular rule of law, 23 or that it requires a
court to exercise jurisdiction while precluding it from reexamin-
ing the merits of particular issues. 24 One can multiply this with
citations to rulings by different judges of the same court indepen-
dently reaching inconsistent results through variant readings of
15. Id. at 301-03. Judge Lynch subsequently reversed himself and dis-
missed the claims on act of state grounds. Liu v. Republic of China, No. C-85-
7461 EFL (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 1987) (WESTLAW, 1987 WL 49413).
16. 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985).
17. Id. at 1113-14.
18. "Because we are barred under the act of state doctrine from inquiring
into the validity of acts of foreign states performed in their own territory[,] ...
we affirm the district court's dismissal of the present suit." Id. at 1105.
19. Id. at 1108-10. The relevant statutory language is found at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(2) (1982).
20. 764 F.2d at 1114-16.
21. Id. at 1113. The passage is quoted at supra note **
22. See, e.g., Marcos III, 862 F.2d at 1360; O.N.E. Shipping Ltd. v. Flota Mer-
cante Grancolombiana, S.A., 830 F.2d 449, 452 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 303 (1988); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank, 822 F.2d 230, 235-
36 (2d Cir. 1987); West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 827-28
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987); Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Doug-
las Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1046 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983); Inter-
national Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1358-61 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
23. See, e.g., Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola, 757 F.2d 516, 520
(2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 934 (1985); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America, 549 F.2d 597, 602 (9th Cir. 1976).
24. See, e.g., Marcos 11, 818 F.2d at 1482-85; Marcos I, 806 F.2d at 357-58.
[Vol. 35: p. I
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the act of state doctrine. 25 Nor has the Legal Adviser to the State
Department exhibited a steady grasp of the meaning or use of the
doctrine. 26
As a result, the doctrine resembles the proverbial elephant
described by a committee of the blind. Comparing almost any
few randomly selected cases involving the act of state doctrine
will quickly cause one to ask: is this a single theory, a related
group of theories, or a disparate collection of theories that have
nothing in common except that they happen, for reasons now be-
yond recall, to have been lumped under the label "act of state
doctrine?" No one, including the Supreme Court, has recently
attempted to describe, let alone explain, the doctrine as a whole.
While each partial explanation of recent years might reveal a par-
ticular truth for a specific use of the doctrine, each partial expla-
nation fails when one attempts to apply it to even closely related
uses.
Thus, few doctrines in American law are in such a state of
utter confusion as is the act of state doctrine. Confusion is so
complete that the doctrine does not necessarily have anything to
do with an act, 2 7 it does not serve only state interests, 28 nor would
anyone but a Supreme Court Justice have the temerity to label it a
doctrine. Consequently, the act of state doctrine continues as
"the most written-about topic in international law journals in this
25. Compare, e.g., Libra Bank v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp.
870 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (action not barred by the act of state doctrine) with Allied
Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola, 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (action
barred by the act of state doctrine), aff'd, 733 F.2d Adv. Sht. 23 (2d Cir. 1984),
withdrawn and replaced on reh 'g, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 934
(1985). The first Allied Bank decision has been described as creating "shock
waves throughout the U.S. international banking community." Rendell, The Al-
lied Bank Case and its Aftermath, 20 INT'L LAW. 819, 823 (1986); see generally
Bazyler, supra note 3, at 327-28, 344-6 1; Chow, Rethinking the Act of State Doctrine:
An Analysis in Terms ofJurisdiction to Prescribe, 62 WASH. L. REV. 397, 398-400, 446-
49 (1987); Ebenroth & Teitz, Winning (or Losing) by Default.- the Act of State Doctrine,
Sovereign Immunity and Comity in International Business Transactions, 19 INT'L LAW.
225, 229-32 (1985); Hoffman & Deming, The Role of the U.S. Courts in the Transna-
tional Flow of Funds, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 493 (1985); Note, The Act of
State Doctrine and Allied Bank, 31 VILL. L. REV. 291 (1986).
26. See Bazyler, supra note 3, at 362-65; Kirgis, Understanding the Act of State
Doctrine's Effect, 82 AM.J. INT'L L. 58 (1988); see also Antolok v. United States, 873
F.2d 369, 384 n. I1 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Justice Department argued simultaneously
that the act of state doctrine is an application of the political question doctrine
and a choice of law rule).
27. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 718-21 (1976)
(Marshal, J., dissenting), and cases cited there; see also infra § III(A) (4).
28. Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468 (1937); Ricaud v. American Metal Co.,
246 U.S. 304 (1918); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
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country." 29
Former Senator Mathias has described the pervasive confu-
sion as rooted in a failure of jurists, lawyers, and scholars to dis-
tinguish clearly between the act of state doctrine, foreign
sovereign immunity, and the political question doctrine. 30 His
analysis was correct as far as it went, but it overlooked the further
confusions of the act of state doctrine with doctrines of absten-
tion, choice of law, justiciability, recognition of judgments, the
role of international law in U.S. courts, and sovereign coercion. 3'
The consistent failure of the legal profession to grapple with
the act of state doctrine is exemplified by the recently completed
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,32
in the drafting of which the reporters simply ignored the confu-
sion surrounding the doctrine. Section 443 of the Restatement
(Third) merely recites the most traditional verbal formula for the
doctrine without any attempt to deal with its many purported ex-
ceptions or limitations. Some of these possibilities appear in the
comments or the reporters' notes, but virtually without evalua-
tion; the rest were ignored. Similarly, section 444 merely reports
the text of what was then the only act of Congress to address the
doctrine, with no attempt to analyze or evaluate its use by courts.
The reporters' cautious approach in the Restatement (Third)
served to minimize (but not eliminate) controversy over adoption
29. The International Rule of Law Act: Hearings on S. 1434 Before the Subcomm.
on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1981)
(statement of Davis R. Robinson, State Department Legal Adviser).
30. Mathias, supra note 3, at 375-81, 406; see also Cooper, Act of State and
Sovereign Immunity: A Further Inquiry, 11 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 193, 224-26, 228, 233-
36 (1980); Golbert & Bradford, The Act of State Doctrine: Dunhill and other Sabba-
tino Progeny, 9 Sw. U.L. REV. 1, 39-42 (1977); Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of
the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 805, 809-15 (1964); Leigh &
Sandier, Dunhill: Toward a Reconsideration of Sabbatino, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 685,
687, 709-10 (1976). In one case, the Supreme Court divided four ways, with the
four dissenters contending that the plurality went wrong by confusing the act of
state doctrine with foreign sovereign immunity. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc.
v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 725-28 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Black-
mun, Brennan, and Stewart, JJ.).
31. A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 170-73 (1962) [hereafter
EHRENZWEIG I]; 1 A. EHRENZWEIG & E. JAYME, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 128-
29, 157 (3 vols. 1967-1977) [hereafter EHRENZWEIG II]; 2 EHRENZWEIG II at 72-
75; R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL III, & R. FELIX, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 204 (4th
ed. 1986) [hereafter LEFLAR]; E. MOONEY, supra note 1, at 25-26; Cooper, supra
note 30 at 226-33; Golbert & Bradford, supra note 30, at 4-8, 18-24; Kirgis, supra
note 26; Leigh & Sandler, supra note 30, at 700-16; Mathias, supra note 3, at 385-
92.
32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL. LAW §§ 443, 444 (1987) [here-
after RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
[Vol. 35: p. I
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of its provisions on the act of state doctrine. 33 This cautious ap-
proach also virtually guaranteed early obsolescence for the re-
porters' efforts. By accepting this approach, the American Law
Institute abandoned any attempt to influence the further evolu-
tion of the doctrine. Some lawyers and scholars reacted to the
confusion by arguing that the act of state doctrine applies only to
foreign expropriations,3 4 but this is no more helpful-the doc-
trine originated in a nonexpropriation case, and it continues to be
applied to a broad spectrum of disputes.35
In sum, the act of state doctrine has become a cipher that
even its authors can no longer decode. To decipher its many con-
fusions, this article examines the full scope and effect of the doc-
trine. The article includes both the doctrine's history and its
present scope. Beginning with the doctrine's core expressions
from the Supreme Court, the article determines the function the
doctrine serves, so one can then determine which interpretations
of the doctrine ought to be continued, and which ought to be put
to rest. Thereafter, the article examines the numerous permuta-
tions found originally in lower courts or scholarly writings, but
which have increasingly infected the Supreme Court and acts of
Congress as well. The article will close with a brief examination
of the recent proposals for Congress to codify, and (perhaps) to
clarify, this flawed legal doctrine.
II. IN THE SUPREME COURT
The act of state doctrine is a creature of the Supreme Court.
Its decisions created the doctrine, they have reshaped it, and, with
the exception of two recent statutes of limited effect, the Court
has remained the ultimate source of law for this question. Thus
any serious study of the doctrine must focus on case law gener-
ally, and on the Supreme Court precedents in particular.
Various expressions resembling the act of state doctrine can
be traced in American cases at least as far back as Hudson v. Gues-
tier 36 in 1808. A plurality of the Supreme Court has argued for
33. See, e.g., Halberstam, Sabbatino Resurrected: The Act of State Doctrine in the
Revised Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 68 (1985);
Houck, Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised): Issues and
Resolutions, 20 INT'L LAW. 1360, 1374-75 (1986).
34. See, e.g., Bazyler, supra note 3, at 337; Houck, supra note 33, at 1374-75.
35. Note that only the Callejo case, of those discussed in the text thus far,
involved an expropriation, unless one stretches the concept considerably be-
yond its ordinary meaning.
36. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 293, 293-94 (1808); see also The Santissima Trinidad,
9
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the well-known case of Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon37 as the
source of the doctrine. 38 Some scholars have traced the idea in
English law back to 1674.39 Until 1897, however, these expres-
sions were all in cases involving suits against foreign sovereigns,
and thus could be taken as expressions of foreign sovereign im-
munity,40 rather than the modern act of state doctrine, as the doc-
trine does not depend on the suit being against the foreign state
itself. Between 1897 and 1990, the Court decided eleven cases
involving the modern doctrine.
A. Fuller's Curse Arises from a Venezuelan Revolution
The first use of the phrase "act of state" in its modern sense
by an American jurist is found in Underhill v. Hernandez.4 1 The
case grew out of a revolution in Venezuela in which one of the
revolutionary generals (Hernandez) seized the city where George
Underhill then resided. Underhill was the head of the municipal
waterworks. General Hernandez refused to allow Underhill to
leave for several weeks. After Underhill returned to the United
States, he sued Hernandez when Underhill learned that Her-
nandez was visiting here, bringing claims for wrongful confine-
ment, assault, and battery.
The district court dismissed the suit against Hernandez on
the basis of sovereign immunity; its decision was affirmed by the
circuit court.42 The Supreme Court might also have decided the
case on the basis that the suit in effect was against a foreign sover-
eign, of which Hernandez was still an official. 43 Instead, Chief
20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 336 (1822); l'Invincible, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 238, 253
(1816); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 230 (1796).
37. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 146 (1812).
38. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762
(1972) (plurality op. per Rehnquist, J.).
39. Blad v. Bamfield, 36 Eng. Rep. 992 (Ch. 1674). See sources cited supra
note 1.
40. This helps to explain the fairly frequent assertions that the act of state
doctrine originated as a corollary of foreign sovereign immunity. First Nat'l City
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762 (1972) (plurality op. per
Rehnquist, J.); Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola, 757 F.2d 516, 520
(2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 934 (1985); Libra Bank v. Banco Nacional de
Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870, 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); M. AKEHURST, A MODERN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 117 (5th ed. 1984).
41. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
42. Underhill v. Hernandez, 65 F. 577, 583 (2d Cir. 1895), aft'd, 168 U.S.
250 (1897).
43. Because of this possibility, several scholars have concluded that the act
of state doctrine in Underhill was mere dictum. Bazyler, supra note 3, at 330-33;
Chow, supra note 25, at 405; Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 52 AM. J. INT'L L.
[Vol. 35: p. I
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Justice Fuller, in a brief opinion for a unanimous court, expressed
the grounds for dismissal differently, thereby creating the classic
formulation of the act of state doctrine:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the inde-
pendence of every other sovereign state, and the courts
of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own territory.
Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be ob-
tained through the means open to be availed of by sover-
eign powers as between themselves. 44
Chief Justice Fuller did not say that a foreign sovereign can-
not be sued before an American court. Had he done so, he would
have based his opinion on sovereign immunity. Nor did he say
that American courts cannot hear cases involving acts by a foreign
state. By such a theory, he could have characterized the problem
as one of judicial abstention or justiciability. Rather, he said that
the validity of acts of a foreign state cannot be challenged in legal
proceedings in the American courts. This has come to be seen as
the act of state doctrine.
The short paragraph is remarkable, however, for the lack of
clarity of its ideas. Chief Justice Fuller defined neither the terms
used in the "rule" nor the policies behind it. Courts found the
terms ambiguous and the policies amorphous. Problems arose as
to: what is a "government;" 45 when does it "act;" 4 6 how does a
court "sit in judgment;" 47 and even what constitutes the "terri-
826, 830 (1959); Note, Rehabilitation and Exoneration of the Act of State Doctrine, 12
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 599, 603 (1980).
44. 168 U.S. at 252.
45. As in Underhill, this is largely a question of recognition. See Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 408-11 (1964); Millen Indus. v. Co-
ordination Council for N. Am. Affairs, 855 F.2d 879, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1988); KMW
Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 606 F.2d 10, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1979); United Bank
v. Cosmic Int'l, Inc., 542 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1976); Stroganoff-Scherbatoffv. Wel-
don, 420 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
46. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 690-95 (1976);
The Gul Djemal, 264 U.S. 90 (1924); Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S.
304 (1918); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Underhill v.
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897); see generally INT'L L. COMM'N, DRAFr CONVEN-
TION ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY, arts. 5-15, 1976 ILC REP. 171-74; INT'L L.
COMM'N REPORT ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY, [1973] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 189,
U.N. Doc. A/9010/Rev. 1.
47. Does this preclude an affirmative judgment either based on, or ignor-
ing, the foreign state's act? Does it preclude a judgment that the foreign state's
act violated U.S. public policy, international law, or some other standard? See
generally Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), discussed
11
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tory" of a state.48
Perhaps most importantly, the paragraph left uncertain the
functional nature of the act of state doctrine. 49 Some construed
the doctrine to be a "super choice-of-law rule."50 Others have
seen it merely as a poorly stated version of foreign sovereign im-
munity,51 or at least as derived from the sovereign immunity con-
cept. 52 Yet others have considered it a jurisdiction-denying rule
or a rule of judicial abstention akin to the political question doc-
trine.53 Finally, a few have seen it as a rule requiring resjudicata
effect to be given to decisions of a foreign government akin to the
obligation of full faith and credit for judgments within the United
States. 54
infra § II(D)(I). Many later disputes over the doctrine are rooted in disagree-
ments over the import of this phrase.
48. See, e.g., Menendez v. Favor, Coe, & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527, 537-
40 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (confiscation occurred in United States), rev'd on this point sub
nom. Menendez v. Saks, 485 F.2d 1355, 1364-65 (2d Cir. 1973) (confiscation
occurred in Cuba), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); see also Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A
Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F.2d 1196, 1203-05 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 928 (1979).
49. See infra § III.
50. See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 705 n.18,
726 (1976); First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 763
(1972) (plurality op. per Rehnquist, J.); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32,
§ 443 reporters' note 1; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN REL. LAw § 41 com-
ment c (1965); E. MOONEY, supra note 1, at 27-30; Chow, supra note 25, at 400-
11, 431-35, 447-77; Ebenroth & Teitz, supra note 25, at 228, 250; Golbert &
Bradford, supra note 30, at 18-20; Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollections in Tran-
quility, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175, 178 (1967); Kirgis, Act of State Exceptions
and Choice of Law, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 173, 178-80 (1972); McCormick, The Com-
mercial Activity Exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the Act of State Doctrine, 16
LAw & POL. IN INT'L Bus. 477, 494, 504 (1984).
51. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354,
1361 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); National Am. Corp. v.
Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd on other grounds, 597 F.2d
314 (2d Cir. 1979); French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 56, 242
N.E.2d 704, 711, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433, 443 (1968); E. MOONEY, supra note 1, at 22-
24; Mathias, supra note 3, at 372-73.
52. See, e.g., First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759,
762-63 (1972) (plurality op. per Rehnquist,J.); Cooper, supra note 30, at 193-94,
203-09, 233-35; Lengel, The Duty of Federal Courts to Apply International Law: A
Polemical Analysis of the Act of State Doctrine, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REV. 61, 62-63; Zander,
supra note 43; Note, supra note 43, at 600-03.
53. See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 715
(1976) (Powell,J., concurring); First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,
406 U.S. 759, 775-76 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1292 (3d Cir. 1979); Occidental of Umm al
Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928 (1979); Delson, The Act of State Doctrine-Judicial Deference
or Abstention?, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (1972).
54. EHRENZWEIG I, supra note 31, at 170-73; LEFLAR, supra note 31, at 203-
[Vol. 35: p. I
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Chief Justice Fuller was not only unclear as to the nature of
the rule he announced in Underhill, but he also managed to ex-
press several distinct policy bases for this new rule. His call "to
respect the independence of every other sovereign" sounded like
then current notions of "comity" between nations. 5 5 "Comity" is
the mutual deference to foreign public acts due between equal
sovereigns out of respect for each other's independence, rather
than out of obligation. 56 Obligation, it was thought, would re-
quire the subordination of one sovereign to the other. 57 The
phrase "is bound," on the other hand, suggests an obligation-in
this context apparently based on international law.58 The territo-
rial limitation also suggests that comity or international obliga-
tion underlies the act of state doctrine, although which is not
clear.
Chief Justice Fuller's reasoning in the first sentence of his
formulation of the act of state doctrine did not suggest the mod-
ern rationale of avoiding interference with the executive's con-
duct of foreign relations: are not foreign relations just as
embarrassed by judicial decisions as to the legality of acts by a
foreign state outside its territory?59 Yet his suggestion that ag-
grieved parties seek redress through diplomatic means brings one
back to deference to the executive in the conduct of foreign rela-
tions, and possibly to justiciability, abstention, and the avoidance
of political questions. 60
The remainder of Fuller's short opinion did nothing to clar-
ify its meaning. Most of the opinion dealt with whether the acts of
General Hernandez, participating in an as yet unsuccessful
04; E. MOONEY, supra note 1, at 25-26; Leigh & Sandler, supra note 30, at 702-05;
Note, supra note 43, at 601-05.
55. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895); see also First Nat'l City
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762 (1972); Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 408-12 (1964); E. MOONEY, supra note 1, at 10-
17; Chow, supra note 25, at 410-11; Lengel, supra note 52, at 63, 80, 84.
56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, § 403 reporters' note 2; see also M.
AKEHURST, supra note 40, at 15-16; I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 31 (3d ed. 1979); Yntema, The Comity Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 9
(1966).
57. But see Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 614
(9th Cir. 1976); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, § 403 reporters' note 2.
58. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 854-57, 859-69
(2d Cir. 1962), revd, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Cooper, supra note 30, at 228-31;
Leigh & Sandier, supra note 30, at 700-09.
59. The Supreme Court has taken the opposite view from that in the text.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-28, 431-32 (1964).
60. E. MOONEY, supra note 1, at 31-36; Delson, supra note 53; Jones, supra
note 1; Lengel, supra note 52, at 63-65.
13
Dellapenna: Deciphering the Act of State Doctrine
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1990
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
revolution against a government still recognized by the United
States when Underhill's confinement and assault occurred, were
acts of the state. After the success of the revolution, the United
States promptly recognized the new government-but not until
five days after Underhill was released. 6' ChiefJustice Fuller gave
retroactive effect to the recognition. He also concluded that Her-
nandez was not "actuated by malice or any personal or private
motive." 62 These two conclusions allowed him to attribute the
acts to the state.
ChiefJustice Fuller's Underhill opinion thus presaged virtually
all of the modern confusions that have grown up around the act
of state doctrine. In the ten cases the Supreme Court has since
decided under the doctrine, 63 the Court only succeeded in per-
petuating the confusions intrinsic to the ChiefJustice's opinion in
Underhill, or as two student commentators put it, "Fuller's
curse."
64
B. Judicial Consensus Confronts the Mexican Revolution
The first case after Underhill generally considered to involve
the act of state doctrine was American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co.65 The case grew out of competition among American corpo-
rations for the banana trade with several Central American repub-
lics. American Banana accused United Fruit of conspiring with
local governments to establish a banana monopoly in violation of
the Sherman Act. 66 The Court, through Justice Holmes, decided
61. 168 U.S. at 251. One commentator has concluded that the act of state
doctrine was purely a device for dealing with the prolonged political instability
of Venezuela in the late nineteenth century, with its resulting problems in sover-
eign immunity and choice of law, while avoiding any decision of the political
question of recognition of short-term governments. Gordon, The Origin and De-
velopment of the Act of State Doctrine, 8 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 595, 615 (1977).
62. Underhill, 168 U.S. at 254.
63. These were the six cases listed by the Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416-17 (1964), Sabbatino itself and three subsequent
opinions based on the doctrine: W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tec-
tonics Corp. Int'l, 58 U.S.L.W. 4140 (1990); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); and First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,
406 U.S. 759 (1972).
64. Note, supra note 43, at 604-05.
65. 213 U.S. 347 (1909). American Banana is considered an act of state case
largely because justice Harlan included it in his list of act of state cases in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416-17 (1964). Presumably, Jus-
tice Harlan included this case because it was the first to cite Underhill.
66. 213 U.S. at 353-55. Plaintiff's reliance on acts of a foreign government
prompted by the defendant prompted one commentator to see the case as a
prototype of the foreign sovereign compulsion defense. Timberg, Sovereign Im-
munity and Act of State Defenses: Transnational Boycotts and Economic Coercion, 55 TEX.
[Vol. 35: p. I
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only that the acts must be judged by the law of the nation in
whose territory the operative events occurred. 67
Justice Holmes' opinion in American Banana reads like a clas-
sic statement of vested rights choice of law theory.68 As neither a
foreign state nor a foreign official was a party to the suit, the case
was even more removed from sovereign immunity than Underhill,
which Justice Holmes cited only regarding the retroactive effect of
recognition. 69 Holmes did not use any language directly sug-
gesting the act of state doctrine. If American Banana is seen as an
act of state case, then it stands as a prime source of the belief that
the act of state doctrine is a choice of law rule. 70
The next cases involving the act of state doctrine grew out of
the Mexican Revolution of 1911. The Court considered and de-
cided several cases together in 1918, producing two brief opin-
ions by Justice Clarke. 71 Both decisions involved title to property
found in the United States-the first decisions to confront the in-
creasingly prominent act of state problem of expropriation of
property which has since figured in every Supreme Court act of
state case. The property involved had been seized by revolution-
ary forces and sold to private parties who brought the property to
the United States.
In Oetjen v. Central Leather Co. ,72 Justice Clarke referred to the
political nature of the problem and refused to permit the original
owner to reclaim his property. He found the act of state doctrine
to rest on "the highest considerations of international comity and
expediency."7 3 In the second case, Ricaud v. American Metal Co. ,74
Justice Clarke also referred to the political nature of the decision,
L. REV. 1, 22 (1976). In American Banana, however, the alleged compulsion went
the opposite way from the defense-from the private party to the foreign gov-
ernment (a "banana republic").
67. 213 U.S. at 355-57.
68. "[T]he general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act
as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where
the act is done." Id. at 356. This language was supported by citation to a single,
choice of law decision, Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904). This
view was recently endorsed by a unanimous Supreme Court. W.S. Kirkpatrick &
Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l, 58 U.S.L.W. 4140, 4142 (1990).
69. 213 U.S. at 357-58.
70. See Chow, supra note 25, at 405-09.
71. Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918); Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
72. 246 U.S. 297, 302-03 (1918).
73. Id. at 303-04. For an analysis of this theory in Oetjen, see Chow, supra
note 25, at 409-11.
74. 246 U.S. 304, 310 (1918).
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but drew from that observation quite a different conclusion. He
wrote that the act of state doctrine required a decision on the
merits of the dispute:
[T]hat the courts of one independent government will
not sit in judgment on the validity of the acts of another
done within its own territory . . . does not deprive the
courts of jurisdiction once acquired over a case. It re-
quires only that, when it is made to appear that the for-
eign government has acted in a given way on the subject-
matter of the litigation, the details of such action or the
merit of the result cannot be questioned but must be ac-
cepted by our courts as a rule for their decision. To ac-
cept a ruling authority and to decide accordingly is not a
surrender or abandonment ofjurisdiction but is an exer-
cise of it.75
This pair of opinions confirmed both retroactive application
of the doctrine to acts taken on behalf of what, albeit briefly,
emerged as an effective government, and the application of the
doctrine to proceedings solely between private parties in which
the private rights depended on the acts of a foreign state. Read
separately, each of Justice Clarke's opinions might present a co-
herent view of the doctrine. Read together, they do little to clar-
ify the uncertainties already attached to the doctrine.
The next decision after Oetjen and Ricaud arose from the af-
termath of the Mexican Revolution. Shapleigh v. Mier 76 entered
the American legal system because of a sudden shift in the course
of the Rio Grande that altered the international boundary be-
tween the United States and Mexico. Shortly before this shift,
land belonging to the defendants had been expropriated by Mex-
ico and conveyed to the plaintiffs as part of a general land re-
form. 77 All agreed that the shift in the boundary did not affect the
title between private parties. 78 Furthermore, the original owners
had already filed a claim for compensation before the United
States-Mexico International Claims Commission, established to
arbitrate claims between the two nations. 79
The parties conceded that the Mexican land reform decree
75. Id. at 309 (citations omitted).
76. 299 U.S. 468, 469-70 (1937).
77. Id. at 470-71, 473 n.*.
78. Id. at 470.
79. Id. at 471.
[Vol. 35: p. I
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would have to be applied if it were valid under Mexican law.8 0
Justice Cardozo, writing for a unanimous Court, dressed this con-
cession in language that sounded suspiciously like the act of state
doctrine. He cited the act of state cases in support of the proposi-
tion that Mexican law had to be applied if the Mexican land re-
form decrees were valid in Mexico. Justice Cardozo went on to
hold that the legality of those decrees could not be challenged in
an American court, but he left unclear whether the challenges he
ruled out were based on violation of American public policy, in-
ternational law, or something else. 8' He also referred to the
pending diplomatic and arbitral proceedings as more appropriate
fora for presenting the claims.
While Justice Cardozo's reasons for applying Mexican law
seemed to be a clear reference to the act of state doctrine, at sev-
eral points the opinion seemed just as clearly not to be any such
thing.8 2 The bulk of the opinion actually addressed whether the
Mexican land decree was valid under Mexican law.83 It is now
well-established that the validity of an act of a foreign state under
its own law is irrelevant to application of the act of state doc-
trine.8 4 Moreover, Justice Cardozo's reference to the law of the
situs as controlling,8 5 while rejecting application of international
law, is more suggestive of the vested rights approach to choice of
law than it is of the act of state doctrine. Even his phrasing of the
choice as mandatory could be merely the traditional deference to
the local sovereign regarding title to land-the so-called "land
taboo." 86
80. Id. This concession alone arguably renders everything in the opinion
dictum. E. MOONEY, supra note 1, at 25.
81. 299 U.S. at 471. For cases in which the act of state doctrine was not
applied to acts of an unrecognized government, and in which the court therefore
set aside the decree of that government as violating the forum's public policy,
see Vladikavkazsky Ry. Co. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N.Y. 369, 189 N.E. 456
(1934); M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679
(1933); Fred S. James & Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co., 239 N.Y. 248, 146 N.E.
369 (1925); Sokoloffv. National City Bank, 239 N.Y. 158, 145 N.E. 917 (1924).
See generally E. MOONEY, supra note 1, at 37-62.
82. The inclusion of this case in Justice Harlan's list of act of state cases in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416-17 (1964), perhaps
settles the matter.
83. 299 U.S. at 472-75.
84. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 415 n.17 (1964);
Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres S.A., 163 F.2d 246, 249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 722 (1947); Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d 438
(2d Cir. 1940); French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 53, 242 N.E.2d
704, 709, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433, 440-41 (1968).
85. 299 U.S. at 471.
86. See generally EHRENZWEIG I, supra note 31, at 209-13, 473-74, 478, 607-
17
Dellapenna: Deciphering the Act of State Doctrine
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1990
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
C. Consensus Breaks Down Confronting the Russian Revolution
In the 1920s and 1930s, a series of cases arose out of the
nationalizations of property by the Soviets after they seized power
in Russia. The property was located in the United States at the
time of the Revolution and continued to be held in favor of the
original owners until 1933 (when the United States at last recog-
nized the Soviet Government). In many cases, New York state
courts had rendered final decisions holding the Soviet national-
izations void as to property within the United States at the time of
the purported nationalization. 87 These decisions, along with the
unsettled claims of Americans for property in Russia that had
been seized by the Soviets, were among the major impediments
that delayed the American recognition for sixteen years after the
Bolshevik coup.
It was no surprise then that the American recognition, when
it finally came, included an agreement (the "Litvinov Agree-
ment") settling these claims. According to the Litvinov Agree-
ment, the United States retroactively recognized the validity of
the Soviet nationalizations even as to property within the United
States, with that property to be liquidated and the proceeds used
initially to pay claims by U.S. citizens for property in Russia lost in
the Revolution. The ensuing litigation produced the first divided
opinions in the Supreme Court concerning the act of state
doctrine. 88
The first of the Russian cases to reach the Supreme Court
16; 1 EHRENZWEIG II, supra note 31, at 48-49; 3 EHRENZWEIG II, supra note 31, at
56-57; LEFLAR, supra note 31, at 39-41, 128-31, 473-94; E. ScoLEs & P. HAY,
CONFLICT OF LAws 219-22, 451-56, 712-32, 931-32 (1982); R. WEINTRAUB, COM-
MENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 228-29, 412-60 (3d ed. 1986).
87. Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 286, 20
N.E.2d 758 (1939), aff'd sub. nom. United States v. Moscow Fire Ins. Co., 309
U.S. 624 (1940); Vladikavkazsky Ry. Co. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N.Y. 369,
189 N.E. 456 (1934); M. Salimoff& Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186
N.E. 679 (1933); People v. Russian Reinsurance Co., 255 N.Y. 415, 175 N.E. 114
(1931); Petrogradsky M.K. Bank v. National City Bank, 253 N.Y. 23, 170 N.E.
479, cert. denied, 282 U.S. 878 (1930); Joint-Stock Co. v. National City Bank, 240
N.Y. 368, 148 N.E. 552 (1925); Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 240 N.Y.
149, 147 N.E. 703 (1925); Fred S. James & Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co., 239
N.Y. 248, 146 N.E. 369 (1925); Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 239 N.Y. 158,
145 N.E. 917 (1924); see generally E. MOONEY, supra note 1, at 37-62.
88. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324 (1937). The emergence of divisions in the Supreme Court makes
the overlooking of these cases by several serious students of the act of state
doctrine, along with Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468 (1937), even more curious.
All three cases were included injustice Harlan's list of act of state precedents in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416-17 (1964). See, e.g.,
Bazyler, supra note 3, at 334-35; Chow, supra note 25, at 412, 420-21.
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was United States v. Belmont.8 9 The defendant challenged the valid-
ity of the Litvinov assignment to the United States. In this case,
there had been no final decision from a court prior to the Litvinov
assignment. Justice Sutherland wrote a brief opinion for the ma-
jority holding that the act of state doctrine, as federal law, dis-
placed any inconsistent state policy.90 Consistent with earlier act
of state decisions, he went on to hold that the recognition of the
Soviet Government retroactively validated the acts of that govern-
ment for American courts, entitling all the acts of that govern-
ment, from its effective creation, to the protection of the act of
state doctrine. 9'
Up to this point Justice Sutherland's opinion could hardly
have been less controversial, but he then announced that the pub-
lic policy of the United States could not be applied to a nationali-
zation of property owned by nationals of the nationalizing state
even when that property was within the United States. 92 He made
no explicit reference to the act of state doctrine in this part of his
opinion, basing his conclusion on the supposition that "our Con-
stitution, laws, and policies have no extraterritorial operation, un-
less in respect of our own citizens." 93
Justice Stone, joined by Justices Brandeis and Cardozo, dis-
sented from this refusal to apply our public policy to nationaliza-
tions when the property was located in the United States,
reasoning that to invoke United States public policy would not
involve extraterritorial application of the Constitution or laws of
the United States. 94 They concurred in the result on the grounds
that this issue was irrelevant to the decision of the case. 95 This
separate opinion does, however, raise considerable doubt
whether the actual decision really has anything much to do with
89. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
90. Id. at 327, 331. This holding should have made clear that the act of
state doctrine was not merely federal common law under Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 1 (1842), as this "common law" did not bind states. Nonetheless, some
still persist in seeing the status of the doctrine as unclear after Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), a status that purportedly was only settled by
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964). See, e.g., Chow,
supra note 25, at 412-16; Henkin, supra note 30, at 810.
91. 301 U.S. at 327-30.
92. Id. at 332-33.
93. Id. at 332; cf Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938)
(a foreign sovereign suing in American courts is subject to the local statute of
limitations in order to protect U.S. citizens).
94. 301 U.S. at 333-37 (Stone, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 337 (Stone, J., concurring).
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the act of state doctrine. 96
In United States v. Pink,9 7 the Court's divisions were much
more central to its decision. Factually, the Pink case is virtually
indistinguishable from the Belmont case, except that in Pink there
was a state court judgment which had become final through ex-
haustive appeals before the Litvinov Agreement. 98 After conclud-
ing that the Soviet laws were intended to have extraterritorial
effect, 99 Justice Douglas wrote a lengthy opinion on behalf of a 5-
2 majority. 0 0
Justice Douglas' opinion in Pink essentially retraced the rea-
soning of the Belmont decision. He declared that state policy on
nationalizations must give way before the federal policy embod-
ied in the Litvinov Agreement.' 0 He also held that the Belmont
case foreclosed the possibility of any relief in favor of the Russian
corporation. 0 2 As for the creditors whose rights were apparently
decided in the 1931 state judgment, Justice Douglas held that,
because they were foreigners, their rights were not protected
from being subordinated to the claims of the United States on its
own behalf and on behalf of Americans whose property in Russia
had been confiscated. 10 3
Justice Douglas had little to say about any case other than
Belmont that might have been applying the act of state doctrine.
He did cite Oetjen 104 and Underhill 105 for the retroactive effect of
recognition.' 0 6 He also quoted Oetjen out of context to support
the need for the supremacy of federal law in the field.' 0 7 Rather,
Justice Douglas focused on the power of the President to make an
agreement such as the Litvinov assignment overriding state laws,
policies, and judgments, declaring the authority "certainly is a
96. A point not made by those who choose to ignore these cases. See supra
note 87.
97. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
98. The case was People v. Russian Reinsurance Co., 255 N.Y. 415, 175
N.E. 114 (1931).
99. 315 U.S. at 217-21.
100. Justices Jackson and Reed did not participate. Id. at 234. Justice
Frankfurter concurred separately. Id. at 234-42. Harlan Fiske Stone (by then
ChiefJustice) dissented in an opinion joined by Justice Roberts. Id. at 242-56.
101. Id. at 221-26, 230-34.
102. Id. at 226.
103. Id. at 226-34; see also Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126
(1938).
104. See the text at supra notes 71-73.
105. See supra § HI(A).
106. 315 U.S. at 233.
107. Id.
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modest implied power of the President who is the 'sole organ of
the federal government in the field of international relations.' -10o1
Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion simply adds empha-
sis to the main lines of Justice Douglas' majority opinion. 0 9
Harlan Fiske Stone, who had become ChiefJustice since his sepa-
rate opinion in Belmont, vigorously dissented in an opinion joined
by Justice Roberts. They relied on Chief Justice Stone's concur-
ring opinion in Belmont to conclude that the parts of the case re-
lied on by the majority of the Court in Pink were mere dicta, and
set about to show that the dicta were wrong. 0
The ChiefJustice pointed out that the federal policy that dis-
placed state law vis-a-vis foreign creditors and claimants must
necessarily displace state law as to local creditors and claimants as
well." ' I He also noted that although recognition retroactively ac-
cepts the acts of the government in its own territory as acts of the
state from the time it began to assert de facto authority, 1 it did
not put the newly recognized government on any better footing
than any other recognized government whose laws would be en-
forced here only through comity, and not when those laws violate
local public policy."l 3
Chief Justice Stone accepted only two possible exceptions to
the conclusion that recognition did not vary the law to be applied
in our courts: (1) if the agreement of recognition clearly indi-
cated an agreement to change the laws applicable in our
courts;" 14 and (2) as to acts of the government within its own ter-
ritory (strictly speaking, the act of state doctrine)." 5 According
to the ChiefJustice, the transfer of Soviet claims to the U.S. gov-
ernment, and our assumption of a duty to report to the Soviets
the outcome of any litigation, provided no basis to imply intent to
change the law applicable to those claims. He considered it clear
that the claims were to be governed by the same law that would
have applied absent the assignment." 6 Furthermore, because the
property was located at all relevant times in the United States, not
108. Id. at 229 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 320 (1936)).
109. Id. at 234-42 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 242-45 (Stone, CJ., dissenting).
111. Id. at 248-49 (Stone, CJ., dissenting).
112. Id. at 251 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 245-53 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 252-54 (Stone, C.J., dissenting); accord Guaranty Trust Co. v.
United States, 304 U.S. 126, 143 (1938).
115. 315 U.S. at 244-47, 251-52 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 253-56 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
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in the U.S.S.R., he pointed to the earlier act of state cases to show
that the doctrine was not applicable.' 17
In sum, the six cases decided by the Supreme Court during
the first fifty years of the act of state doctrine produced a "doc-
trine" that was already a rather amorphous policy of deference to
acts of a foreign state in its own territory, and perhaps outside
that territory. The Court had left the proper theoretical basis of
the doctrine unclear. Nor had the Court offered any attempt to
define what acts qualified as "acts of state." Finally, the Pink case
threw into doubt the previously announced territorial limitation
on the doctrine.
D. Confusion Becomes Chaos Confronting the Cuban Revolution
The next round of act of state decisions grew out of the na-
tionalizations by Cuba's revolutionary government of American
assets in Cuba. Of the many lawsuits that ensued in the United
States, three reached the Supreme Court presenting questions
about the act of state doctrine. Each case merely left the doctrine
in a state of greater confusion.
1. Sabbatino
The first of these cases, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino," 1 8
is still, in the view of many, the leading case on the act of state
doctrine. 19 Sabbatino arose from Cuba's nationalization of Amer-
ican-owned assets with only an illusory prospect for compensa-
tion, in retaliation for reductions in the quota for Cuban sugar
exports to the United States.' 20 At the time, a ship being loaded
with sugar was in a Cuban harbor under a contract for sale to
Morocco.' 2 1 Cuban agencies arranged for the sale to Morocco to
go through, making the arrangements through the same broker,
Farr, Whitlock & Co. (Farr), as had arranged the original sale on
behalf of the prior owners, Compania Azucarera Vertientes-Ca-
maguey de Cuba (C.A.V.).1 22
Upon receiving the money for the sugar, Farr confronted
117. Id. at 245 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
118. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
119. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, § 469 comments a-d,
reporters' note 2; Bazyler, supra note 3, at 335; Comment, The Act of State Doctrine
and Foreign Sovereign Defaults on United States Bank Loans: A New Focus for a Muddled
Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 470, 475 (1985).
120. 376 U.S. at 401-03.
121. Id. at 401, 403-04.
122. Id. at 401, 404-05.
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claims for payment both on behalf of the Cuban government and
on behalf of C.A.V.' 23 State court maneuvers brought about the
appointment of Peter Sabbatino as receiver for C.A.V. 124 Banco
Nacional, acting on behalf of the Cuban government, filed suit
against Farr in federal court. Farr paid the funds into court, invit-
ing Sabbatino to defend.' 25 The procedural complexities of the
case continued to grow throughout its life, but the basic facts
were not altered by such events as the termination of the receiver-
ship by the state court, the refusal of the federal courts to sub-
stitute C.A.V. for Sabbatino, and other complicating
developments. ' 26
Sabbatino knew enough about the act of state doctrine that
he did not challenge the Cuban takings as a violation of local pub-
lic policy. Rather he argued that the takings were void because
they violated international law. The lower courts agreed, holding
that the Cuban takings were invalid because the takings were not
for a public purpose, they were discriminatory, and Cuba had
made no provision for prompt, adequate, and effective compensa-
tion. 127 In a famous opinion by Justice Harlan, an eight Justice
majority applied the act of state doctrine and determined that
U.S. courts could not question the validity of the Cuban expropri-
ations even if the taking had violated international law.
Justice Harlan quickly concluded that our government still
recognized Cuba despite having broken off diplomatic rela-
tions, 1 28 and that the takings had occurred in Cuba.' 29 He then
reviewed the history of the act of state doctrine, concluding that
the doctrine was neither a rule of international law, nor to be im-
plied from the inherent nature of sovereign authority. 30 He also
concluded that the doctrine was not commanded by the
Constitution. 13'
Justice Harlan then concluded that the act of state doctrine
123. Id. at 405-06.
124. Id. at 406.
125. Id. at 406-07.
126. Id. at 407-08.
127. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375, 384-86
(S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
128. 376 U.S. at 409-12.
129. Id. at 413-15.
130. Id. at 416-23; see also E. MOONEY, supra note 1, at 165-77. Louis Hen-
kin, who later served as Reporter for the Restatement (Third), immediately ob-
jected that Justice Harlan was too hasty in rejecting international law as the basis
for the doctrine. See Henkin, supra note 30, at 819.
131. 376 U.S. at 423.
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had "constitutional underpinnings" arising out of the separation
of powers in our system of government. 132 The doctrine is neces-
sary, he concluded, to permit the executive to conduct the foreign
relations of the United States properly. 3 3 Given the peculiarly
federal nature of this interest, he easily concluded that the doc-
trine must be a matter of federal common law binding-in both
federal and state courts.'1 34 Turning at last to the crux of the mat-
ter, Justice Harlan addressed the question of when the act of state
doctrine should be applied to validate the acts of a foreign state:
If the act of state doctrine is a principle of decision
binding on federal and state courts alike but compelled
by neither international law nor the Constitution, its
continuing vitality depends on its capacity to reflect the
proper distribution of functions between the judicial and
political branches of the Government on matters bearing
upon foreign affairs. It should be apparent that the
greater the degree of codification or consensus concern-
ing a particular area of international law, the more ap-
propriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions
regarding it, since the courts can then focus on the appli-
cation of an agreed principle to circumstances of fact
rather than on the sensitive task of establishing a princi-
ple not inconsistent with the national interest or with in-
ternational justice. It is also evident that some aspects of
international law touch much more sharply on national
nerves than do others; the less important the implica-
tions of an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker
the justification for exclusivity in the political branches.
The balance of relevant considerations may also be
shifted if the government which perpetrated the chal-
lenged act is no longer in existence .... for the political
interest of this country may, as a result, be measurably
altered. Therefore, rather than laying down or reaffirm-
ing an inflexible and all-encompassing rule in this case,
we decide only that the Judicial Branch will not examine
132. Id. At this point one might begin to nod in agreement with one stu-
dent who described Justice Harlan's opinion as "somewhat cryptic." Comment,
Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the Act of State Doctrine: The Need for a Commercial[sic]
[Comity?] Exception to the Commercial Act Exception, 17 U.S.F. L. REV. 763, 767
(1983).
133. 376 U.S. at 423-25.
134. Id. at 424-27. Why this should be an issue after Pink and Belmont is
unclear. See supra note 90.
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the validity of a taking of property within its own terri-
tory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and rec-
ognized by this country at the time of suit, in the absence
of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding
controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges
that the taking violates customary international law.' 35
This paragraph lays down the Sabbatino balancing test. Jus-
tice Harlan never explained just how a court is to conduct this
balancing process. In Sabbatino itself, he concluded that there was
no clear rule as to the validity of expropriations under customary
or other international law. 136 In an attempt to avoid embarrass-
ing the State Department, Justice Harlan simply announced that
the act of state doctrine required the Supreme Court to treat the
taking as valid regardless of whether it violated customary inter-
national law.' 37 Finally, Justice Harlan found irrelevant that the
challenge to the validity of the Cuban taking arose as a
counterclaim.138
Justice White vigorously dissented from the refusal to apply
international law to assess the validity of the Cuban acts.' 39
While he agreed that the act of state doctrine was not a direct rule
of international law, he considered it a corollary of the customary
international law setting forth jurisdiction to prescribe. 40 If this
premise is correct, it would seem appropriate that acts would not
be entitled to the protection of the act of state doctrine if they
violated other rules of international law. 14 1 He concluded that
there is a rule of international law that prohibits takings that are
retaliatory, discriminatory, and without proper compensation. 42
Justice White argued that to refuse to decide the validity of
the Cuban acts was to decide a case on a basis other than the
135. 376 U.S. at 427-28.
136. Id. at 428-3 1. The emphasis Justice Harlan placed on this point has
been traced back to Falk, Toward a Theory of the Participation of Domestic Courts in the
International Legal Order: A Critique of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 16
RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1961). See also R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 64-114 (1964) [hereafter FALK I]; Bazyler,
supra note 3, at 336; Kline, An Examination of the Competence of National Courts to
Prescribe and Apply International Law: The Sabbatino Case Revisited, 1 U.S.F. L. REV.
49, 81-93 (1966).
137. 376 U.S. at 431-37.
138. Id. at 437-39.
139. Id. at 439-72 (White, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 445-47 (White, J., dissenting); see generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 32, §§ 401-416.
141. 376 U.S. at 447-50 (White, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 457-61 (White, J., dissenting).
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applicable law.' 43 He recognized that such a decision could em-
barrass the executive branch in the conduct of foreign affairs, but
argued that the Court should apply the usual standards for treat-
ing an issue as a political question: while the conduct of foreign
affairs is textually committed by the Constitution to the executive
branch, the adjudication of claims under ascertainable legal stan-
dards is not. 144 Furthermore, to decline to declare the Cuban tak-
ings void embarrassed the executive branch when that branch had
consistently denounced the Cuban takings as being in violation of
international law.' 45 Justice White would accommodate the inter-
est in preventing embarrassment to the conduct of foreign rela-
tions by deferring to a direct request from the State Department
that courts not pass on the validity of a foreign expropriation or
other act of state-he admitted that it was unclear in the Sabbatino
case whether there was any such request. 146
2. After Sabbatino
The Sabbatino decision became, and continues to be, the fo-
cus of considerable controversy. 47 Congress reversed the pre-
cise holding of the case by adoption of the "Sabbatino" or
"Hickenlooper" amendment. 148 The amendment, and attempts
of the executive branch to influence courts on the act of state doc-
143. Id. at 450-56 (White, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 461-62 (White, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 462-67 (White, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 467-72 (White, J., dissenting). The majority concluded that
there was no such request, although the lower courts had construed the State
Department's documents as requesting the courts not to refrain from judging
the validity of the Cuban acts. Id. at 419-21.
147. See R. FALK, THE AFTERMATH OF SABBATINO (1965); R. FALK, THE STA-
TUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1970) [hereafter FALK III]; E. MOONEY,
supra note 1, at 73-160; Bazyler, supra note 3, at 335-38; Cooper, supra note 30;
Domke & Henkin, Act of State: Sabbatino in the Courts and in Congress, 3 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 99 (1965); Golbert & Bradford, supra note 30; Goldie, The Sabba-
tino Case: International Law Versus the Act of State, 12 UCLA L. REV. 107 (1964);
Halberstam, supra note 33; Henkin, supra note 30; Henkin, supra note 50; Jones,
supra note 1; Kirgis, supra note 50; Leigh & Sandier, supra note 30; Lengel, supra
note 52; Lillich, The Proper Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order, II
VA. J. INT'L L. 9 (1970); Mazaroff, An Evaluation of the Sabbatino Amendment as a
Legislative Guardian of American Private Investment Abroad, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
788 (1969); McCormick, supra note 50; Reeves, The Sabbatino Case and the Sabba-
tino Amendment: Comedy--or Tragedy-of Errors, 20 VAND. L. REV. 429 (1967); Ste-
venson, The'State Department and Sabbatino-"Ev 'n Victors Are by Victories Undone,'
58 AM. J. INT'L L. 707 (1964); Note, supra note 43.
148. Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. 89-171,
§ 620, 79 Stat. 653 (1965) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982)). The
amendment was applied in Sabbatino on remand sub nom. Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
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trine, largely failed.' 49 Attorneys continued to raise the act of
state doctrine in a variety of contexts. Two of these cases, both
involving Cuban expropriations of American property, reached
the Supreme Court, only to confirm the ever deepening confu-
sion surrounding the doctrine.
The first, First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,150
involved the nationalization of American-owned banks in Cuba.
City Bank set about to recoup its losses by liquidating bonds be-
longing to Banco Nacional and applying the proceeds to the
amount City Bank claimed on loans to, and for its property in,
Cuba. When Banco Nacional brought suit over the bonds, a State
Department letter indicated that it would not be embarrassed if
the courts were to judge the validity of the acts of the Cuban
state.15 1
The Court split hopelessly, producing four opinions, with the
largest bloc being the four Justices in dissent. Based on the ra-
tionale that the act of state doctrine served to facilitate the execu-
tive's conducting of foreign relations, a three Justice plurality, in
which Chief Justice Burger and Justice White joined an opinion
by Justice Rehnquist, concluded that the State Department's let-
ter advising against application of the doctrine removed any im-
pediment to judging the validity of the foreign act of state.' 52
Failing to persuade a majority, they went on to suggest that the
act of state doctrine did not apply to counterclaims against the
foreign state.' 53 Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion,
thought the implied waiver of sovereign immunity from the for-
eign state's filing of the suit should control. 154 Justice Powell con-
curred, but took the view that the State Department's letter and
the counterclaim were both irrelevant; rather, he concluded that
the potential embarrassment to the conduct of foreign relations
was not enough to raise the problem to the level of a political
question. 155
149. See generally Comment, Foreign Expropriation Cases in the United States:
Conflicting Legislation and Judicial Policies, 17 U.S.F. L. REV. 117 (1982). See infra
§ IV(B)(5).
150. 406 U.S. 759, 760-61 (1972) (plurality op. per Rehnquist,J.).
151. Id. at 764.
152. Id. at 764-70.
153. Id. at 768-69. Note that Sabbatino had involved a counterclaim, and the
Court there had rejected any notion of a "counterclaim exception." 376 U.S. at
437-39. This discrepancy was not discussed by the plurality.
154. 406 U.S. at 770-73 (Douglas, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 773-76 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell's view differs
from the plurality in that he believed that courts should independently deter-
27
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Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and Stewart joined a dissenting
opinion by Justice Brennan. 156 They argued vigorously that the
balancing test that Justice Harlan had announced in Sabbatino ap-
plied to this case and determined all issues in favor of Cuba.
They specifically rejected virtually every point asserted in each of
the three opinions that together constituted the majority.
Four years later, the Supreme Court decided Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Cuba. 157 Dunhill arose when the Cuban government
nationalized cigar manufacturers in Cuba, appointing "in-
terventors" to manage the businesses. 158 In order to maintain
their sources of supply, American importers paid to the in-
terventors monies owed for pre-intervention shipments. When
the former owners, having fled to the United States, sued the im-
porters here for the monies due on cigars imported before inter-
vention, the importers sought to set-off their liability to the
present owners against the monies owed for post-intervention
shipments. Cuba was allowed to join in the suits to claim the
money; Dunhill and the other importers counterclaimed for their
set-offs, which in Dunhill's case exceeded the amount it owed to
Cuba.
Dunhill appeared to be the perfect case for the Supreme
Court to re-examine and clarify the act of state doctrine. The
Legal Adviser to the State Department took a strong, official, and
public stand in favor of rethinking of the doctrine. 159 Given that
there was something of a tradition of deference to executive de-
terminations regarding the doctrine, 160 many expected the
Supreme Court to follow this suggestion to develop a new con-
cept of the act of state doctrine sensitive to the modern realities
of large scale state trading. 16'
The inability, however, of more than four Justices (and those
mine the answer to this question; he opposed relying on the judgment of the
State Department.
156. Id. at 776-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
157. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
158. Id. at 684-86. Why this word was not translated as "intervenors" is
not explained. Perhaps it was to avoid confusion with those who simply inter-
vene in a law suit.
159. Letter from Monroe Leigh, State Department Legal Adviser, to the
Solicitor General (Nov. 26, 1975), reprinted in Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 706-11.
160. See, e.g., Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-
Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954) (the act of state doctrine will not be
applied if the President certifies that the judging act will not embarrass the con-
duct of foreign relations); 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982) (the act of state doc-
trine is not applicable in some cases unless the President requests it).
161. The Supreme Court specifically asked for argument in Dunhill on
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four, as in City Bank, in dissent) to agree with any particular ap-
proach indicated the near total collapse of coherent understand-
ing of the act of state doctrine. 62 The Justices again produced
four opinions largely reflecting the divisions in City Bank.' 63 This
time the various opinions embraced no less than seven different
theories, with both the plurality opinion (by Justice White, joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist), and the dissent
(by Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and
Stewart) embracing more than one theory in the elusive search
for a majority.
The plurality's first theory was that an act of a foreign state
would only be protected by the act of state doctrine if it took
place within the territory of the foreign state. 164 The second the-
ory (which was also joined by Justice Stevens) was that these acts
by foreign officials were not acts of the state, although the Justices
did not specify which circumstances brought them to this conclu-
sion.' 65 The plurality's final theory was that the act of state doc-
trine would not protect commercial acts by a state. 166
In a separate opinion, Justice Powell reiterated his view that
the doctrine really involved allocating responsibility among the
branches of government which should properly be resolved
through the political question doctrine. 167 The dissenters put
forth two theories: (1) that Cuba's acts were protected by what
might be termed the "pure theory" of the act of state doctrine-
whether Sabbatino ought to be reconsidered. 422 U.S. 1005 (1975); see also Gol-
bert & Bradford, supra note 30, at 1; Leigh & Sandier, supra note 30, at 686.
162. One student aptly described the resulting confusion as "legal anar-
chy." Comment, supra note 132, at 788; see also Note, First National City Bank v.
Banco para el Commercio Exterior de Cuba: Act of State and Choice of Law Aspects
of Suing Foreign Governmental Corporations, 9 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 147, 151
(1983). The confusion could not help but generate a massive literature which
does little to clarify matters. In addition to those sources already cited, see also
EHRENZWEIG I, supra note 31, at 170-73; 2 EHRENZWEIG II, supra note 31, at 73-
75; 3 EHRENZWEIG II, supra at 25-26; LEFLAR, supra note 31, at 203-07; Conant,
The Act of State Doctrine and its Exceptions: An Introduction, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 259 (1979); Crockett, Extraterritorial Expropriations, 13 IND. L. REV. 655 (1980);
Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976); Swan, Act
of State at Bay: A Plea on Behalf ofthe Elusive Doctrine, 1976 DUKE L.J. 807 (1976).
163. See the text at supra notes 150-56.
164. 425 U.S. at 687, 689 n.l I (plurality op. per White,J.), 716-18, 721-22,
729-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also infra § IV(A)(2).
165. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 690-95 (plurality op. per White, J.), 715 (Stevens,
J., concurring), 718-23 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also infra § IV(A)(I).
166. 425 U.S. at 695-706 (plurality op. per White, J.), 724-30 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); see also infra § IV(B)(1).
167. 425 U.S. at 715 (Powell, J., concurring), 726-27 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing); see also infra § III(B).
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which contemplates no exceptions as such to the doctrine, requir-
ing a case-by-case balancing of the factors identified by Justice
Harlan in the Sabbatino decision; 168 and (2) that a "counterclaim
exception," created by City Bank, had only limited application in
Dunhill.169 And finally, lurking in several places in these opinions
is the well-known Bernstein (executive suggestion) exception. 170
Given the consistent lack of clarity regarding the act of state
doctrine from its inception, 17 1 one should not be too critical of a
decision like Dunhill. While doing nothing to improve the tradi-
tion, it usefully brought into focus the different approaches possi-
ble to the act of state doctrine. Struggling out of the morass was
not made any easier by a Supreme Court that refused to consider
the act of state doctrine for thirteen years after Dunhill was de-
cided, perhaps because of the very confusion its earlier opinions
have generated.
The consistent refusal by the Supreme Court to tackle seri-
ously the act of state doctrine left the bench and the bar to grap-
ple uncertainly with each theory, whether supported by one or
another Supreme Court Justice, lower courts, or non-judicial
opinion. In the Court's most recent act of state case, W.S. Kirkpat-
rick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. International,172 the Court
evaded these problems by finding that the act of state doctrine
was not even involved in the case. In so doing, the Court only
assured that Fuller's doctrine will remain "Fuller's curse."173
III. WHAT PURPOSE DOES THE DOCTRINE SERVE?
Section II of this article reviewed the progressively growing
confusion in the Supreme Court cases dealing directly with the
act of state doctrine, including the DunhiU 174 case in which the
Court produced four opinions supporting no less than seven ver-
sions of the doctrine. This plethora of theories, however, pro-
duced an extraordinary result: six of the seven theories were
rejected by a clear majority of the Court.175 With such a state of
168. 425 U.S. at 715-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also infra § III(A)(3).
169. 425 U.S. at 730-37 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also infra § IV(B)(2).
170. See especially 425 U.S. at 724-25 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also infra
§ IV(B)(4).
171. See supra § II(A).
172. 58 U.S.L.W. 4140 (1990).
173. See Note, supra note 43, at 604-05.
174. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682
(1976). See the text at supra notes 157-72.
175. The only theory apparently accepted by all Justices was the territorial
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near judicial anarchy at the top, it is no surprise to find cases from
lower courts which support each of these theories and several
more. Additionally, lawyers and scholars have proposed other
exceptions that might yet catch on in the courts.
Some of these theories, whether supported by a faction of the
Supreme Court or not, propound narrow exceptions or limita-
tions to an otherwise absolute doctrine. Others attempt to pro-
vide a flexible and comprehensive approach to the doctrine as a
whole. There is at present no way of predicting with certainty
which theories ultimately will prevail. Only a complete reevalua-
tion of the doctrine by the Court could possibly resolve these con-
fusions and make the doctrine a workable tool for furthering its
avowed purposes. Until the Court is ready or able to do so, we
are left to struggle with a doctrine that changes shape with each
change in emphasis on the multifarious functions it is said to per-
form, until one can scarcely recognize the numerous versions of
the doctrine as having a real relation to each other. 76
With so many exceptions, limitations, and theories compet-
ing for application under the act of state doctrine, anyone consid-
ering the doctrine must resort to some general theory to warrant
a particular choice. These general theories purport to explain
how the doctrine functions and what purposes it serves. This part
of the article will consider the four major theories advanced to
answer these questions, ranked roughly in their order of popular-
ity with judges, lawyers, and scholars.
A. Is the Doctrine a Rule of Abstention?
Among judges, lawyers, and legal scholars, the most popular
understanding of the function of the act of state doctrine is that it
requires some form of abstention from the exercise of judicial
competence.' 77 Proponents of the abstention theory relate it to
limitation. See infra § IV(A)(2). On the problem of the authority of plurality
opinions, see .Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80
COLUM. L. REv. 756 (1980).
176. These confusions are rooted in a grafting together of the inconsistent
general policies said to underlie the act of state doctrine. See Bazyler, supra note
3, at 327-28; Chow, supra note 25, at 399-400, 446-47; Ebenroth & Teitz, supra
note 25, at 231; Kirgis, supra note 26, at 60-61; see also Bandes v. Harlow &Jones,
Inc., 852 F.2d 661, 666 (2d Cir. 1988).
177. "Judicial competence" is a synonym for "subject matter jurisdiction"
in the sense of the classes of cases which may properly be brought before a
court. See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 485 n.5
(1983);J. DELLAPENNA, supra note ***, § 2.1.
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one or more of four specific grounds for barring a court's compe-
tence or for a court declining to exercise competence:
(1) directly, as a rule of abstention; 78
(2) as a special rule of foreign sovereign immunity; 179
(3) for lack of justiciability; 180 or
(4) under the political question doctrine.' 8 '
The notion that the act of state doctrine requires some form
of abstention results from three features that are frequently found
in cases under the doctrine. The first is the language in which the
doctrine is expressed. Second is that the doctrine frequently re-
quires the dismissal of a suit without regard to its merits. Finally,
there is the peculiar perspective involved in applying the doctrine
in antitrust cases.
The act of state doctrine has always been expressed in terms
178. See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697
(1976) (plurality op. per White, J.); First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de
Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 775-76 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); Philippines v.
Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1360 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1933 (1989);
O.N.E. Shipping Ltd. v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 830 F.2d 449,
452-53 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 303 (1988); West v. Multibanco
Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 827-28 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906
(1987); Riedel v. Bancam, S.A., 792 F.2d 587, 592 (6th Cir. 1986); Abourezk v.
Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1070 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 1 (1987); Cal-
lejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1112-13 (5th Cir. 1985); Ramirez de
Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1533-34 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on
other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,
595 F.2d 1287, 1292-93 (3d Cir. 1979); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68,
74 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977); see also Bazyler, supra note 3, at 334,
384-85; Mathias, supra note 3, at 372.
179. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354,
1361 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 617 F.2d 1248, 1254 n.21 (7th Cir. 1980); Pons v.
Cuba, 294 F.2d 925, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 960 (1962); see
also Bazyler, supra note 3, at 385; Ebenroth & Teitz, supra note 25, at 230-32.
180. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank, 822 F.2d 230,
235-36 (2d Cir. 1987); West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 827
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987); Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344,
356-57 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 480 U.S. 942, cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1048
(1987); International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1359-61 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio
Algom Ltd., 617 F.2d 1248, 1254 (9th Cir. 1980); Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v.
Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48, 51-55 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903
(1980); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 605-08 (9th Cir.
1976); United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155, 629 P.2d 231
(1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 901 (1981); see also Chow, supra note 25, at 421-23;
Kirgis, supra note 26, at 59; Laylin, Justiciable Disputes Involving Acts of States, 7
INT'L L. 513 (1973); Note, Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A.: The Need for a Commercial
Activity Exception to the Act of State Doctrine, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 413, 413
(1985).
181. See infra § III(B).
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that sound as if courts will not exercise their competence. Chief
Justice Fuller's classic statement of the doctrine included the
phrase "the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of the government of another."' 82 This phrasing has been
repeated over the years, sometimes more elaborately, but without
significant change.' 83 Judges and lawyers naturally construe
phrases like courts will "refrain from examining" or "refrain from
sitting in judgment" as commands of judicial abstention or deni-
als of competence. One need only explain why and how.
When a complaint can succeed only if a court determines that
an act by a foreign state was invalid, the act of state doctrine re-
quires the court to dismiss the suit. 184 By itself, this dismissal no
more suggests a lack of competence or abstention than any other
for failure to state a cause of action. The frequency of such dis-
missals, however, when combined with the language of the doc-
trine 8 5 and knowledge that the dismissal does not bar further
proceedings in third countries to challenge the validity of the
original act, 186 reinforces the notion that application of the doc-
trine is not a decision on the merits, but rather is a refusal to
exercise competence.
Finally, in federal courts judicial competence is often pecu-
liarly interwoven with the substantive legal basis of the litiga-
tion-as when federal judicial competence depends on a federal
question. 87 The pattern is particularly pronounced for antitrust
litigation in which the issue of the court's competence and the
issue of choice of law are intertwined, and depend on whether the
parties or transactions are within the prescriptive jurisdiction of
182. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). See the text atsupra
note 44 for a more complete quotation.
183. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, § 443(1):
In the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement re-
garding controlling legal principles, courts in the United States will
generally refrain from examining the validity of a taking by a foreign
state of property within its "own" territory, or from sitting in judgment
on other acts of a governmental character done by a foreign state
within its own territory and applicable there.
184. See, e.g., Friedar v. Israel, 614 F. Supp. 395, 399-400 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
MOL, Inc. v. Bangladesh, 572 F. Supp. 79, 85-86 (D. Or. 1983), aff'd on other
grounds, 736 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984).
185. See Halberstam, supra note 33, at 74.
186. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, § 443 comment f.
187. See, e.g., Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970); Incres
S.S. Co. v. International Maritime Workers Union, 372 U.S. 24 (1963); McCul-
loch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marinaros, 372 U.S. 10 (1963); Romero v. Interna-
tional Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345
U.S. 571 (1953).
33
Dellapenna: Deciphering the Act of State Doctrine
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1990
34 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35: p. 1
federal antitrust laws. 188 Thus, any dismissal of an antitrust com-
plaint based on the act of state doctrine is usually expressed as a
dismissal for lack of a federal question-i.e., for lack of judicial
competence. 89
The abstention theories of the act of state doctrine appear to
have solid foundations. Yet, there are insuperable difficulties
with these views. One cannot account for at least two significant
classes of act of state cases by an abstention theory: the applica-
bility of the doctrine to proceedings in state courts; and those
cases in which the doctrine is held to require a court to enter af-
firmative relief. Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that the doctrine is not a denial or refusal of competence,
but a decision on the merits.' 90 Finally, jurists have developed
analyses of abstention theories of the doctrine only for political
188. The assumption in antitrust cases is that if a court can hear the case, it
will apply its own law, and if the court cannot apply its own law, it cannot hear
the case. See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977); Ameri-
can Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357-58 (1909); Mannington
Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1292-93 (3d Cir. 1979);
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 605-08 (9th Cir.
1976); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir.
1945); EHRENZWEIG I, supra note 31, at 561-62; 1 EHRENZWEIG II, supra note 31,
at 158; 3 EHRENZWEIG II, supra note 31, at 85-88; Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 AM. J. INT'L L.
257, 276-80 (1981). For the difficulties these assumptions create, compare
Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) with British Airway Bd.
v. Lake Airways, [1983] 3 W.L.R. 544 (Ch.), revd, [1984] 3 W.L.R. 413 (H.L.),
and compare United States v. Imperial Chemical Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504
(S.D.N.Y. 1951) with British Nylon Spinners Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Indus.,
[1953] Ch. 19 (C.A. 1952), [1955] Ch. 37 (C.A. 1954). So strong are these as-
sumptions that federal antitrust laws are not enforced in state courts. See, e.g.,
General Investment Co. v. Lakeshore & M.S.R.Y., 260 U.S. 261 (1922); Young v.
Seaway Pipeline, Inc., 576 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Okla. 1978); Matuszak v. Houston
Oilers, Inc., 515 S.W.2d 725, 729 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
189. O.N.E. Shipping Ltd. v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, 830 F.2d
449, 452-53 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 303 (1988); International Ass'n
of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1358-62 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1163 (1982); Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of
Petroleum, 577 F.2d 1196, 1201-03 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928
(1979); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Co., 550 F.2d 68, 72-73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
984 (1977); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus., 513 F. Supp. 1100,
1193-95 (E.D. Pa. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd,
475 U.S. 574 (1986); General Aircraft Corp. v. Air Am. Inc., 482 F. Supp. 3, 6
(D.D.C. 1979); Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1323-24
(D. Conn. 1977); see also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 617 F.2d
1248, 1254 (7th Cir. 1980); Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d
48, 51-55 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980); Dominicus Americana
Bohio v. Gulf& Western Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680, 687-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Out-
board Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384, 397-99 (D. Del. 1978).
190. See infra § III(C).
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questions, and these analyses have proven to be neither helpful
nor easy to apply.
As a rule of federal law, the act of state doctrine has always
been at least implicitly supreme over state law and applicable in
state courts in any appropriate case. In 1937, the Supreme Court
made this explicit. 19' Today the supremacy of the act of state
doctrine over state law is axiomatic. 92 Yet, federal law normally
determines the competence only of federal courts, leaving state
law to determine the competence of state courts. If the doctrine
is based upon limitations of competence peculiar to federal
courts, as in antitrust cases, then it cannot be relevant to proceed-
ings in state courts.
In some cases, including several prominent in the history of
the act of state doctrine, the Court did not simply dismiss a suit
based on the doctrine, but held the doctrine to require a judg-
ment of affirmative relief in favor of the party claiming through
the foreign state.193 Affirmative relief would be impossible if the
doctrine's function was to preclude exercise of competence or
even to permit a court to choose to decline to exercise its
competence.
Application of the act of state doctrine in state courts, while
suggesting problems with competence restricting views, is not
conclusive as to those views. The problem of affirmative relief is.
Furthermore, the abstention theories have not provided stan-
dards for application of the doctrine. Only for the political ques-
tion form of these theories has any jurist attempted to develop
analytical standards beyond merely repeating the formal language
of the doctrine itself. This form of the abstention theories thus
merits a closer look.
191. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-32 (1937); see also Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 424-27 (1964); United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 222-23, 230-34 (1942).
192. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, § 443 comment g; United Nu-
clear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155, 629 P.2d 231 (1980), cert. de-
nied, 451 U.S. 901 (1981); Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460,
463 N.E.2d 5, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984); Weston Bank-
ing Corp. v. Turkiye Garanti Bankasi, A.S., 57 N.Y.2d 315, 442 N.E.2d 1195,
456 N.Y.S.2d 684 (1982); Lucchino v. Foreign Countries, 82 Pa. Commw. 406,
476 A.2d 1369 (1984), vacated on other grounds after removal, 631 F. Supp. 821
(E.D. Pa. 1986).
193. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964);
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324 (1937); Halberstam, supra note 33, at 74-75. In two of the most recent
Supreme Court act of state cases, Dunhill and City Bank, all Justices recognized
that, if the doctrine applied, affirmative relief would have to be ordered in favor
of the foreign state.
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B. Does the Doctrine Involve Political Questions?
The political question doctrine is a special instance ofjudicial
abstention from the exercise ofjurisdiction. 194 The failure of the
concept of the act of state doctrine as a rule of abstention then
must ultimately doom the concept of the doctrine as a special ap-
plication of the political question doctrine. Yet Justice Powell, in
two recent Supreme Court decisions on the doctrine, insisted that
the doctrine simply expresses the judicial abstention due political
questions.195 Justice Powell's idea is not so esoteric as his isola-
tion on the Supreme Court might seem to suggest.1 96 Some have
seen the political question theory as embedded in the classic for-
mulation of the doctrine in Underhill v. Hernandez;197 others have
found the comity theory announced in Oetjen v. Central Leather
Co. 198 to be based on the political question notion.
Ultimately, viewing the act of state doctrine as an application
of the political question doctrine is firmly rooted in what the
Supreme Court in recent years has come to see as the function of
the doctrine: avoidance of interference with ("embarrassment
to") the conduct of foreign relations by the executive branch. 99
Most pointed of the few recent critics of the embarrassment to
194. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002-03 (1979) (Rehnquist,J., con-
curring); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 449-51 (1939); see also P. STRUM, THE
SUPREME COURT AND "POLITICAL QUESTIONS": A STUDY IN JUDICIAL EVASION 2
(1974); Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
(1988); Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75
YALE L.J. 517, 596 (1966). A few commentators have argued that the political
question doctrine should be seen as a rule of decision rather than as a rule of
abstention. Champlin & Schwarz, Political Question Doctrine and Allocation of Foreign
Affairs Power, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 215, 231-39 (1985); Henkin, supra note 162.
195. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 715 (1976)
(Powell, J., concurring); First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406
U.S. 759, 773-76 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
196. The four Justices who dissented in Dunhill and City Bank apparently
endorsed the political question theory in 1972, but abandoned it by 1976. Com-
pare First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 787-88
(1972) (Brennan,J., dissenting) with Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425
U.S. 682, 726-28 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
197. 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). See the text at supra notes 44 & 53.
198. 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabba-
tino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-28 (1964); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229-30
(1942); Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 308-09 (1918); the text at
supra notes 55-58, 72 & 73.
199. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697-98 (plural-
ity op. per White, J.), 715 (Powell, J., concurring), 726-28 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (1976); First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 763-
68 (plurality op. per Rehnquist, J.), 774 (Powell, J., concurring), 777-78, 787-88
(Brennan,J., dissenting) (1972); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 423-25 (1964).
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foreign relations rationale is Senator Mathias, who described that
rationale as the "most confounding ...advanced in support of
the act of state doctrine." 200 He did not, however, specifically
criticize the political question theory.
Not surprisingly, the political question theory is more popu-
lar with lower courts and legal authors than interpretations of the
doctrine which had broader support in the Supreme Court. 20'
While the political question theory charges courts to avoid inter-
ference with the functioning of the political branches of govern-
ment, it vests responsibility in the courts to decide when to defer
to the supposed interests of the executive branch, rather than, as
under the executive suggestion (Bernstein) exception or the Hick-
enlooper Amendment, leaving that decision to suggestions by the
executive branch.20 2 On the other hand, Monroe Leigh and
Michael Sandler argued that the political question theory reverses
the usual presumption that courts are not to judge the validity of
acts of foreign states. 20 3 Yet, in invoking the act of state doctrine,
courts all too often have simply labeled the issue a political ques-
200. Mathias, supra note 3, at 400-01; see also Bazyler, supra note 3, at 337
(describing this theory as "broad ruminations"--i.e., dictum); Conant, supra note
162, at 264-65; Note, Adjudicating Acts of State in Suits Against Foreign Sovereigns: A
Political Question Analysis, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 722, 742-43 (1983).
201. See, e.g., Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1360-61 (9th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1933 (1989); Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344,
356-59 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 480 U.S. 942, cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1048
(1987); Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1116-17 (5th Cir. 1985); Ra-
mirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1511-15 (D.C. Cir. 1984), va-
cated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985); Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1046-49 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849
(1983); International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1358-59 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn,
Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F.2d 1196, 1201-05 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928 (1979); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 28-29 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 619-27
(D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Bazyler, supra note 3, at 389-
92; Champlin & Schwarz, supra note 194; Chow, supra note 25, at 435-38; Jones,
supra note 1, at 465-79; Comment, supra note 132, at 768, 780, 789-96; Note,
supra note 200.
202. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 773-74
(1972) (Powell, J., concurring); see also Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 623-27
(D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Champlin & Schwarz, supra
note 194, at 231-39; Chow, supra note 25, at 436; Cooper, supra note 30, at 224-
26; Comment, supra note 132, at 792-96; Note, supra note 200, at 740-46; cf.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120 (1976). For the Bernstein exception, see infra
§ IV(B)(5). For a discussion of the Hickenlooper Amendment, see infra § IV(C).
203. Leigh & Sandler, supra note 30, at 699-700. Monroe Leigh was the
Legal Adviser of the State Department whose memorandum to the Supreme
Court failed to convince a majority in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba,
425 U.S. 682, 706-11 (1976). See the text supra notes 158-63.
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tion without bothering to explain how or why the label was
applied.
20 4
Surprisingly, then, some commentators have concluded that
the political question doctrine holds the promise of narrowing the
application of the act of state doctrine, and also of making its ap-
plication more certain. 20 5 This could only happen if courts were
to advance beyond the classic political question doctrine to devise
more specific standards than are usually articulated when that
doctrine is invoked. Those courts that have considered the point,
however, have predictably adopted the standards announced in
the classic political question cases-particularly Baker v. Carr.206
The criteria for a nonjusticiable political question are that:
(1) the Constitution commits the issue to a "political"
(non-judicial) branch of the government; or
(2) a court could not decide the issue without a policy
determination involving nonjudicial discretion; or
(3) a court cannot resolve the issue without expressing
disrespect for the coordinate branches of government;
or
(4) there is an unusual need for unquestioning adher-
ence to a political decision already made; or
(5) multiple pronouncements by various departments
of government create potential embarrassment to the or-
derly processes of government. 20 7
Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Goldwater v. Carter,20 8 a
204. See, e.g., Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1514-15
(D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985); International
Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976); Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d
438, 442 (2d Cir. 1940); The Amoco Cadiz, 491 F. Supp. 161, 169 (N.D. Ill.
1979); Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp.
1291, 1299 (D. Del. 1970).
205. Goldbert & Bradford, supra note 30, at 43-44; Comment, Act of State
and Sovereign Immunities Doctrines: The Need to Establish Congruity, 17 U.S.F. L. REV.
91, 125 (1982).
206. 369 U.S. 186 (1962),followed in: Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabba-
tino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964); Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
705 F.2d 1030, 1046 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983); Occidental of
Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F.2d 1196, 1203
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928 (1979).
207. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217.
208. 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring),followed in Northrop
Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1046 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 849 (1983).
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case not involving the act of state doctrine, defined similar stan-
dards. Justice Powell's shorter (and even more vague) questions
are worth quoting both because he alone on the Supreme Court
supports the political question theory of the act of state doctrine,
and because he was writing in a case involving foreign relations.
His questions were:
(1) Does the issue involve the resolution of questions
committed by the text of the Constitution to a coordi-
nate branch of Government?
(2) Would resolution of the question demand that a
court move beyond areas of judicial expertise?
(3) Do prudential considerations counsel against judi-
cial intervention? 209
With criteria as vague as those set forth in Baker and Goldwa-
ter, even the most careful analysis usually could reasonably lead to
several conclusions. 2t 0 Only a few issues, such as foreign political
boundaries or the recognition of foreign governments, are easily
classifiable as political questions under these criteria. 21' Thus lit-
tle is gained from conflating the two doctrines, but something is
lost.
Abandoning the classic act of state doctrine in favor of a
political question doctrine obscures the true role of the act of
state doctrine, which, properly understood, is a special kind of
rule of decision, not a rule of abstention.2 1 2 While one can argue
that the political question doctrine is also misunderstood when
209. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. at 998 (Powell, J., concurring).
210. See, e.g., tel-Oren v. Libya, 726 F.2d 774, 796 (Edwards, J., concur-
ring), 803 n.8 (Bork, J., concurring) (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003
(1985).
211. For cases discussing boundaries as political questions, see Occidental
of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F.2d 1196,
1201-05 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928 (1979); Occidental Petroleum
Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 103-04 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd
mem., 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972). For cases dis-
cussing recognition as a political question, see Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S.
996 (1979); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942); United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937); Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S.
304, 309 (1918); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918); Un-
derhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 253-54 (1897).
212. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l, 58
U.S.L.W. 4140, 4142-43 (1990); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425
U.S. 682, 705 n.18 (plurality op. per White, J.), 715 (Stevens, J., concurring),
726-28 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (1976); see also Ricaud v. American Metal Co.,
246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918).
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thought of as a rule of abstention rather than a rule of decision'2 1 3
one should not further confuse the act of state doctrine with dis-
putes on the true nature of the political question doctrine. Such
obfuscation merely serves to hide a court's evasion of its duty to
decide, on the basis of law, the cases brought before it.214 Nor
does conflating the act of state doctrine with the political question
doctrine necessarily resolve the problem of possible embarrass-
ment to the executive's conduct of foreign relations.
The executive branch would be just as embarrassed by a
court refusing to pass on the legality of an act the executive has
declared a violation of international law as by a court declaring
the act valid, because the court in the former case is declaring that
there are no legal standards to be applied.2 15 Embarrassment can
only be avoided if courts are bound by the position espoused by
the executive branch, and not simply by a suggestion on whether
to decide the case.2 16 For courts to determine, on a case-by-case
basis, whether to decide a dispute involving acts of a foreign state
condemns us to having the validity of an act of a foreign state turn
on a frankly political decision that courts are ill-equipped to
make.2 17 Such an approach politicizes the judiciary in precisely
the way all Justices of the Supreme Court have insisted that the
doctrine should prevent. 218
213. Champlin & Schwarz, supra note 194, at 231-39; Henkin, supra note
162.
214. Cf Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1984):
Our national policy reflects, if anything, a reexamination of Sabbatino,
rather than a political consensus for its transformation into a jurisdic-
tional bar through its indiscriminate amalgamation with the analogous
but similarly questionable device of judicial abstention. Absent some
guidance to the contrary from the political branches, the present cir-
cumstances do not justify a refusal to perform the duty to adjudicate.
215. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-37
(1964). Former Senator Mathias described this as "the 'apogee' of'[t]he confu-
sion between the doctrines of act-of-state and political questions.' " Mathias,
supra note 3, at 380.
216. As is true for political boundaries or governmental recognition. See
supra note 211.
217. See, e.g., Philippines v. Marcos, 818 F.2d 1473, 1486-88 (9th Cir.
1987), rev'd on other grounds in reh 'g en banc, 862 F.2d 1355 (1988), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 1933 (1989); KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10, 16-
17 (2d Cir. 1979); Leigh & Sandier, supra note 30, at 697-700. But see Comment,
supra note 132, at 788-96; Note, supra note 7, at 96-101; Note, supra note 200, at
740-46.
218. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 696-98 (plural-
ity op. per White, J.), 715 (Powell, J., concurring), 726-28 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (1976); First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 765-
66 (plurality op. per Rehnquist, J.), 773-76 (Powell, J., concurring), 782-90
(Brennan,J., dissenting) (1972); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
[Vol. 35: p. I
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One can only avoid the difficulties of the abstention theories
generally, and the political question theory in particular, by treat-
ing the act of state doctrine as a special rule of decision shaped by
important concerns of national and international policy. To do
so, one must not only eschew seeing the act of state doctrine as a
rule of abstention, but also to treat the political question doctrine
as a distinct, albeit related, theory, with its own task to perform:
as a rule of abstention in favor of the political branches of govern-
ment. Three courts have followed this approach. 219
C. Is the Doctrine a "Super Choice-of-Law" Rule?
The Supreme Court has repeatedly, recently, and nearly
unanimously characterized the act of state doctrine as a rule of
decision on the merits under what Louis Henkin has termed a
"super choice-of-law rule." 220 This view has proven almost as
popular with lower courts and others as seeing the doctrine as
involving a political question orjudicial abstention on some other
basis.22' The Supreme Court's apparent adoption of the choice
398, 423-24, 431-33 (1964); Comment, supra note 132, at 763-65, 767-68, 780,
793; Note, supra note 200, at 744-45.
219. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1511-15, 1533-43
(D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985); Northrop Corp.
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1046-49 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 849 (1983); International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354,
1358-59 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); see also Buttes Gas &
Oil Co. v. Hammer, [1981] 3 W.L.R. 787, 804-06 (H.L.).
220. Seven Justices joined in statements that the act of state doctrine is a
choice of law rule, and not a rule of judicial abstention, in Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 705 n.18 (plurality op. per White, J.), 726-
28 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (1976). See also First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Na-
cional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 763 (1972) (plurality op. per Rehnquist,J.); Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 418, 439 (1964); Ricaud v. Ameri-
can Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918). For Professor Henkin's views, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, § 443 reporters' note 1; Henkin, supra note
50.
221. See, e.g., Randall v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 778 F.2d 1146, 1153 (5th Cir.
1985); Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1114 (5th Cir. 1985); Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Fernandez, 741 F.2d 355, 360 n.16 (11 th Cir. 1984);
Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F.2d
1196, 1200 n.4 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928 (1979); Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 602 (9th Cir. 1976); PerezJimenez v.
Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 557 n.6 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914
(1963); see also Bazyler, supra note 3, at 333-44 (confusingly expressing choice of
law theory and abstention theory simultaneously); Chow, supra note 25; Crock-
ett, Choice of Law Aspects of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 14 LAw &
POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 1041, 1053-54 (1983); Ebenroth & Teitz, supra note 25, at
228, 250; Golbert & Bradford, supra note 30, at 15-20; Halberstam, supra note
33, at 74-75; Kahale, Characterizing Nationalizations for Purposes of the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act and the Act of State Doctrine, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 391, 394
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of law theory of the act of state doctrine would seem to settle the
matter, permitting one to disregard cases in which a court de-
scribed the doctrine as a rule of abstention as based on miscon-
struction of the relevant authorities.
The choice of law approach would explain why the doctrine
displaces state law even in state courts, and why the doctrine
sometimes requires a court to order affirmative relief for the party
claiming through the foreign state.22 2 The approach does not
contradict the frequent dismissals for failure to state a cause of
action; and, given the intertwining of competence ("subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction") and substantive law issues in antitrust, it does
not contradict dismissals for lack of competence under federal an-
titrust laws. 223
Viewing the act of state doctrine as a compulsory choice of
law rule thus is superficially appealing. Such a view requires a
court to exercise its competence within the familiar framework of
ordinary choice of law rules, circumscribed only by certain special
preclusions to challenges to the validity of the "acts" of a foreign
state. In the context of territorially defined vested rights choice
of law analysis, the doctrine simply precludes a court from apply-
ing such ordinary escape devices as reference to the whole law of
the foreign state (renvoi), characterization of an issue as proce-
dural, or (most importantly) reference to the forum's public
policy. 22 4 The view also fits neatly with the seldom used "neoter-
ritorialist" approach to choice of law.2 25
(1983); Kirgis, supra note 50, at 178-80; Kirgis, supra note 26; McCormick, supra
note 50, at 494-504; Singer, supra note 1, at 30 1-10.
222. See the text at supra notes 190-93.
223. See supra notes 184-89.
224. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 436-37 (1964); see
generally Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953) (sub-
stance/procedure); Casanova Club v. Bisharat, 189 Conn. 591, 458 A.2d 1
(1983) (public policy); In re Schneider's Estate, 198 Misc. 1017, 96 N.Y.S.2d 652
(Sur. Ct. 1950) (renvoi); RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934); J. BEALE,
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935); EHRENZWEIG I, supra note 31, at 326-46; 1
EHRENZWEIG II, supra note 31, at 113-68; LEFLAR, supra note 31, at 11-13, 143-45,
204, 255-63, 331-37, 363-78, 407-23; R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 86, at 46-85,
292-315, 323-27, 362-77; Dolinger, World Public Policy: Real International Public
Policy in the Conflict of Laws, 17 TEX. INT'L L.J. 167 (1982); Egnal, The "Essential"
Role of Modern Renvoi in the Governmental Interest Analysis Approach to Choice of Law,
54 TEMP. L.Q. 237 (1981).
225. See generally Chila v. Owens, 348 F. Supp. 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); First
Nat'i Bank v. Rostek, 182 Colo. 437, 514 P.2d 314 (1973); Neumeier v. Kuehner,
31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972); Cipolla v. Shaposka,
439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970); D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS
(1965); 1 EHRENZWEIG II, supra note 31, at 68-69; LEFLAR, supra note 31, at 275-
77, 385-88; E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 86, at 28-30, 572-73, 593-606; R.
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Viewing the act of state doctrine as a compulsory choice of
law rule does not sit so well, however, with the interest analysis
approach to choice of law.2 26 Renvoi, procedural characteriza-
tion, and public policy play no role as escape devices in interest
analysis properly understood. 227 Nor can a court undertake an
interest analysis without a searching examination and comparison
of the policies and interests of the forum, the foreign state, and
any other interested state. 228 This is precisely the sort of inquiry
that the act of state doctrine seeks to prevent.22 9
WEINTRAUB, supra note 86, at 8-9, 327-33; Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism and
Professor Cavers-The Pennsylvania Method, 9 Duo. L. REV. 573 (1971); Twerski,
Nuemeier v. Kuehner: Where Are the Emperor's Clothes?, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 104
(1973).
226. Ebenroth & Teitz, supra note 25, at 250; Comment, The Continued Via-
bility of the Act of State Doctrine in Foreign Branch Bank Expropriation Cases, 3 AM. U.J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 99, 137-40 (1988). For modern interest analysis, see generally
Barnes Group, Inc. v. C & C Prods., Inc., 716 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir. 1983); Rosen-
thai v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973); Babcock
v.Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Gutierrez
v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979); Lichter v. Fritsch, 77 Wis. 2d 178, 252
N.W.2d 360 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971); B.
CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONFLICTS OF LAWS (1963); E1HRENZWEIG I, supra
note 31, at 348-52, 458-90; 1 EHRENZWEIG II, supra note 31, at 57-74, 97-98,
100-03, 115-21, 204-07, 229-30; 3 EHRENZWEIG II, supra note 31, at 12-42; LE-
FLAR, supra note 31, at 264-73, 288-305, 378-93, 423-29; E. SCOLES & P. HAY,
supra note 86, at 16-42, 565-82, 587-94, 632-52, 656-65; R. WEINTRAUB, supra
note 86, at 6-11, 315-23, 333-61, 377-411.
227. Tomlin v. Boeing Co., 650 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1981); Henry v. Rich-
ardson-Merrell, Inc., 508 F.2d 28 (3d Cir. 1975); Hossler v. Barry, 403 A.2d 762
(Me. 1979); Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973); Pfau v.
Trent Aluminum Co., 55 N.J. 511, 263 A.2d 129 (1970); Dym v. Gordon, 16
N.Y.2d 120, 128, 209 N.E.2d 792, 796, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463, 469 (1965), overruled
on other grounds, Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E,2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d
519 (1969).
While Daniel Chow correctly concluded that the act of state doctrine does
not work well with interest analysis choice of law, he completely misconceived
what it means to describe the doctrine as a choice of law rule. He assumed that
the doctrine could only function to preclude escape devices, and not to mandate
directly the law to be chosen. He thus argued that the doctrine cannot even be
applied unless the court first determines that, under relevant choice of law theo-
ries, the foreign state's law is to be applied. Chow, supra note 25, at 431-35.
228. See, e.g., Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157,
583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978); Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d
313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 214, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976); Hurtado
v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974);
Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969);
Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963);
Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964).
229. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697 (1976) (plu-
rality op. per White, J.); First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406
U.S. 759, 765-67 (plurality op. per Rehnquist, J.), 782-85 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (1972); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423-25, 431-
33, 436-37 (1964).
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Careful analysis of the compulsory choice of law view thus
reveals that the act of state doctrine so conceived simply does not
relate meaningfully to modern approaches to choice of law.
Thus, either the design of the doctrine has become obsolete as
approaches to choice of law have changed, or the model of the
doctrine as a compulsory choice of law rule is seriously flawed.
That this choice of law theory is seriously flawed is also shown by
other features of the doctrine, whose incompatibility with the
choice of law theory antedates the revolution in choice of law
theory.
First among the long-standing traditions of the act of state
doctrine inconsistent with viewing it as a compulsory choice of
law rule is the tradition that the doctrine does not apply to gen-
eral lawsY 30 This conclusion might be implied from the title of
the doctrine itself-which suggests that an act, and not a law, is
the necessary prerequisite to invoking the doctrine. Some au-
thorities carry this constraint further, holding that the doctrine
does not apply to judgments from courts of foreign states that
simply apply a state's general laws to the interests of private par-
ties,2 31 or to public laws that have not been implemented by acts
of states.2 32 As the doctrine's application to judgments involving
public law questions is at least open to question,2 33 just what
"laws" the doctrine compels a court to apply remains remarkably
unclear.
Furthermore, the act of state doctrine precludes inquiry into
the legality of the act under the law of the foreign state.2 34 Fear
230. See, e.g., Randall v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 778 F.2d 1146, 1153 (5th Cir.
1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN REL. LAW 41 comment d (1965);
Note, Acts of State and the Conflicts of Laws, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 234 (1960).
231. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 608 (9th Cir.
1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN REL. LAW § 41 comment d (1965).
232. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN REL. LAW § 41 comment 1 (1965).
233. Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD), supra note 32, § 443 reporters' note 10.
234. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 415 n.17 (1964);
Philippines v. Marcos, 818 F.2d 1473, 1482-85 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd en banc on
other grounds, 862 F.2d 1355 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1933 (1989); West v.
Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 828-29 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 482
U.S. 906 (1987); Randall v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 778 F.2d 1146, 1153 (5th Cir.
1985); Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres S.A., 163 F.2d 246, 249 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 722 (1947); Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d
438, 444 (2d Cir. 1940); Liu v. Republic of China, 642 F. Supp. 297 (N.D. Cal.
1986); New York Land Co. v. Philippines, 634 F. Supp. 279, 289 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344 (2d Cir.
1986), cert. dismissed, 480 U.S. 942, cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987); Bandes v.
Harlow & Jones, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 955, 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 852 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1988); Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf &
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of offending the foreign officials who form the state's govern-
ment, and deference to their greater capacity to determine the
effect of their own laws, might be perfectly sound reasons for de-
clining to examine the legality of the acts of those officials. This
cannot, however, be a serious attempt to apply the law of their
state: how can a rule compel a court to apply the law of a particu-
lar state, and then bar inquiry into what that law is? Only slightly
less puzzling is the idea of a choice of law rule that compels a
court to decline to apply international law when all agree that in-
ternational law, although sometimes not entirely settled, is the
proper law of the case. 23 5
Finally, if the act of state doctrine is a compulsory choice of
law rule, then a decision under the doctrine is a judgment on the
merits. Such a judgment creates a claim to recognition in the
courts of other countries which generally will be honored. 236 Yet
it is well-established that a judgment dismissing a claim because
of the act of state doctrine is not conclusive on a proceeding
brought elsewhere that involves the validity of the act which was
the basis of the judgment in the United States.23 7
D. The Doctrine as a Rule of Repose
The analysis of the asserted purposes of the act of state doc-
Western Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Eastern States Petro-
leum Corp. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 28 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); French
v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 53, 242 N.E.2d 704, 709, 295
N.Y.S.2d 433, 440-41 (1968); see also INT'L L. COMM'N, DRAFT CONVENTION ON
STATE RESPONSIBILITY, arts. 10, 1976 ILC Rep. 173 [hereafter ILC DRAFT CON-
VENTION]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, § 443 comment d; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN REL. LAw § 41 comment f (1965).
Some courts recently evaded this stricture by concluding that the allega-
tions that the acts in question were illegal under the state's law amounted to
challenging whether the acts were acts of the state. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531,
1546 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
The act of state doctrine does not prevent a court from interpreting the
scope and effect of the act or law involved. See Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhat-
tan Bank, 660 F.2d 854, 861-62 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982);
Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706, 713-14
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968); Reavis v. Exxon Corp., 90 Misc. 2d
980, 987-88, 396 N.Y.S.2d 774, 779-80 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Comment, supra note
226, at 109-10. A court must perform such interpretation gingerly, to say the
least, to avoid running afoul of the strictures of the doctrine. See Note, The Har-
vest of Sabbatino: Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 8 N.C.J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 87, 93 (1982).
235. Compare Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)
with Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
236. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, § 491 reporters' notes 6 & 7.
237. Id. § 469 comment f.
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trine thus far has demonstrated that the doctrine speaks neither
to the jurisdiction of courts nor to the applicable law. What pur-
pose does the doctrine serve? Justice Clarke provided a pointed
answer on behalf of a unanimous Supreme Court when he wrote
that the doctrine "requires ... that, when ... the foreign govern-
ment has acted in a given way on the subject-matter of the litiga-
tion, the ... merit of the result cannot be questioned but must be
accepted by our courts as a rule for their decision." 238 Rather
than requiring or permitting a court to refuse to hear a case, the
doctrine actually functions as a rule of special deference to spe-
cific exertions of state power similar in effect to a judgment by a
court in that the state decision (an "act" if you will) precludes
fresh inquiry into issues decided by that decision. In short, the
doctrine is a rule of repose. 239
The earliest English case generally cited as authority for the
act of state doctrine involved the judgment of a foreign court. 240
And some have seen Underhill v. Hernandez24' (the first act of state
case in the United States) as Chief Justice Fuller's attempt to re-
store the traditional view that a judgment by a foreign court car-
ried out within the territory of the foreign state was conclusive
against the whole world. 242 By this view, the Chief Justice indi-
rectly attained the point of his dissent two years earlier from a
decision where the Supreme Court held that judgments from for-
eign courts were not entitled to conclusive effect except to the
238. Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918). Note that a
companion decision on the same day contained no similar language. See Oetjen
v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918). See generally the text at supra notes
72-75. See also W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l,
58 U.S.L.W. 4140, 4142-43 (1990).
239. EHRENZWEIG I, supra note 31, at 170-73; 1 EHRENZWEIG II, supra note
31, at 128-29, 157; 2 EHRENZWEIG II, supra note 31, at 72-75; LEFLAR, supra note
31, at 204; E. MOONEY, supra note 1, at 25-26; E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 86,
at 982-87; Leigh & Sandier, supra note 30, at 702-05; Note, supra note 43, at 600-
06; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, introductory note to
Ch. 3, at 100 (1971).
240. Blad v. Bamfield, 36 Eng. Rep. 992 (Ch. 1673). The case that ex-
tended this principle to the acts of a foreign executive is still controversial in
England. See Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover, 2 H.L. Cas. 1 (1848);
Jones, supra note 1, at 437-40; Singer, supra note 1, at 284-85, 289-91. The
cross-fertilization between the courts of England and the United States in devel-
oping the act of state doctrine seems clear, but curiously was usually not ac-
knowledged by courts at the time. Jones, supra note 1, at 439-43; Singer, supra
note 1, at 291.
241. 168 U.S. 250 (1897); see generally supra § II(A).
242. For this traditional view, see H. HERMAN, THE LAw OF ESTOPPEL AND
RES JUDicATA 576 (1886); The Mary, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 126, 144 (1815); Wil-
liams v. Armroyd, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 423 (1813); Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 241, 269 (1808); Cammell v. Sewell, 5 Hurl. & N. 728 (Ex. Ch. 1860).
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extent our courts chose to accord that effect out of comity243 -a
basis riddled with exceptions and easily set aside.
Under this binding recognition view, the act of state doctrine
functions as a sort of international full faith and credit clause.
Like the Constitution's full faith and credit clause, the doctrine
has little to do with the recognition or enforcement of laws. 244
Rather, it is principally applicable to specific decisions applying
law to situations within the decision-making authority of a foreign
state-to "acts," whether executive, legislative, or judicial.245
If the purpose of the doctrine is to make certain foreign gov-
ernmental decisions binding on our courts, Chief Justice Fuller
did not clearly enunciate that purpose, and, despite Justice
Clarke's pointed statement, that purpose had been lost from sight
at the latest by the time Sabbatino246 reached the Supreme Court.
Neither Sabbatino nor later cases mentions this purpose. 247 Yet
this concept continues to be the only theory that adequately ac-
counts for all well-established facets of the doctrine, including
facets that compel the rejection of concepts of the doctrine as di-
rected at the exercise ofjurisdiction or the resolution of choice of
law questions.
We need not undertake a full account of recognition ofjudg-
ments from other jurisdictions. Here it is sufficient to know that
when a judgment is recognized it is treated as precluding the rec-
243. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). For a detailed discus-
sion of this view of "Fuller's curse," see Note, supra note 43, at 601-05. See also
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1964);
EHRENZWEIG I, supra note 31, at 4-6; 1 EHRENZWEIG II, supra note 31, at 35; E.
SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 86, at 961-81. Ironically, courts and commentators
occasionally describe the act of state doctrine as being based on comity. See the
text at supra notes 55-58, 72 & 73.
244. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S.
797 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). The one court
which analogized the act of state doctrine to the full faith and credit clause, how-
ever, had compulsory choice of law rules in mind. See Randall v. Arabian Am.
Oil Co., 778 F.2d 1146, 1153 (5th Cir. 1985).
245. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 92-121 (1971);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 83, 84 (1982); EHRENZWEIG 1, supra
note 31, at 160-234; 1 EHRENZWEIG II, supra note 31, at 128-30; 2 EHRENZWEIG
II, supra note 31, at 50-89; LEFLAR, supra note 31, at 215-53; E. SCOLES & P. HAY,
supra note 86, at 915-61, 982-87; R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 86, at 4-6, 89-91.
246. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
247. Only three post-Sabbatino district court decisions have considered the
interplay between ordinary judgment recognition principles and the act of state
doctrine. See Galu v. Swissair, No. 86 Civ. 5551 (CSH) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1987)
(WESTLAW, 1987 WL 15580); Forbo-Giubiasco S.A. v. Congoleum Corp., 516
F. Supp. 1210, 1213-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss,
Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892, 906-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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ognizing court from reconsidering the merits of issues controlled
by the judgment.2 48 Courts in fact have occasionally identified is-
sue preclusion as the core of the act of state doctrine. 249 In this
sense only does the doctrine mandate a particular rule of decision
or require a court "not [to] sit in judgment on the acts of [an-
other] government. '250
In other words, the act of state doctrine requires a U.S. court
to apply the "law of the case" (in a strong, resjudicata, sense) to
"acts" of a foreign state;251 it does not operate as a full-blown
choice of law principle applicable to every situation with signifi-
cant connections to a foreign state. This not only accounts for
the language used in the several versions of the doctrine; it also
makes clear that whatever advantages the choice of law analysis
has over the jurisdiction-restricting view of the doctrine apply as
well to the rule of repose theory.
The rule of repose theory of the act of state doctrine, more-
over, resolves the difficulties of the choice of law theory. One
need not be concerned about the increasingly poor fit between
the doctrine and the modern general choice of law theories; nor
that it does not apply to general laws as opposed to "acts." This
theory also eliminates any problem with the bar on inquiry into
the propriety of the act under the law of the foreign state: recog-
nition of a judgment always bars inquiry into errors of law or fact
in the judgment. 252
248. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 95 (1971); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 27-29 (1982); E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note
86, at 916-25.
249. Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1113-14 (5th Cir. 1985);
Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1380 (5th Cir. 1980);
Phoenix Canada Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 1372, 1381 (D. Del. 1983);
National Am. Corp. v. Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd on
other grounds, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979).
250. This was Chief Justice Fuller's original formulation of the act of state
doctrine in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). For a complete
quotation of this passage, see supra note 44. See also the text at supra notes 190 &
193.
251. Jordan v. Jordan, 132 Ariz. 38, 43, 643 P.2d 1008, 1012-13 (1982).
On the somewhat narrower, more technical use of the phrase "law of the case,"
see Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 352 U.S. 992, 994 (1957); United
States v. United States Smelting Refining & Mining Co., 339 U.S. 186, 198
(1950); Insurance Group Comm. v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R. Co., 329 U.S. 607,
612 (1947); Messinger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912); Central Soya Co.
v. George A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
252. See Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545 (1947); Treinies v. Sunshine Mining
Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908); Emery v. Ho-
vey, 84 N.H. 499, 153 A. 322 (1931); Barnes v. Buck, 464 Pa. 357, 346 A.2d 778
(1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 106 (1971); RESTATE-
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One can also use the rule of repose theory to solve the re-
maining puzzle under the choice of law theory: that the judgment
on act of state grounds is on the merits but does not preclude
courts outside the United States from making independent in-
quiry into the claim already litigated in the American court. 253 A
judgment enforcing a judgment from another jurisdiction is on
the merits, but, unlike a final judgment on the original cause of
action, a judgment based on a consistent judgment from another
jurisdiction does not merge the two judgments or bar proceed-
ings directly on the original judgment.254 The act of state doc-
trine operates no differently.
Viewing the act of state doctrine as a rule of repose-a sort of
rule for full faith and credit to specific decisions (judgments in a
broad sense) by a foreign state-also accounts for all the other
major features of the doctrine. The doctrine protects the inter-
ests of private parties who trace their interests through the act of
a foreign state in the same fashion as a judgment binds parties in
privity with the original parties to the judgment. 255 Even the ter-
ritorial limitation is rooted in the notion that a judgment is valid
only if it is the result of a proper exercise of jurisdiction. 256
MENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS §§ 17-19 (1982); EHRENZWEIG I, supra note 31, at
201-02; LEFLAR, supra note 31, at 223, 238-39, 241-43.
253. See the text at supra notes 236-37.
254. Grubb v. Public Utility Comm'n, 281 U.S. 470 (1930); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 95 comment c (1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 18 comment j (1982); EHRENZWEIG I, supra note 31, at 217-22;
LEFLAR, supra note 31, at 223. Merger and bar do apply to inconsistent judg-
ments. Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 114 (1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG-
MENTS § 15 (1982); EHRENZWEIG I, supra note 31, at 222; LEFLAR, supra note 31,
at 243; E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 86, at 956-57.
255. Compare Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030,
1047-49 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983); Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 606 (9th Cir. 1976) and Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1292-93 (3d Cir. 1979) with Riley v. New
York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1942); Sovereign Camp v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66
(1938) and Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933); see generally RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 94 (1971); RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 32, §. 482(1)(b); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 34-63
(1982); EHRENZWEIG I, supra note 31, at 224-32; LEFLAR, supra note 31, at 229; E.
SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 86, at 917; Luneburg, The Opportunity to Be Heard and
the Doctrines of Preclusion: Federal Limits on State Law, 31 VILL. L. REV. 81, 110-19,
131-38 (1986).
256. Compare Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F.
Supp. 870, 883-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) and infra § IV(A)(2) with Riley v. New York
Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1942); Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938) and Fall v.
Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909); see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAws § 104 (1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 4-9 (1982);
EHRENZWEIG I, supra note 31, at 206-14; LEFLAR, supra note 31, at 158-60, 164-
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The prohibition of testing the validity of acts of state against
the public policy of the forum resembles the similar prohibition
of inquiry into the forum's public policy in enforcing a sister state
judgment under the full faith and credit clause. 257 One even finds
here the explanation for the notion that the act of state doctrine
does not validate foreign judicial judgments involving public law
questions. 258 This is simply the old notion that there is no obliga-
tion to enforce foreign judgments based on penal or revenue
laws. 259 That repudiation of an act by a foreign state makes it
reviewable in the United States finds obvious parallels in the no-
tion that a judgment which has been vacated or reversed is no
longer entitled to recognition in other courts.2 60
The last question to be considered in identifying the act of
state doctrine with a rule of repose is why one would want to ac-
cord special deference to decisions characterized as "acts of
state" when that same deference is denied to laws or other deci-
66; E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 86, at 937-40; Luneburg, supra note 255, at
92-101.
257. Compare Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank, 658 F.2d 903, 908
(2d Cir. 1981); Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp.
870, 878, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) and Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966) with Yarborough v. Yarborough,
290 U.S. 202 (1933) and Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908); see generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 (1971); EHRENZWEIG I, supra
note 31, at 202-05; LEFLAR, supra note 31, at 223-25; E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra
note 86, at 942-46. The usual rule for international recognition ofjudgments,
without the compulsion of the full faith and credit clause, is to deny recognition
to judgments that violate the forum's public policy. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 32, § 492(2)(d).
258. See the text at supra note 233.
259. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWs § 120 (1971); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, § 493;
EHRENZWEIG I, supra note 31, at 203-04; LEFLAR, supra note 31, at 225-26; E.
SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 86, at 948-50; Kutner,Judicial Identification of "Penal
Laws" in the Conflict of Laws, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 590 (1978). The erosion of this
rule as to revenue laws in the interstate context has not yet been followed in the
international context. British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161 (9th Cir.
1979).
260. Compare Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus., 473 F.
Supp. 680, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) with Ezagui v. Dow Chemical Corp., 598 F.2d
727 (2d Cir. 1979); see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir.
1980); Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 112, 113, 118 (1971); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comment o (1982); EHRENZWEIG I,
supra note 31, at 196-98; LEFLAR, supra note 31, at 238, 247-48. A second judg-
ment, entered before the first judgment is vacated, is still a valid judgment enti-
tled to recognition elsewhere. Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 199 (1932);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 121 (1971); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OFJUDGMENTS § 16 (1982).
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sions of foreign states.2 6' To understand why, one must examine
the policies that underlie all rules of finality of decision (rules of
repose) in multijurisdictional contexts, building upon the well-es-
tablished policy differences between the recognition of laws and
the recognition of judgments.2 62
To disregard the law of a foreign state is to select which gen-
eral laws or policies, among several that could reasonably be ap-
plied, are properly applicable to a specific fact situation; to
disregard a judgment is to set aside a specific exercise of authority
by a state, to affront the dignity and authority of that sovereign.2 63
This also wastes the decision-making resources of both sover-
eigns, not to mention wasting the resources committed by the
parties to obtaining a resolution of the controversy. 264 Finally, to
reexamine the validity of a final judgment prevents the parties
and the public generally from knowing with certainty what their
rights or responsibilities are.2 65
Today, only the policy of protecting individual reliance on
prior decisions is pronounced in interstate recognition cases.
This policy's prominence under the act of state doctrine is shown
by the early cases in which the Supreme Court invoked the doc-
trine to protect reliance by third parties on prior decisions
("acts") by foreign states. 266 The policies of avoiding affront to
the dignity and authority of foreign states and of not wasting state
261. See the text at supra notes 230-32.
262. See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 292-94 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 348-49
(1942); Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525-26
(1931); Cowans v. Ticonderoga Pulp & Paper Co., 219 A.D. 120, 219 N.Y.S.
284, aff'd on op. below, 246 N.Y. 603, 159 N.E. 669 (1927); EHRENZWEIG I, supra
note 31, at 160-68; E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 86, at 916; Brilmeyer, Credit
Due Judgments and Credit Due Laws: The Respective Roles of Due Process and Full Faith
and Credit in the Interstate Context, 70 IOWA L. REV. 95, 97-103 (1984); Hazard,
Preclusion as to Issues of Law: The Legal System's Interest, 70 IOWA L. REV. 81 (1984);
Levin & Leeson, Issue Preclusion Against the United States Government, 70 IOWA L.
REV. 113 (1984); Vestal, Relitigation by Federal Agencies: Conflict, Concurrence and
Synthesis ofJudicial Policies, 55 N.C.L. REV. 123 (1977); von Mehren & Trautman,
Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 1601, 1602-04 (1968).
263. Although recognized by all three factions of the Supreme Court in its
recent examination of these questions, this policy is not now strong in interstate
conflict cases. See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 277, 280-
81 (plurality op. per Stevens, J.), 289 (White, J., concurring), 292-93 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (1980).
264. Id. at 284-85 (plurality op. per Stevens, J.), 293-94 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting); see also Luneburg, supra note 255.
265. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 272, 282 (plurality op. per Stevens, J.), 288-89
(White, J., concurring).
266. See, e.g., Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468 (1937); Ricaud v. American
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and private decision-making resources, while no longer promi-
nent in interstate recognition cases, continue prominent in act of
state cases. 26
7
The prominence of the concern of avoiding affront to foreign
states and preventing the waste of their decision-making re-
sources in cases in which the foreign state has "acted" in a direct
exercise of its sovereignty explains why these decisions are pro-
tected by the doctrine and simple judgments involving only pri-
vate interests are not.2 68 As the involvement of the state's
resources (including prestige) are much less in judgments involv-
ing only private interests, the policy of recognition is lessened to
the point that the act of state doctrine simply does not apply.
Recognition of such private judgments involves only the balanc-
ing of ordinary concerns of respect for finality against the concern
to assure that there has been a fair hearing and no offense to fun-
damental interests or policies of the enforcing forum. 26 9
Thus virtually every feature of the act of state doctrine that
proves troubling to the usually proffered explanations of the
functioning of the doctrine are seen as simply normal aspects of a
rule of repose. Even the recent uncertainties about the doctrine's
scope and effect might be seen as parallel to the stress currently
felt for full faith and credit to judgments among sister states of
the United States. 270 Correctly resolving these uncertainties is
more than just an academic question. If judges and lawyers do
not understand how the doctrine functions, they will continue to
misconceive its application, whether through formal analogy to
Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297
(1918).
267. See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695-705
(plurality op. per White, J.), 726-28 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (1976); First Nat'l
City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762-65 (plurality op. per
RehnquistJ.), 785-88 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (1972); Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-30, 437-39 (1964); see also W.S. Kirkpatrick &
Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l, 58 U.S.L.W. 4140, 4142 (1990).
268. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 608 (9th
Cir. 1976); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF FOREIGN REL. LAw § 41 comment d
(1965).
269. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia
Chewing Gun Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017
(1972); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, §§ 491-498; RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWs § 98 (1971); LEFLAR, supra note 31, at 249-53; E.
SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 86, at 961-81; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note
262.
270. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 103 (1971); E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra
note 86, at 954-55; Levin & Leeson, supra note 262; Smith, Full Faith and Credit
and Section 1983: A Reappraisal, 63 N.C.L. REV. 59 (1984); Vestal, supra note 262.
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domestic law or otherwise. The next section will demonstrate in
detail the consequences of these misconceptions.
IV. INTERPRETING THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
If the act of state doctrine is to serve its purposes of prevent-
ing embarrassment to the executive's conduct of foreign relations
and of assuring certainty of right of one who reasonably relies on
an act of a foreign state, 27 1 three steps are imperative to clarify
the application of the doctrine. These steps must begin with a
renewal of the legal focus on the doctrine's meaning, on how it
functions, and on its underlying policies. Judges, lawyers, and
scholars must also eschew the careless language so frequently
found in cases involving the doctrine-language which has often
been misleading, if not outright erroneous.2 72 Finally, the profes-
sion must rework the doctrine into a coherent rule of repose-a
rule of binding recognition of decisions by foreign states consis-
tent with modern theories of compulsory recognition of
judgments. 273
To accomplish this ambitious program, jurists must evaluate
whether each proposed theory, limitation, and exception to the
act of state doctrine is consistent with a properly delineated rule
of repose. They must begin with the most general theories to es-
tablish the true parameters of the doctrine. Thereafter, they must
carefully evaluate each proposed specific limitation or exception
to the doctrine, including those enacted by Congress as well as
those created or proposed by judges.
271. For cases dealing with the impact on foreign relations, see Alfred Dun-
hill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697-98 (plurality op. per White, J.),
715 (PowellJ., concurring), 726-28 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (1976); First-Nat'l
City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 763-68 (plurality op. per
Rehnquist, J.), 774 (Powell, J., concurring), 777-78 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(1972); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423-25, 461-67
(1964). For those addressing the certainty of right aspect, see United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 212-14, 232-34 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324, 327-30 (1937); Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468, 470-71 (1937); Ricaud v.
American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.,
246 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1918). See generally the text at supra notes 261-70.
272. The most notable instances of clearly wrong language involve the fre-
quent assertion that the act of state doctrine requires abstention from the exer-
cise of judicial jurisdiction. See supra § III(A), (B). The Supreme Court
unanimously rejected this theory as early as 1918, in Ricaud v. American Metal
Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918), and reaffirmed this rejection in one of its most
recent decisions under the doctrine, in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba,
425 U.S. 682, 705 n.18 (plurality op. per White, J.), 726-28 (Marshall,J., dissent-
ing) (1976).
273. See supra § III(D).
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A. General Interpretive Problems
The Justices of the Supreme Court have proposed various
general theories about the functioning of the act of state doctrine.
In so doing, they have identified several important general inter-
pretive problems in understanding (and applying) the doctrine:
identifying acts of state; the application and effect of the territo-
rial limitation; and the more controversial claim that there is a
"pure theory" of the doctrine which is currently ignored by the
majority of the Court. Two other general interpretive problems
have recently been raised by the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit: the "phenomenological approach" and the relation of
the doctrine to the notion of "comity." Each of these general in-
terpretive problems will be discussed in this section in turn.
1. Identifying acts of state
Given that the designation plays a central role in the act of
state doctrine, it is more than a little strange that courts have
never developed meaningful criteria for deciding when an act
qualifies as an act of a foreign state. Even the four Justices who
concluded that no act of a foreign state was involved in Alfred Dun-
hill of London, Inc. v. Cuba 274 disagreed among themselves on the
fundamental question of what acts are acts of a sovereign. The
plurality of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and
White interpreted acts as sovereign only if they were "public"
rather than "commercial." 275 Justice Stevens disagreed; he ap-
parently would answer the question purely in terms of whether
274. 425 U.S. 682, 690-95 (plurality op. per White, J.), 715 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (1976).
275. Id. at 695-707 (plurality op. per White, J.). One might count Justice
Powell as agreeing with this view, although he is ambiguous on the point. Id. at
715 (Powell, J., concurring). Many lower courts have consequently adopted this
view. See, e.g., Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1360-61 (9th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1933 (1989); Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 359 (9th
Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 480 U.S. 942, cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987); De
Roburt v. Gannett Co., 733 F.2d 701, 703-04 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1159 (1985); Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712
F.2d 404, 406-07 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984); Empresa
Cubana v. Lamborn & Co., 652 F.2d 231, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1981); International
Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1360 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371,
1380 (5th Cir. 1980); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d
1287, 1294 (3d Cir. 1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d
597, 606-08 (9th Cir. 1976); see also PerezJimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547,
557-58 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
or FOREIGN REL. LAW, § 41 (1965).
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the act was under the authority of the foreign state. 276
Justice White, in an apparent search for that elusive fifth vote
to turn the plurality into a majority, also argued in Dunhill that a
"sovereign act" must involve a "statute, decree, order, or resolu-
tion of the [foreign] Government itself."277 His assertion contra-
dicts numerous earlier decisions, some of which he cited with
approval. 278 His remarks were ambiguous enough to permit one
to conclude still that a "sovereign act" need not take any particu-
lar form. 279
The confusion in Dunhill over what qualifies as an act of
state-a "sovereign act," if you will-is a major change from the
apparently wide prior consensus over the meaning of the concept.
Before Dunhill, the phrase had been used to resolve three distinct,
but related, questions:
(i) how to treat acts by unrecognized governments;
(ii) whether to attribute an act to the state; and
(iii) whether acts not involving a significant policy judg-
ment are protected by the act of state doctrine.
These problems continue to arise today.
Whether to cloak acts by an unrecognized government with
the dignity of an act of state was a question involved in nearly all
the early act of state cases. Courts routinely gave retroactive ef-
fect to recognition of a (revolutionary) government, and there-
fore applied the doctrine to protect acts completed before
recognition. 280 Courts quickly took the small step of according
276. 425 U.S. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring).
277. Id. at 695 (plurality op. per White, J.). justice Stevens also joined this
part of the plurality opinion, giving this dictum the support of four justices.
Some lower courts have seized on this statement to conclude that formal action
is necessary before an act could be an "act of state." See Philippines v. Marcos,
806 F.2d 344, 359 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 480 U.S. 942, cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1048 (1987); Empresa Cubana v. Lamborn & Co., 652 F.2d 231, 237 (2d
Cir. 1981); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 606-07 (9th
Cir. 1976); Mexico v. Ashley, 556 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex. 1977).
278. A point stressed byJustice Marshall for the four dissenters, 425 U.S. at
718-23.
279. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, § 443 comment i. This point
was noted by the dissenters in Dunhill. 425 U.S. at 718 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
Only two later courts reached this conclusion despite its strong support on the
Court. Asociaion de Reclamantes v. Mexico, 561 F. Supp. 1190, 1199 (D.D.C.
1983), aff'd, 735 F.2d 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985);
D'Angelo v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 422 F. Supp. 1280, 1290 (D. Del. 1976), aff'd
mem., 564 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978).
280. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1942); United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 253
(1897).
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the same protection to regimes that remained unrecognized at
the time of the litigation, 28' and even to regimes which were re-
placed without ever having been recognized. 28 2 Courts do not
seem troubled by these conclusions today. 283
Attributing a person's act to a state also seems unlikely to
create the level of confusion reached in Dunhill. States, not being
natural persons, necessarily act through agents (or agencies).
Naturally, these agents sometimes act on behalf of themselves or
others, and only sometimes on behalf of the state. 284 Such agents
could also act contrary to, or in excess of, their authority. 285
Certain confusions in Dunhill are rooted in the realities of
agents' conduct, although properly understood these need not
produce serious confusion in attributing an act to a state. In a
number of cases where a court stressed the presence or absence
of particular forms appropriate to state acts, the court was merely
searching for a relatively certain badge of state authority. 286 But
281. Wulfsohn v. R.S.F.S.R., 234 N.Y. 372, 375-76, 138 N.E. 24, 25-26
(1923), appeal dismissed, 266 U.S. 580 (1924).
282. Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918); Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302-03 (1918).
283. See Millen Indus. v. Coordination Council for N. Am. Affairs, 855 F.2d
879, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (the act of state doctrine protects the acts of the "un-
recognized" government of Taiwan). Note that some might construe the Tai-
wan Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3316 (1982), as congressionally-mandated
recognition of the government of Taiwan-the Republic of China. See also Mor-
gan Guar. Trust Co. v. Palau, 657 F. Supp. 1475, 1478 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (com-
mercial acts not acts of state; the act of state doctrine not applied). But see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN REL. LAw § 42 (1965) (the acts of a wholly
unrecognized government are not protected by the act of state doctrine).
284. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l, 58
U.S.L.W. 4140, 4141 (1990); Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 357-59 (9th
Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 480 U.S. 942, cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987); DeR-
oburt v. Gannett Co., 733 F.2d 701, 704 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1159 (1985); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889-90 (2d Cir. 1980); Perez
Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 557-63 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373
U.S. 914 (1963); United States v. Evans, 667 F. Supp. 974, 987-88 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); see generally ILC DRAFT CONVENTION, supra note 234, arts. 5-15; INT'L L.
COMM'N, REPORT ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY [1973] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, 189;
Note, supra note 7, at 89-94.
285. For cases involving agents acting contrary to authority, see Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 415 n.17 (1964); Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889-90 (2d Cir. 1980); Perez Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311
F.2d 547, 557-63 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963). For cases
involving acts in excess of authority, see Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf &
Western Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); French v. Banco Na-
cional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 52-53, 242 N.E.2d 704, 709, 295 N.Y.S.2d 443,
440-41 (1968). See generally ILC DRAFr CONVENTION, supra note 234, arts. 7-10.
286. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 694-95 (plurality op. per WhiteJ.); Arango v. Guz-
man Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1380 (2d Cir. 1980); see also
Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1070 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork,J., dissent-
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the cases in which a court stressed that state action need not take
any particular form also involved situations where the court
sought to determine whether an act was authorized by, or attribu-
table to, a state. 287 To always rely on formal authority would be
self-defeating because foreign states could then bring an act
within the act of state doctrine merely by ratifying the act
formally.
Problems in analyzing the authority of an agent of a foreign
state are no different than the usual problems in determining an
agent's authority. The inquiry admittedly is complicated by its
often politically sensitive nature, shown in part by the frequent
assertion that U.S. courts will not inquire into the legality of acts
of a foreign state under that state's own law. 288 This does not,
however, obviate the need to determine whether the act was in
fact an act of the state. Thus, when an agent violated the express
orders of his own government, courts easily concluded that the
act was not an act of the state. 289
ing), aff'd, 484 U.S. 1 (1987); Empresa Cubana v. Lamborn & Co., 652 F.2d 231,
237 (2d Cir. 1981); Perez Jiminez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 557 (5th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963).
287. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 720 (Marshall,J., dissenting); Asociaion de Recla-
mantes v. Mexico, 561 F. Supp. 1190, 1199 (D.D.C. 1983), af'd, 735 F.2d 1517
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1051 (1985); D'Angelo v. Petroleos Mexi-
canos, 422 F. Supp. 1280, 1290 (D. Del. 1976), aft'd, 564 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978); French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d
46, 66, 242 N.E.2d 704, 717, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433, 452 (1968) (Hopkins,J., concur-
ring); see also Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1546 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(no act of state without a showing of authority or ratification).
288. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l, 58
U.S.L.W. 4140, 4142 (1990) (inquiry permitted only if without challenge to the
legality of the act); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 415
n.17 (1964); Philippines v. Marcos, 818 F.2d 1473, 1482-85 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd
en banc on other grounds, 862 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1933
(1989); West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 828-29 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987); Randall v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 778 F.2d 1146,
1153 (5th Cir. 1985); Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres S.A., 163 F.2d 246, 249
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947); Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve
Bank, 114 F.2d 438, 444 (2d Cir. 1940); New York Land Co. v. Philippines, 634
F. Supp. 279, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd on other grounds sub nom. Philippines v.
Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 359 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 480 U.S. 942, cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1048 (1987); Bandes v. Harlow & Jones, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 955, 961
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 852 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1988); Dominicus
Americana Bohio v. Gulf& Western Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680, 688-89 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); Eastern States Petroleum Corp. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 28 F. Supp.
279, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 52-
53, 242 N.E.2d 704, 709, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433, 440-41 (1968); see also ILC DRAFr
CONVENTION, supra note 234, art. 10; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN REL.
LAw § 41 comment f (1965).
289. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l, 58
U.S.L.W. 4140, 4142 (1990); Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 357-58 (2d
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The final problem-whether acts not establishing significant
state policy are protected by the act of state doctrine-is the one
which appeared to trouble the Court in Dunhill,290 although one
cannot be entirely certain given the vagueness of the plurality
opinion. In Dunhill the acts were performed by "interventors"-
relatively low level officials appointed to administer expropriated
businesses. Were acts of such low level officials acts of the state?
Significantly, the plurality had to refer to an old sovereign immu-
nity case to reach the issue.291 The issue simply does not appear
in any earlier act of state case, or even in earlier foreign sovereign
immunity cases except those involving foreign-government-
owned ships.2 92
Looking at the early act of state cases, one finds it hard to
believe that the issue could ever come up. The very first act of
state case involved a suit against an agent of a government unrec-
ognized when the agent acted, and not against the state itself.2 93
And after all, the acts of Pancho Villa, who at the time of his acts
was little more than an extraordinarily successful bandit, acting
on behalf of a government which was never recognized by the
United States, were treated as acts of state.2 94 How then can one
question the sovereign quality of acts by even low level officials
exercising the actual authority of the state?
In Dunhill, the interventors not only exercised actual author-
ity on behalf of the state, but they also made decisions-exercised
discretion-affecting the interests of the state.2 95 Specifically, the
interventors, as managers of state-owned businesses, decided to
Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 480 U.S. 942, cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987); Filar-
tiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889-90 (2d Cir. 1980). But see Dominicus Amer-
icana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(the subsequent repudiation of an act by its government does not strip it of the
aura of act of a state).
290. 425 U.S. at 691-95 (plurality op. per White, J.).
291. The Gul Djemal, 264 U.S. 90, 94-95 (1924).
292. U.S. courts struggled with restricting immunity in cases involving for-
eign-government-owned ships decades before they became concerned about the
restrictive theory in other cases. See, e.g., Berizzi Bros. Co. v. The Pesaro, 271
U.S. 562 (1926); The Gul Djemal, 264 U.S. 90 (1924); The Sao Vincente, 260
U.S. 151 (1923); The Pesaro, 255 U.S. 216 (1920); The Santissima Trinidad, 20
U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283 (1822); l'Invincible, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 238 (1816); see gener-
ally J. DELLAPENNA, supra note ***, at 1-5.
293. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
294. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303 (1918); see also Ri-
caud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
295. The notion that there should be an exercise of judgment involving
effect on public interests is found in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN REL.
LAW § 41 comment c (1965). Such language does not appear in the RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD), supra note 32. See also Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745
[Vol. 35: p. I
58
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol35/iss1/1
1990] DECIPHERING THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE 59
keep certain moneys to which the plaintiffs claimed to be enti-
tled. 296 To question the sovereign quality of these decisions
raises the issue of whether the interventors were exercising gov-
ernmental authority or mere business judgment, i.e., whether
their's was an act of the state.2 97 Either way, one need not see this
as leading into a commercial act exception to the act of state
doctrine. 298
To see how one can conclude that an act by a state official
involving only business judgment is not an act of the state without
reaching the question of whether the act would properly be char-
acterized as "commercial" or "sovereign," consider what the ar-
guments in Dunhill would have been if the expropriated
businesses had been sold to the interventors rather than merely
administered by them. 299 No one would then argue about a com-
mercial act exception. Rather the argument would focus exclu-
sively on whether acts of the new owners were acts of the state.
Now, a private party can exercise state authority, but only if
that party is in a position to affect state (or public) interests. 300
One might not want to carry this idea back to the actual situation
of the interventors, who operate distinct and separate entities on
behalf of the state. If one did so, however, one would not neces-
sarily need even to consider whether their acts are properly char-
acterized as "commercial" or "sovereign." In fact, whether a
separate entity, or even a private party, acts on behalf of a state is
not easily resolved by reference to the "nature" or "purpose" of
the act.3 0 l A court must consider the actor's claim to authority,
the state's delegation of authority, and the degree to which a U.S.
F.2d 1500, 1534-38 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113
(1985); see generally infra § IV(B)(8).
296. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 687.
297. Compare Dunhill 425 U.S. at 691-95 (plurality op. per White, J.) with id.
at 731 (Marshall,J., dissenting); see also W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental
Tectonics Corp. Int'l, 58 U.S.L.W. 4140, 4142 (1990); International Tin Council
v. Amalgamet, Inc., 138 Misc. 2d 383, 386-87, 524 N.Y.S.2d 971, 974-75 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd mem., 140 A.D.2d 1014, 529 N.Y.S.2d 983 (1988).
298. This apparently is the point of Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in
Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring).
299. As happened, for example, in the Barcelona Traction Case (Belgium v.
Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3.
300. See, e.g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S.
682, 689-92 (1949); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740,
843-50 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987); Outboard Marine
Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384, 396-98 (D. Del. 1978); ILC DRAFT CONVEN-
TION, supra note 234, art. 8.
301. See generally J. DELLAPENNA, supra note ***, at 147-64; see also infra
§ IV(B)(I).
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court's inquiry into such matters will intrude into the affairs of the
foreign state.30 2
The several opinions in Dunhill divided primarily over
whether the interventors had authority to act on behalf of the Cu-
ban state.303 Unfortunately, the opinions confused this question
with other, largely irrelevant matters, particularly the "nature" of
the act. This confusion would not have been particularly prob-
lematic if the Court had been able to speak through a majority,
articulating a new, coherent vision of the act of state doctrine.
Justice White, however, could neither write on behalf of a major-
ity, nor (perhaps because of his search for that elusive majority)
write with sufficient clarity to prevent the now pervasive confu-
sion surrounding the doctrine.
How a court determines whether an "act" (and its underlying
decision) is that of a foreign state would be less important if the
Supreme Court were to delineate clearly the limitations and ex-
ceptions to issue preclusion which properly apply to the act of
state doctrine. In part, the failure to devise criteria for what is an
"act of state" results from the pervasive confusion about just what
purposes the doctrine is intended to achieve. Once one recog-
nizes the function of the doctrine as a special rule of repose, an
"act of state" should be recognized whenever there has been a
decision under the authority of a foreign state to create or change
specific legal rights or duties if this decision expresses policies
central to the political sovereignty of that state.30 4
No one has quite described an "act of state" in this fashion,
but the criteria offered here seem to capture the essential features
of the fact situations to which the act of state doctrine has been
applied. While no complete definition of the second criterion-
decisions expressing central political concerns of the foreign
state-could be easily developed, a paradigm is apparent from ex-
302. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco para el Commercio Exterior, 462 U.S.
611 (1983); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 415 n.17
(1964); Perez Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 557 (5th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp.
384, 398 (D. Del. 1978); see generally Note,Jurisdiction over Foreign States for Acts of
Their Instrumentalities: A Model for Attributing Liability, 94 YALE LJ. 394 (1984).
303. Thus from Justice White's plurality opinion: "Neither does it demon-
strate that in addition to authority to operate commercial businesses, to pay
their bills and to collect their accounts receivable, interventors had been in-
vested with sovereign authority to repudiate all or any part of the debts incurred
in the businesses." 425 U.S. at 691-93; see also id at 722-23 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
304. Cf W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l, 58
U.S.L.W. 4140 (1990); Bazyler, supra note 3, at 365-68.
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amining the facts of the cases involving the act of state doctrine.
Examples have included a complete change of the political struc-
ture of a state (i.e., revolution),30 5 fundamental changes in the
economic structure of a state (e.g., expropriations), 30 6 or basic
policy decisions about the managing of the society or economy of
a state.307 The paradigm does not include decisions taken in the
day-to-day management of government.308
Drawing the line suggested here will not always be easy. 30 9
Yet the paradigm does provide a model with which courts can
compare specific fact situations with a prospect of relatively clear
answers in most cases. If the appropriate criteria of authority and
centrality are met, the particular form of the "act" should be irrel-
evant.3 10 An "act" could even be a decision that produces com-
plete nonaction.3 1' Whether the "act" emanates from a foreign
state's executive, legislature, or judiciary, makes no difference.31 2
305. See, e.g., Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918); Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250
(1897).
306. See, e.g., First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759
(1972); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324
(1937); Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468 (1937).
307. For cases involving foreign economic policy, see American Banana Co.
v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A.,
807 F.2d 820, 828-29 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987); Airline Pilots
Ass'n v. TACA Int'l Airlines, S.A. 748 F.2d 965 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1100 (1985); Compania de Gas v. Entex, Inc., 686 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1041 (1983); International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649
F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Industrial Inv. Dev.
Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903
(1980); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984
(1977); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
For cases involving foreign military policy, see Ramirez de Arellano v. Wein-
berger, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113
(1985); Saltany v. Reagan, 702 F. Supp. 319, 320-21 (D.D.C. 1988); Friedar v.
Israel, 614 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). For a case involving foreign social
policy, see Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres, S.A., 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947).
308. See, e.g., W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp.
Int'l, 58 U.S.L.W. 4140 (1990); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S.
682 (1976); Remington Rand Corp. v. Business Sys. Inc., 830 F.2d 1260, 1265-
66 (3d Cir. 1987); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287
(3d Cir. 1979). This point distinguishes cases like Mannington Mills from cases
like Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), a
distinction that befuddled Michael Bazyler. See Bazyler, supra note 3, at 358.
309. Thus, I would have decided some of the cases cited in support of the
foregoing paragraph differently than the court did. See, e.g., infra § IV(B)(4).
310. See the text at supra notes 277-79 & 294-96.
311. See supra note 279.
312. For cases involving foreign executive decisions, see Ricaud v. Ameri-
can Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297
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Nor does the level of government that makes the decision matter
if the actors involved have authority to act on behalf of the
state. 313 A court in the United States might have to inquire cir-
cumspectly into the actor's authority in order to avoid embarrass-
ing the executive's conduct of foreign relations, but even this
circumspection is similar to the usual rule of repose for judg-
ments-only a complete want of competence or jurisdiction ren-
ders the decision invalid. 31 4
2. The territorial limitation
Chief Justice Fuller, in his original statement of the act of
state doctrine, indicated that the doctrine protects only acts of a
foreign state within that state's territory.31 5 While the proposi-
tion has never been questioned in the Supreme Court, neither has
it ever actually been applied there-it remains mere dictum. 31 6
Yet the territorial limitation remains one of the few aspects of the
doctrine that has been accepted by every Supreme Court Justice,
at least in dictum, and followed in numerous lower court deci-
sions. 317 Localizing an "act" of state will remain troublesome,
(1918); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); Un-
derhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897). For cases involving foreign legisla-
tive decisions, see First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759
(1972); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324
(1937). For a case involving foreign judicial decisions, see Shapleigh v. Mier,
299 U.S. 468 (1937).
313. See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 690-95
(1976) (plurality op. per White, J.).
314. Compare Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 415 n.17
(1964); Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres, S.A., 163 F.2d 246, 249 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947); Liu v. Republic of China, 642 F. Supp. 297 (N.D.
Cal. 1986) and French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 53, 242 N.E.2d
704, 709, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433, 440-41 (1968) with Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106
(1963); Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939) and Baldwin v. Iowa
State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
315. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897), quoted at supra
note 44.
316. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l, 58
U.S.L.W. 4140, 4142 (1990); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S.
682, 691-94, 696 n.Il (plurality op. per White, J.), 716-18, 721-22, 729 (Mar-
shall,J., dissenting) (1976); First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406
U.S. 759, 763 (1972) (plurality op. per Rehnquist, J.); Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 400-01, 413-15 (majority op.), 454-55 (White, J.,
dissenting) (1964); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 217 (1942); United
States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 327-30 (1937); Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468,
469-72 (1937); Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918); RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, § 443 comment b.
317. See, e.g., Bandes v. Harlow &Jones, Inc., 852 F.2d 661, 666-67 (2d Cir.
1988); Grass v. Credito Mexicano, S.A., 797 F.2d 220, 222 (5th Cir. 1986), cert.
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but, compared to the rest of the doctrine, the problem is refresh-
ingly commonplace and manageable Without great difficulty.
The extensive literature on the territorial limitation includes
only four weak criticisms of the limitation as such.3 "8 Nonethe-
less, one might conclude that the limitation is a notion that, while
unremarkable when first announced, was carried forward without
further analysis long after it outlived its usefulness. Created dur-
ing the era of Pennoyer v. Neff 3 1 9 the territorial limitation does not
seem so self-evident in an era accustomed to long-arm jurisdic-
tion producing, even in international contexts, reliance on the fi-
nality of decisions, potential waste of decision-making resources,
and probable affront to a foreign state's sovereignty nearly as
much for extraterritorial assertions of authority as for territorially
focused assertions. 320
The argument is not likely to persuade a court. The
Supreme Court, if only in dictum, has always insisted that there
can be no affront to the sovereignty of a foreign state when it acts
denied, 480 U.S. 934 (1987); Riedel v. Bancam, S.A., 792 F.2d 587, 592 (6th Cir.
1986); Randall v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 778 F.2d 1146, 1153 (5th Cir. 1985);
Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222, 224-25 (2d Cir. 1985); Allied Bank
Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola, 757 F.2d 516, 521-22 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed,
473 U.S. 934 (1985); Banco para el Commercio Exterior v. First Nat'l City Bank,
744 F.2d 237, 241-42 (2d Cir. 1984); Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 735 F.2d
645, 650 (2d Cir. 1984); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank, 658 F.2d
903, 908-09 (2d Cir. 1981); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Banco Nacional de
Cuba, 658 F.2d 895, 901 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1091 (1982);
Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179, 1189 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856
(1980); United Bank v. Cosmic Int'l Inc., 542 F.2d 868, 871-77 (2d Cir. 1976);
Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 462 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1060 (1972); Oliva v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 448 F.2d 217, 220 (5th Cir.
1971); Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 61 N.Y.2d 460, 469-71, 463 N.E.2d 5, 8-
9, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689, 692-93, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984); Weston Banking
Corp. v. Turkiye Garanti Bankasi, A.S., 57 N.Y.2d 315, 323-25, 442 N.E.2d
1195, 1198-99, 456 N.Y.S.2d 684, 687-88 (1982). One court recently ques-
tioned the territorial limitation, but in a confused context involving several other
alleged exceptions to the doctrine. See Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745
F.2d 1500, 1533-43 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113
(1985); see generally Crockett, supra note 162; Mathias, supra note 3, at 392-94.
318. EHRENZWEIG I, supra note 31, at 172-73; Bazyler, supra note 3, at 372-
73; Henkin, supra note 30, at 328-30; Comment, Act of State Doctrine Held Inappli-
cable to Foreign Seizures when the Property at the Time of the Expropriation Is Located
Within the United States, 9 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 515 (1977). This does not
include criticisms of particular applications of the limitation.
319. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
320. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). That these are the relevant policies, see the text
at supra notes 261-69. For examples of governments (including the United
States) feeling affront when they act extraterritoriality, see the antitrust disputes
discussed in supra note 188.
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outside its borders. 32 1 Moreover, the dependence internationally
of both jurisdiction to adjudicate and jurisdiction to enforce on
jurisdiction to prescribe 322 makes the latter jurisdictionally dis-
positive for the act of state doctrine. The central, unchallenge-
able basis'of international jurisdiction to prescribe remains the
jurisdiction over persons, conduct, or property within the terri-
tory of the sovereign.3 23
The territorial limitation might be seen as too deferential an
approach to the authority of a foreign state, disregarding jurisdic-
tion over the state's nationals and over activities affecting certain
state or universal interests.3 24 The limitation does avoid the often
obscure debates over whether these alternate bases ofjurisdiction
are being exercised reasonably.32 5 If certainty of finality of deci-
sion is the paramount policy underlying the act of state doctrine,
then restricting the doctrine to the virtually unchallengeable terri-
torial jurisdiction provides ample certainty about when the doc-
trine applies. The limitation also only slightly impairs reliance on
"acts" based on more contentious bases of jurisdiction, as these
other "acts" might still be recognized and enforced under more
fluid concepts of ordinary rules concerning the recognition of
judgments or the like.3 2 6
Determining what "act" is in question, or what property is
the object of the foreign state's action, thus is a critical step in
determining whether and how to apply the act of state doctrine.
This is most apparent in a dramatic situation like a murder in the
United States ordered by a foreign state. Was the act of state the
murder (in the United States) or the order (in the foreign
state)?327 More ordinary, but just as troubling, is determining
whether the "property" expropriated was the ownership of a cor-
321. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 763
(1972) (plurality op. per Rehnquist, J.); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, 400-07, 413-15 (majority), 454-55 (White, J., dissenting) (1964);
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 217 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324, 327-33 (1937); Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309
(1918); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
322. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, §§ 423, 431(1); see generally J.
DELLAPENNA, supra note ***, at 67-72.
323. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, § 402(1).
324. Id. §§ 402(2), (3), 404; see also Chow, supra note 25, at 458, 465-68.
325. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, § 403.
326. Id. §§ 491-498.
327. See DeLetelier v. Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 673-74 (D.D.C. 1980); cf
Risk v. Norway, 707 F. Supp. 1159, 1167-69 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (the ratification of
acts in the United States by authorities in Norway does not bring the act of state
doctrine into play).
[Vol. 35: p. I
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poration or a corporation's assets.3 28
As with so many other difficulties in applying the act of state
doctrine, the problem of determining the location of key acts
arose in Dunhill. The District Court and the Court of Appeals
both thought the location of the property at the time of the "tak-
ing" was dispositive of the controversy.3 29 They reached oppo-
site conclusions on the location of the property, however, because
the District Court thought the property taken was the debts (lo-
cated in the United States), but the Court of Appeals thought the
property was the monies (located in Cuba).
When Dunhill reached the Supreme Court, the majority sim-
ply avoided addressing which theory should be used to localize
the property. Justice White's plurality opinion did, however, im-
plicitly decide what property was in issue by focusing on the re-
fusal by the interventors to pay over the money in their
possession.330 The four dissenters chose to address the property
question directly, apparently managing to endorse the views of
both lower courts!33' The dissenters would have upheld the con-
fiscation of the monies while holding that the confiscations of the
debts themselves were ineffective.3 32
If the expropriated property is a debt or other intangible
legal right, one confronts the problem of localizing "intangible
property" or an "intangible event." This has always been ex-
tremely uncertain.33 3 Most American courts have decided the lo-
cation of intangible property according to the location of the
328. See Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 462 F.2d 1021, 1024-30 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1060 (1972); Ethiopian Spice Extraction Share Co. v.
Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co., 543 F. Supp. 1224, 1231-33 (W.D. Mich.
1982), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Ethiopia,
729 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984); F. Palicio y Cia., S.A., v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd mere., 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom. Brush v.
Cuba, 389 U.S. 830 (1967); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl ZeissJena, 293 F.
Supp. 892, 898-915 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Compania Ron Bacardi v. Bank of Nova
Scotia, 193 F. Supp. 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
329. Menendez v. Favor, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527, 536-40
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1364-65
(2d Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S.
682 (1976).
330. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 691-94, 697 n.11 (plurality op. per White, J.).
331. Id. at 716-18, 721-22 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
332. Id. at 729 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
333. One might conclude that the question will support just about any an-
swer a court wishes to reach. EHRENZWEIG I, supra note 31, at 172; see also Taba-
calera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706, 714 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968).
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obligor (the "debtor domicile test").33 4 Other courts, responding
to the traditional tie of the act of state doctrine to sovereignty,
have framed the inquiry in terms of whether the nation in ques-
tion had power to make its action effective, i.e., whether it had
jurisdiction over the property (the "complete fruition" or 'fait ac-
compli test").3 35 One court recently rejected both of these tests
and adopted a test which balances various factors to determine
whether the foreign state had "reasonable expectations of domin-
ion" over the property in question (the "incidents of the debt
test").336
Each test has been criticized. 337 In fact, when the property in
issue is a right to collect a monetary debt, the outcomes under the
three tests are not significantly different. 338 When other intangi-
ble rights or events are involved, however, the tests can lead to
very different results. The clearest instance is when a corporation
is nationalized. Are the shares of the corporation located (fiction-
ally) where the corporation is incorporated, or where its principal
334. United Bank v. Cosmic Int'l Inc., 542 F.2d 868, 873-74 (2d Cir. 1976);
Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
1027 (1966); Bandes v. Harlow & Jones, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 955, 963-64
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); cf. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. v. Galadari, 777 F.2d
877, 881 (2d Cir. 1985); Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 660 F.2d 854,
862 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982).
335. Tchacosh Co. v. Rockwell Int'l, 766 F.2d 1333, 1336-39 (9th Cir.
1985); Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1121-25 (5th Cir. 1985); Braka
v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222, 224-25 (2d Cir. 1985); Allied Bank Int'l v.
Banco Credito Agricola, 757 F.2d 516, 521 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 934
(1985); Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 735 F.2d 645, 650 n.5 (2d Cir. 1984);
Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 462 F.2d 1021, 1024-27 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 1060 (1972); Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar
Co., 392 F.2d 706, 712-16 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968); Weston
Banking Corp. v. Turkiye Garanti Bankasi, A.S., 57 N.Y.2d 315, 324, 442 N.E.2d
1195, 1199, 456 N.Y.S.2d 684, 688 (1982); see also Kirgis, supra note 26, at 59
n.8; McCormick, supra note 50, at 497-98; Comment, supra note 119, at 492-95;
Note, The Territorial Exception to the Act of State Doctrine: Application to French Nation-
alization, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 121, 136-40 (1982).
336. Libra Bank, Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870,
884 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1124 (5th
Cir. 1985).
337. Chow, supra note 25, at 424-30, 439-45, 465-72; Ebenroth & Teitz,
supra note 25, at 234, 243-45, 247-52; Zaitzeff & Kuntz, The Act of State Doctrine
and the Allied Bank Case, 40 Bus. LAw. 449, 473-83 (1985); Comment, The Act of
State Doctrine. A History of Judicial Limitations and Exceptions, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J.
677, 684-87 (1977); Note, supra note 25, at 305-13, 320-30; Note, The Act of State
Doctrine: Resolving the Debt Situs Confusion, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 594 (1986); Com-
ment, supra note 226, at 115-17; Note, supra note 43, at 626-3 1.
338. Bandes v. Harlow &Jones, Inc., 852 F.2d 661, 666-67 (2d Cir. 1988);
United Bank v. Cosmic Int'l Inc., 542 F.2d 868, 873 (2d Cir. 1976); Perez v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 61 N.Y.2d 460, 469-71, 463 N.E.2d 5, 8-9, 474 N.Y.S.2d
689, 692-93, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984).
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office is located? Which represents the place at which the nation-
alization can be made effective?339 Similar problems arise for
copyrights, patents, or trademarks. 340
3. The balancing approach ("the pure theory")
The four dissenters in DunhiUl34 1 and First National City Bank
v. Banco Nacional de Cuba342 attempted to provide a complete and
highly restrictive analysis of when courts in the United States
might "sit in judgment" on the acts of a foreign state. They pro-
posed that courts balance, on a case-by-case basis, the risks of em-
barrassment to the executive's conduct of foreign relations
against the degree of codification of the relevant law and the im-
portance of the issue to the "national nerves" of the foreign
state. 343 Although no one has yet explained how one is to bal-
ance these incommensurable factors in some comprehensive
calculus, 344 the dissenters would have resolved virtually all ques-
tions left open in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino345 through
339. Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 462 F.2d 1021, 1024-27 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1060 (1972); Ethiopian Spice Extraction Share Co. v.
Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co., 543 F. Supp. 1224, 1231-33 (W.D. Mich.), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Ethiopia, 729 F.2d
422 (6th Cir. 1984); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss Jena, 293 F. Supp.
892, 898-9 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd on other grounds, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 905 (1971); F. Palicio y Cia., S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481,
487 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd mem., 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830
(1967); Compania Ron Bacardi v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 193 F. Supp. 814
(S.D.N.Y. 1961); see also Loyrette & Gaillot, The French Nationalizations: The Deci-
sions of the French Constitutional Council and Their Aftermath, 17 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L
L. & ECON. 17, 41-48 (1982); Note, supra note 335, at 140-47.
340. Williams & Humbert Ltd. v. W. & H. Trade Marks (Jersey) Ltd., 840
F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 462 F.2d 1021,
1028-30 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1060 (1972); Zwack v. Kraus Bros. & Co.,
237 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1956); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss Jena, 293 F.
Supp. 892, 910-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
341. 425 U.S. at 715-37 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun,
Brennan, & Stewart, JJ.).
342. 406 U.S. 759, 776-96 (1972) (Brennan,J., dissenting, joined by Black-
mun, Marshall, & Stewart, JJ.).
343. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 728; City Bank, 406 U.S. at 787-88. This test was
first set forth in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-28
(1964), quoted supra at note 135. See also Rosenthal,jurisdictional Conflicts between
Sovereign Nations, 19 INT'L LAW. 487, 497-502 (1985); Note, Judicial Balancing of
Foreign Policy Considerations: Comity and Errors under the Act of State Doctrine, 35 STAN.
L. REV. 327 (1983).
344. Compare Justice Scalia's comment in Bendix Autolite Corp. v.
Midwesco Enter., 486 U.S. 888 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("This process is
ordinarily called balancing, but the scale analogy is not appropriate, since the
interests on both sides are incommensurate. It is more like judging whether a
particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.") (citations omitted).
345. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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this case-by-case balancing. In Kirkpatrick, however, a unanimous
Court indicated that balancing was appropriate only for restrict-
ing the act of state doctrine, not for expanding its scope. 346
One might term the dissenters' position the "pure theory" of
the act of state doctrine. They most closely followed Sabbatino -
until Kirkpatrick, the last act of state case to command a majority in
the Supreme Court. The dissenters formed the largest and most
cohesive group in the intervening decisions. And rarely, if ever,
would they not have applied the doctrine to an act arguably at-
tributable to a foreign state.
Because of this "pure" stance, the dissenters opposed virtu-
ally every other theory put forth in Dunhill, except for a grudging
acceptance of the counterclaim exception. 347 They apparently
concluded that the validity of any act colorably performed on be-
half of a foreign state is not to be questioned in a U.S. court ab-
sent a clear consensus on relevant principles of international
law. 34 8 Their view that courts should consider the question on a
case-by-case basis rings hollow given their demand for nearly
complete certainty of international law before they would set
aside the act of state doctrine. Their unwillingness to displace the
doctrine even for the tortured facts of Dunhill makes one doubt
their willingness to displace the doctrine under any circum-
stance. 349 The factors the dissenters balance against the risk of
embarrassment to the executive seem so unlikely to weigh heavily
that the "pure theory" easily evolves into an unbreachable wall of
protection for any controversial act of a foreign state.350
The best known attempt actually to balance these factors was
in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America.35l The Bank of
America allegedly conspired with local interests to prevent
346. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l, 58
U.S.L.W. 4140, 4143 (1990).
347. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 733 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also infra
§ IV(B)(2).
348. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 718-23, 729-30 (Marshall,J., dissenting); City Bank,
406 U.S. at 786-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-30 (1964). The dissenters might have added the
possibility of the extinction of the government in question, although they did
not mention this aspect of Justice Harlan's theory in Sabbatino. See 376 U.S. at
428.
349. See the text at supra notes 157-61.
350. Cf McCormick, supra note 50, at 504 (the balancing test is "of 'mini-
mal utility' because 'the factors will always balance in favor of a court's applica-
tion of the act of state doctrine' due to the weight of the 'conflicting ideology'
element"); see also Note, supra note 43, at 612.
351. 549 F.2d 597, 603-05 (9th Cir. 1976).
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Timberlane from entering the Honduran lumber trade.
Timberlane further alleged that in furtherance of this conspiracy
the Bank corrupted an officer of a Honduran court and used Hon-
duran police and soldiers to keep Timberlane's people off dis-
puted land.
The trial court dismissed the proceedings, but the reason was
unclear.35 2 On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Judge Choy's opinion
concentrated on the act of state doctrine and the proper extrater-
ritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws. 35 3 In his discussion of the act
of state doctrine Judge Choy appeared to rely on the Dunhill plu-
rality to conclude that no public act was involved in the case.3 54
Turning to the extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws,
however, he announced a balancing test that he admitted was de-
rived from the act of state doctrine. 355 On remand, the district
court applied the balancing test and dismissed the complaint.3 56
Judge Choy's version of the balancing test was more detailed
than either Justice Harlan's in Sabbatino, the Dunhill dissenters or
Justice Scalia's in Kirkpatrick. Although Judge Choy included
some factors that are more attuned to the special problems of the
extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws than the usual
concerns under the act of state doctrine, other jurists have recog-
nized Judge Choy's analysis as developing the balancing test from
Sabbatino and Dunhill.357 Judge Choy wrote:
The elements to be weighed include the degree of
conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or alle-
giance of the parties and the location of principle places
352. Id. at 601-03.
353. Id. at 605-08 (the act of state doctrine), 608-16 (extraterritorial reach).
354. Id. at 608.
355. Id. at 613; compare Judge Choy's act-of-state analysis in International
Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1360 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
356. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., Nat'l Trust and Say. Ass'n,
574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).
357. Compania de Gas v. Entex, Inc., 686 F.2d 322, 326 n.4 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1041 (1983); Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671
F.2d 876, 884 n.7 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated mem., 460 U.S. 1007, decision reinstated
mem., 704 F.2d 785 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983); Sage Int'l, Ltd. v.
Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896, 905 (E.D. Mich. 1981); see also Comment,
supra note 132, at 778-80; Comment, IAM v. OPEC: CommercialActivity-One Fac-
tor in a Balancing Approach to the Act of State Doctrine, 14 LAw & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus.
215, 233-36 (1982); Note, An Exercise in Judicial Restraint: Limiting the Extraterrito-
rial Application of the Sherman Act under the Act of State Doctrine and Sovereign Immunity,
9 SYRACUSEJ. INT'L L. & COM. 379, 388-89 (1982); Note, supra note 343, at 327-
28 n.2, 335-37.
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of business of corporations, the extent to which enforce-
ment by either state can be expected to achieve compli-
ance, the relative significance of effects on the United
States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to
which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect Ameri-
can commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the
relative importance to the violations charged of conduct
within the United States as compared with conduct
abroad.3 5 8
Other courts have given us still more versions of the balanc-
ing test, 359 which differ in details, but add little in either certainty
or clarity to Judge Choy's version. Often the courts have said lit-
tle other than that there should be a balancing.3 60 The cases in
which the court attempted to develop the most elaborate balanc-
ing are the least helpful-these courts offered so many factors
that one cannot determine which, if any, are important, nor pre-
cisely why the decision was made. 36'
Although the balancing approach rests solidly on Sabba-
tino,362 it might just rest too solidly there. To defer to sovereign
acts as thoroughly as the "pure theory" requires abandons any
pretense of contributing to the growth or maturation of interna-
358. 549 F.2d at 614 (footnote omitted).
359. Airline Pilots Ass'n v. TACA Int'l Airlines, S.A., 748 F.2d 965, 970-71
(5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1100 (1985); Ramirez de Arellano v. Wein-
berger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1533-43 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 471
U.S. 1113 (1985); Compania de Gas v. Entex, Inc., 686 F.2d 322, 326 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1041 (1983); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum
Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979); Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage
Co., 534 F. Supp. 896, 901-11 (E.D. Mich. 1981); see also Bazyler, supra note 3, at
347-59; Chow, supra note 25, at 462-77; Comment, Applying an Amorphous Doctrine
Wisely: The Viability of the Act of State Doctrine after the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, 18 TEX. INT'L L.J. 547, 560-62 (1983); Note, The Act of State Doctrine: A Shield
for Bribery and Corruption, 16 INTERAMERICAN L. REV. 167, 169-72, 176 (1984).
360. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola, 757 F.2d 516, 521 (2d
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 934 (1985); DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 733 F.2d 701,
703 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1159 (1985); Clayco Petroleum Corp. v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 406-07 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1040 (1984); Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 694 F.2d 300, 304-05
(3d Cir. 1982); Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 884 n.7
(5th Cir. 1982), vacated mem., 460 U.S. 1007, decision reinstated mem., 704 F.2d 785
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983); International Ass'n of Machinists v.
OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1360-61 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163
(1982); Friedar v. Israel, 614 F. Supp. 395, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
361. See, e.g., Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1533-43
(D.C. Cir. 1984), vacatedon other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985); Sage Int'l, Ltd. v.
Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896, 901-11 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
362. 376 U.S. at 427-30.
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tional law. 363 Further, the "pure theory" or balancing approach
requires judges, who are often unfamiliar with the foreign policy
dimensions of a particular case, to balance these dimensions
against other dimensions which are only somewhat less impon-
derable-all without any substantial guidance from the depart-
ments of government charged with responsibility for the
dimensions to be balanced.3 64
The Dunhill dissenters further unsettled their position by va-
rying the basis they posited for it. At times they spoke of "polit-
ical questions," but ultimately they based their approach on the
choice of law nature of the issue to be decided.3 65 They did not
discuss why seeing the act of state doctrine as a choice of law rule
should require courts, in the context of modern interest analysis
choice of law approaches, to defer to rules of law from other
countries which the courts found offensive.
With an insistent and cohesive bloc of four Justices, backed
by widespread support in lower courts, and able to cite the last
majority opinion in the Supreme Court in support of this view,
one might have expected the "pure theory" to carry the day. One
of the dissenters (Justice Stewart), however, is already gone from
the Court, and others might leave soon. Support for other theo-
ries seems just as entrenched on the Court, and at least as widely
supported in lower courts. Thus the prospects for the "pure the-
ory" were uncertain at best.
Virtually all the comments addressed to the abstention and
political question theories could be equally addressed to this
"pure theory." 366 Nor does the dissenters' choice of law charac-
terization of the act of state doctrine strengthen the case for their
approach. That characterization will no more stand up to close
scrutiny than does the abstention or political question characteri-
zation. 367 Moreover, a court cannot avoid these policy problems
363. Id. at 439-72 (White, J., dissenting); Cooper, supra note 30, at 228-33;
Leigh & Sandier, supra note 30, at 700-09. Note that although Justice White was
the lone dissenter in Sabbatino, he joined the plurality in City Bank, and wrote the
plurality opinion in Dunhill. See also G. BARN & D. WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 461-65 (1989).
364. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 724-25, 727 (Marshall, J., dissenting); City Bank,
406 U.S. at 782-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Leigh & Sandier, supra note 30, at
699; Note, supra note 343, at 333-41.
365. On the political question theory, see Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 727-28 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); City Bank, 406 U.S. 759, 787-88 (1972) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). On the choice of law theory, see Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 726 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
366. See supra § III(A), (B).
367. See supra § III(C).
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by turning the balancing test into an absolute rule of repose that
provides virtually unassailable protection for any controversial
"act" that can be colorably attributed to a foreign state. While
this does encourage third parties to rely on "acts" of foreign
states, a court could provide this level of protection only by nour-
ishing cynicism about the possibility that a rule of law governs the
conduct of nations, and by embarrassing the executive's conduct
of foreign relations.368
The costs in international law terms might not relate directly
to the functions and policies of the act of state doctrine, but these
costs have had strong appeal and are the source of at least three
proposed exceptions to the doctrine.3 69 One could achieve con-
sistency between international law and the doctrine by careful
analysis. Resort to international law is justified by the familiar no-
tion that judgments are not entitled to recognition if there is a
strong reason to doubt the impartiality of the proceedings or of
the laws applied. While one might argue that the purpose of the
act of state doctrine is precisely to prevent inquiry into such mat-
ters, with the emergence of such limiting notions even regarding
sister-state judgments under the full faith and credit clause,370
one must expect such concerns to arise under the act of state doc-
trine as well.
Finally, the "pure theory" balancing approach can only work
with reasonable certainty and evenhandedness if a single court-
necessarily the Supreme Court-is willing and able to undertake
review of a large number of cases to develop the appropriate con-
tours of the balancing process. The "pure theory" would be bet-
ter abandoned. Rather, the Court should adopt the approach of
the four Justice plurality in Dunhill: to apply the doctrine to any
properly identified "act" of a foreign state subject to clearly an-
nounced limitations or exceptions consistent with the policies and
368. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-37
(1964).
369. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F. Supp. 412, 429-35 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), modified, 514 F. Supp. 5, aff'd as modified, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981); FALK
III, supra note 147, at 410-11; Halberstam, supra note 33; Lengel, supra note 52,
at 72-81, 91-102; see generally infra § IV(B)(3), (7), (9).
370. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984);
Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982); Allen v. McCurry, 449
U.S. 90 (1980); Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980);
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FLICT OF LAws § 103 (1971).
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functions of the doctrine. 371 The recent announcement by a
unanimous Supreme Court that balancing could be used to nar-
row, but not to widen, the scope of the act of state doctrine, 372 at
least significantly restricts the pure balancing theory. Whether
the Court will go as far as I have argued, and eschew the balanc-
ing approach, remains to be seen.
4. The "phenomenological approach"
In three cases decided on the same day by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, that court announced a so-called
"phenomenological approach." 373 The approach is an uncertain
amalgam of the commercial act exception, the counterclaim ex-
ception, the executive suggestion (Bernstein) exception, and the
"pure theory," without any attempt to analyze whether or how
these mutually inconsistent theories can be blended together. 374
The approach thus is more an expression of the utter confusion
bedeviling the act of state doctrine than a reasoned attempt to
develop a coherent theory of the doctrine. The theory has not
been referred to since, even in the Second Circuit.
5. Comity
In an apparent attempt to develop a coherent basis for its
approach to the act of state doctrine that other courts could un-
derstand and follow, a panel of the Second Circuit in 1984 redis-
covered the old notion that the doctrine was based on
"comity." 375 The court's brief per curiam opinion concluded on
this basis that the doctrine did not apply; this view was withdrawn
and replaced after a rehearing before the same panel with the re-
sult that the doctrine was applied to bar the proceeding.
In this curious episode the court presented comity as an al-
371. 425 U.S. at 682-715 (plurality op. per White, J.), 715 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
372. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l, 58
U.S.L.W. 4140, 4143 (1990).
373. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank, 658 F.2d 903, 911 (2d Cir.
1981); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 658 F.2d 895, 902
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1091 (1982); Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 884 (2d Cir. 1981).
374. See infra § IV(A)(3), (B)(1), (2), (5). For an attempt to explain this
blend, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, § 443 reporter's note 9.
375. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola, 733 F.2d Adv. Sht. 23 (2d
Cir. 1984), withdrawn & replaced on reh'g, 757 F.2d 516, 521-22 (2d Cir.), cert. dis-
missed, 473 U.S. 934 (1985). For the antecedents to this theory, see the text at
supra notes 55-58, 72, & 73.
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ternative to the act of state doctrine.3 76 Indeed, from early times
comity has been the governing notion underlying both interna-
tional choice of law and the recognition of foreign judgments. 377
To the extent that the act of state doctrine functions as a rule of
repose guaranteeing finality of decision to "acts" of foreign
states, comity will be an alternative consideration when the doc-
trine is not applied.378 No court, however, has explained why
comity should be relevant to the act of state doctrine itself.
The Second Circuit, however, has continued to flirt with the
notion of comity as a relevant guide to application of the act of
state doctrine, without attempting to develop how that inherently
nebulous notion should affect the application of the doctrine.379
One is left to puzzle over the implications of such a development
should the Second Circuit or other courts embark upon a serious
effort to develop the idea. Given that an excellent case has been
made that Chief Justice Fuller devised the act of state doctrine
precisely to evade the uncertainties of the notion of comity, to
now conclude that the doctrine merely expressed the notion of
comity would be ironic indeed. 380 Such an approach would seri-
ously undermine all of the policies, including certainty of deci-
sion, that the act of state doctrine was meant to serve.38'
B. Proposed Exceptions to the Act of State Doctrine
When the Supreme Court took up the case of Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Cuba,3s 2 many hoped that the Court would resolve
the growing confusion around the act of state doctrine. Unfortu-
nately, as no Justice was able to write on behalf of a majority, or
(perhaps because of the very search for a majority) to write with
sufficient clarity to prevent further confusion, Dunhill only com-
pounded the problems surrounding the doctrine. As the Justices
376. See Ebenroth & Teitz, supra note 25, at 235-39; Note, supra note 25, at
316-20.
377. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895); The Appollon, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824); EHRENZWEIG I, supra note 31, at 161-66; A. KUHN,
COMPARATIVE COMMENTARIES ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 29-30 (1937); J.
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 31-37, 47-48 (4th ed. 1852).
378. See, e.g., Remington Rand Corp. v. Business Sys. Inc., 830 F.2d 1260,
1266 (3d Cir. 1987); International Tin Council v. Amalgamet Inc., 138 Misc. 2d
383, 387-388, 524 N.Y.S.2d 971, 974 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 140 A.D.2d 1014,
529 N.Y.S.2d 983 (1988).
379. Bandes v. Harlow &Jones, Inc., 852 F.2d 661, 666 (2d Cir. 1988).
380. Note, supra note 43, at 601-05.
381. See the text at supra notes 261-69.
382. 425 U.S. 682 (1976). See the text at supra notes 157-73.
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did seem to embrace the notion that the doctrine should be ap-
plied unless some exception were found,38 3 lower courts, lawyers,
and legal scholars have apparently taken the Court's lack of clarity
as an invitation to devise their own exceptions to the doctrine,
almost without regard for its functions or underlying policies.
The idea of an act of state doctrine limited by proposed ex-
ceptions antedates the Dunhill decision.384 Since Dunhill was de-
cided, no less than eleven exceptions, including some that
originated before Dunhill, have found support by jurists or others
in a position to influence court decisions. Yet these proposed ex-
ceptions, unlike the territorial limitation, remain controversial.
To determine which, if any, of these exceptions courts should ac-
cept, one must carefully evaluate them in light of the policies and
purposes of the doctrine. 385
1. Commercial acts
Justice White's plurality opinion in Dunhill386 posited an alto-
gether new exception to the act of state doctrine for the commer-
cial acts of foreign states. The newness of his theory was shown
by his citation of only two act of state cases in this part of the
opinion: Banco Nacional de Cuba v, Sabbatino, for the general poli-
cies underlying the doctrine; 387 and Underhill v. Hernandez, for the
statement that the doctrine protects "the exercise of governmen-
tal authority,-3 88 a statement that had never before been taken to
suggest the exclusion of commercial acts from the doctrine.38 9
383. Even the four dissenters, who generally opposed such a rule-oriented
approach in favor of a balancing approach, see supra § IV(A)(3), embraced-al-
beit reluctantly-a "counterclaim exception" to the act of state doctrine; see Dun-
hill, 425 U.S. at 733 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also infra § IV(B)(2).
384. See, e.g., Note, International Law-Act of State Doctrine-First National
City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 49 WASH. L. REV. 213, 223-24 (1973).
385. See the text at supra notes 261-69.
386. 425 U.S. 682, 695-706 (plurality op. per White, J.) (1976).
387. Id. at 697, 704 & n.16, 706 (citing Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)).
388. Id. at 706 (quoting Underhill, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)).
389. Note that when Underhill was decided, foreign states were absolutely
immune if they were sued in U.S. courts. See Berizzi Bros. v. The Pesaro, 271
U.S. 562 (1926); The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116
(1812). This makes it unlikely that Chief Justice Fuller had an exception for
commercial acts in mind when he wrote Underhill: such an exception had ap-
peared nowhere in the common law at that time, and was then only beginning to
emerge (under a different name) in the civil law. See generally J. DELLAPENNA,
supra note ***, at 3-8. Justice White did cite 29 recent sovereign immunity cases
to bolster his contention: 7 involving foreign sovereigns before U.S. courts,
Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 703; 8 involving domestic sovereigns before U.S. courts, id.
at 695; and 14 involving foreign sovereigns before foreign courts, id. at 702
n.15.
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Justice White's suggestion did not come wholly out of the
blue. The Legal Adviser to the State Department had issued a
Bernstein letter for Dunhill in which he suggested an exception for
commercial acts. 390 The Solicitor General appeared as amicus cu-
riae in the case and pressed the argument for a commercial act
exception. 39' With the history of deference to the executive
branch in matters touching on foreign affairs,3 92 one might have
expected a majority of the Court to adopt this position. Appar-
ently Justice White thought so as well. His phrasing of this part of
the plurality opinion in terms of "we hold" could suggest that the
opinion commanded the support of a majority at one stage in its
evolution from pen to published opinion.393 All such expecta-
tions were disappointed.
Despite strong support from within and without the Court,
only three Justices, Justice White joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Rehnquist, unequivocally supported a commercial act
exception.3 94 Justice Powell made an unsteady fourth. He stated
in his separate opinion that he concurred in the entire plurality
opinion, but only because he could not foresee that embarrass-
ment to the conduct of foreign relations could arise from "cases
involving only the commercial acts of foreign states."3 95 The
other five Justices refused to accept a commercial act excep-
tion.3 96 OnlyJustice Stevens left open the possibility of accepting
such an exception at a later time.
Dunhill thus provides tenuous authority at best for a commer-
cial act exception to the act of state doctrine. Still, a surprising
number of lower courts and commentators have relied on Dunhill
as establishing the exception.3 97 Congress apparently also read
390. 425 U.S. at 706-11; see also infra § IV(B)(4).
391. 425 U.S. at 696-97.
392. Cf Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945); Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S.
578 (1943); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 222-23, 229 (1942); United
States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 328 (1937); United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936); Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amer-
ikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954); see generally
Cooper, supra note 30, at 210-28; Comment, supra note 337, at 688-91; see also
infra § IV(B)(4).
393. 425 U.S. at 705. The suspicion is shared by Monroe Leigh, the Legal
Adviser who issued the Bernstein letter in Dunhill. Leigh & Sandier, supra note 30,
at 693 n.26.
394. 425 U.S. at 684 n.* (plurality op. per White, J.).
395. Id. at 715 (Powell, J., concurring).
396. Id. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring), 724-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
397. Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 359 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed,
480 U.S. 942, cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987); Empresa Cubana v. Lamborn &
Co., 652 F.2d 231, 238 (2d Cir. 1981); Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors
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Dunhill as establishing a commercial act exception. 398 In other
cases, courts avoided passing on the commercial act exception by
finding the act in question was not commercial.3 99
Supporters of the commercial act exception generally claim
that it is only "natural" to limit the act of state doctrine to "public
Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1380-81 (5th Cir. 1980); Egyptian Navigation Co. v.
Uiterwyk, No. 83-334 Civ-T-10 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 7, 1988) (WESTLAW, 1988 WL
70047); Gage Int'l Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896, 899-900, 905-08
(E.D. Mich. 1981); American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Iran, 493 F. Supp. 522, 525
(D.D.C. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 657 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Behring Int'l,
Inc. v. Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 396, 401 (D.N.J. 1979), order vacating deci-
sion on 'other grounds aff'd, 699 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1983); Dominicus Americana
Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680, 689-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Phoenix Canada Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 445, 458 (D. Del. 1978);
National Am. Corp. v. Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd on
other grounds, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); Mirabella v. Banco Indus. de la Rep.
Argentina, 101 Misc. 2d 767, 769, 421 N.Y.S.2d 960, 961-62 (Sup. Ct. 1979);
Lucchino v. Foreign Countries, 82 Pa. Commw. 406, 476 A.2d 1369 (1984), va-
cated on other grounds after removal, 631 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Chow, supra
note 25, at 458-59; Cooper, supra note 30, at 204-06; Friedman & Blau, Formulat-
ing a Commercial Exception to the Act of State Doctrine: Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc.
v. Republic of Cuba, 50 ST.JoHN'S L. REV. 666 (1976); Golbert & Bradford, supra
note 30, at 35-37; Kahale, Characterizing Nationalizations for Purposes of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act and the Act of State Doctrine, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 391, 395-
96 (1983); Leigh & Sandler, supra note 30, at 693-96; Timberg, supra note 66, at
33; Comment, supra note 119, at 483-84; Comment, supra note 132, at 770-72;
Comment, supra note 226, at 113-14; Comment, Rationalizing the Federal Act of
State Doctrine and Evolving Judicial Exceptions, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 295, 318-19
(1977); Note, supra note 43, at 631-37; Note, supra note 359, at 172-73.
398. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 20 n.1, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6619 n.l [hereafter H.R. REP. 94-
1487 with pagination given only to the reprinted version].
399. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847
F.2d 1052, 1058-59 (3d Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 58 U.S.L.W. 4140
(1990); West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 828 n.5 (9th Cir.).
cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987); Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1114-
16 (5th Cir. 1985); Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222, 225 (2d Cir. 1985);
Airline Pilots Ass'n v. Taca Int'l Airlines, 748 F.2d 965, 970 n.2 (5th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1100 (1985); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Banco Nacional
de Cuba, 658 F.2d 895, 902 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1091 (1982);
Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 72-73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984
(1977); Federal Rep. of Germany v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 813, 825 (E.D.N.Y.
1978), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Kunstammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon,
678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982); New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power
Generation and Transmission Co., 502 F. Supp. 120, 124 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
remanded on other grounds, 646 F.2d 779 (2d Cir.), order rev'dsub nom. Marschalk Co.
v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 657 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1981); Outboard Marine Corp. v.
Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384, 398 (D. Del. 1978); Bokkelen v. Grumman Aerospace
Corp., 432 F. Supp. 329, 333-34 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); D'Angelo v. PEMEX, 422 F.
Supp. 1280, 1286 (D. Del. 1976), aft'd, 564 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1977); see also RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, § 443 comment c & reporters' note 6; McCor-
mick, supra note 50, at 505-11.
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acts" by excluding "commercial acts." 40 0 One might well be
skeptical of how natural a corollary it is when it remained unseen
for eighty years after the doctrine emerged. 40 1 How one is to
convince someone who does not immediately perceive the "natu-
ralness" of the exception remains unclear.
Other supporters have argued that the commercial act excep-
tion will remove the act of state doctrine from litigation involving
private parties, much as does a finding of bad faith on the part of
a foreign official for the related foreign sovereign compulsion de-
fense.40 2 The argument fails, however, because arguably a pur-
pose of the act of state doctrine is precisely to prevent inquiry
into the motives of foreign state officials. 40 3 Nor will the excep-
tion remove the doctrine from litigation between private parties;
many such cases will turn upon "public acts" rather than "com-
mercial acts" by foreign states.40 4
More recently, supporters of the exception have turned in-
creasingly to a claim that it is absurd to distinguish between the
act of state doctrine and foreign sovereign immunity.40 5 The ar-
400. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 695-96; Cooper, supra note 30, at 204-07; Leigh &
Sandier, supra note 30, at 693-95.
401. The only pre-Dunhill case that might possibly have discussed a com-
mercial act exception is Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d
354, 363 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965). The language in this
decision is so obscure in this regard, however, that neither the plurality in Dun-
hill nor other courts or commentators have cited it in support of the supposed
exception.
402. Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404,
407-09 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984); Northrop Corp. v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1047-48 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 849 (1983); Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48, 55 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980); Friedman & Blau, supra note 397, at
685; Hawk, Act of State Doctrine, Noerr-Pennington Abroad and the Foreign Government
Compulsion Defense, 47 ANTITRUST L.J. 987 (1978); Note, supra note 43, at 637-45;
see generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, §§ 441, 442.
403. Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1380 (5th
Cir. 1980); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 76-77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 984 (1977); General Aircraft Corp. v. Air Am., Inc., 482 F. Supp. 3, 6-7
(D.D.C. 1979); Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus., 473 F.
Supp. 680, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas &
Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
404. Braka v. Bancomer, 762 F.2d 222, 225 (2d Cir. 1985); Clayco Petro-
leum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 406-08 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984); Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 694
F.2d 300, 301-03 (3d Cir. 1982); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 76-77
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977). Even one of the advocates of a com-
mercial act exception recognized this. Hawk, supra note 402, at 995.
405. Chisholm & Co. v. Bank ofJamaica, 643 F. Supp. 1393, 1403 n.9 (S.D.
Fla. 1986); Cooper, supra note 30, at 227-28; Golbert & Bradford, supra note 30,
at 35-37; Leigh & Sandier, supra note 30, at 694-96; Comment, supra note 205;
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gument merely displays failure to understand the very different
roles the two concepts play. This argument views the act of state
doctrine as simply another rule restricting the jurisdiction of
courts. While some Supreme Court Justices have used language
supportive of this view, even questioning the utility of distinguish-
ing between the act of state doctrine and the immunity of foreign
sovereigns, 40 6 the Court as a whole has consistently recognized
that the two doctrines are functionally different.
Foreign sovereign immunity is a rule of substantive law which
sometimes provides the rule of decision in suits against foreign
states.40 7 As such, it serves to regulate the conduct of foreign
states towards private individuals in transactions or events signifi-
cantly connected to the United States. 40 8 The act of state doc-
trine, on the other hand, is neither a rule of jurisdictional
immunity or abstention, 40 9 nor a full-fledged rule of decision.
Rather, it is a rule of repose requiring the recognition of certain
decisions effectuated by a foreign state. 410
As a result, the possibility of a commercial act exception to
the act of state doctrine has also encountered strong criticism. 411
Surprisingly, given that at least five Justices voted against a com-
mercial act exception in the case which first gave voice to it, only
one lower court has unequivocally rejected the exception. 41 2
Comment, supra note 149; Note, supra note 43, at 631-37. But see Kahale, supra
note 397.
406. See Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 697-99, 705-06 (plurality op. per WhiteJ.); City
Bank, 406 U.S. at 762-63 (plurality op. per Rehnquist, J.).
407. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493-98
(1983).
408. See generally J. DELLAPENNA, supra note ***, at 30-33, 66-108, 144-45.
For a more complete analysis of the policies expressed in the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982), seeJ. DELLAPENNA, supra note
* at 8-13.
409. All Justices in Dunhill agreed on this point. 425 U.S. at 705 n.18 (plu-
rality op. per White, J.), 715 (Powell, J., concurring), 726-28 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting); see also Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918); see
generally infra § IV.
410. See Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918); see gener-
ally supra § III; see also Golbert & Bradford, supra note 30, at 8-27; Mathias, supra
note 3, at 392-401.
411. Lengel, supra note 52, at 90; McCormick, supra note 50, at 511-14,519-
32; Comment, supra note 132, at 781-96; Comment, supra note 337, at 691-94;
Comment, supra note 359, at 563-71; Note, International Association of Machin-
ists v. OPEC: The Ninth Circuit Breathes New Life into the Act-of-State Doctrine in Com-
mercial Settings, 16 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 427, 444-49 (1982); Note,
supra note 200, at 737-40; Note, supra note 357, at 397-400.
412. International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1359-60
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
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Still, simply characterizing an act as commercial does not demon-
strate that the policies underlying the act of state doctrine do not
apply to the act.
Proponents of a commercial act exception contend that a for-
eign state cannot feel affront if the act in question does not in-
volve a sovereign, or public policy judgment.4 13 The proponents
do not disclose why this should be so. Reliance on the finality of
the act, the waste of public and private decision-making re-
sources, and the potential to affront the sovereign dignity of a
foreign state are not lessened by pinning the label "commercial"
on the act.41 4 Prudence, at least, could cause a court to accord
the protection of the act of state doctrine to decisions of a foreign
state affecting that state's interests and made within its own terri-
tory regardless of whether the resulting "act" be characterized
sovereign, commercial, public, or private. 415
Acceptance of an exception for commercial acts would intro-
duce a new problem: what constitutes a "commercial act" for
purposes of the act of state doctrine. While Justice White's plu-
rality opinion in Dunhill maintained that the standards developed
for the immunity of foreign sovereigns would be appropriate to
the act of state doctrine, 4 16 the thirty-four sovereign immunity
cases he cited were already deeply divided over the proper test to
determine if an act is commercial or private. At that time, Ameri-
can courts usually looked to the purpose of an act to determine
whether it was commercial, while courts abroad usually looked to
its "nature. '41 7 Shortly after Dunhill, Congress opted for the "na-
413. See, e.g., Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 695-707 (plurality op. per White, J.); Phil-
ippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 358-59 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 480 U.S.
942, cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum
Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1294 (3d Cir. 1979).
414. See, e.g., Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 724-30 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 694 F.2d 300, 302-04 (3d Cir. 1982); Interna-
tional Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1359-60 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621
F.2d 1371, 1380 (5th Cir. 1980); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 76-77
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
415. Remember that only some decisions qualify as "acts" for purposes of
the act of state doctrine. See supra § IV(A)(1).
416. 425 U.S. at 702-05 (plurality op. per White, J.). The Legal Adviser to
the State Department also told the Court that the sovereign immunity standards
would be a workable guide. Id. at 707; Leigh & Sandler, supra note 30, at 695-
96.
417. See, e.g., Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354 (2d
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965); see generally J. DELLAPENNA, supra note
***, at 148-50.
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ture" test in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 418 Justice
White gave no hint as to whether he expected courts to follow
such changes. The four dissenters in Dunhill were content merely
to decry the inherent uncertainty of a commercial act exception
and thus gave no hint of their attitude towards such changes.4' 9
Commentators on the question are divided into two camps:
those who believe that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is
utterly meaningless if the act of state doctrine provides a different
test for commercial acts,420 and those who believe that the stan-
dards for the Immunities Act and the doctrine must necessarily be
different because they serve different policies and seek different
goals.42' Congress seems to have opted for the latter view if one
takes as controlling the statement in the section-by-section analy-
sis of the Immunities Act that it was to have no effect on the sub-
stantive law to be applied in cases under it.422 Congress also
expressly approved the plurality opinion in Dunhill and the amicus
brief of the United States in that case, both of which were based
on the earlier, "purpose" test.423 Yet the remarks were suffi-
ciently unfocused that some commentators have remained
unconvinced.
Since Dunhill, the Supreme Court has not reconsidered or
clarified whether there is a commercial act exception, or how it
should be applied. Despite the great deal of ink consumed debat-
ing how to decide whether an act of state is commercial, which
test is ultimately applied probably does not make much differ-
ence. Even under the purportedly more certain "nature" test
adopted by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, determining
which acts are commercial and which are not has proven highly
uncertain. 424 The continuing uncertainty over how a supposed
exception for commercial acts would be applied perhaps explains
the paucity of cases actually relying on it despite the many cases
418. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1982).
419. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 728-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
420. See, e.g., Bazyler, supra note 3, at 377; Ebenroth & Teitz, supra note 25,
at 252; Lengel, supra note 52; Comment, supra note 119, at 484 n.84; Comment,
supra note 205, at 100-12, 114-15; Note, supra note 200, at 736-37 n.102, 741.
421. See, e.g., Ebenroth & Teitz, supra note 25, at 230-31; McCormick, supra
note 50, at 519-24, 535-38; Comment, supra note 132, at 774-77, 781-96; Note,
supra note 200, at 737-40, 742-46; Note, supra note 411, at 439-49.
422. H.R. REP. 94-1487, supra note 398, at 6610, 6621; see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1606 (1982);J. DELLAPENNA, supra note ***, at 214-21, 235-40.
423. H.R. REP. 94-1487, supra note 398, at 6619 n.l.
424. SeeJ. DELLAPENNA, supra note ***, at 147-64.
81
Dellapenna: Deciphering the Act of State Doctrine
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1990
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
purportedly accepting it in principle.425 This uncertainty rein-
forces the irrelevance of the label "commercial" to the policies
underlying the act of state doctrine and underscores the reasons
why courts should not incorporate a commercial act exception
into the act of state doctrine.
2. Counterproceedings
Perhaps no proposed exception to the act of state doctrine
better illustrates the difference between a rule of repose and a
rule restricting competence or jurisdiction than the so-called
counterclaim exception. In the cases in which the counterclaim
exception was considered by the Supreme Court, Cuba sought to
have American courts enforce Cuban decisions, not to judge their
validity. The growing confusion over this posture produced a
most peculiar history. Rejected in what many consider the last
definitive statement of the act of state doctrine in the Supreme
Court, the exception has since been adopted by a majority of the
Justices-but not in a single case. Subsequently, several lower
court opinions rejected the purported exception.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino426 involved a counterclaim
against the Cuban bank. Justice Harlan's majority opinion re-
jected the possibility of an exception for counterproceedings.
Justice White's dissent did not dispute the point.
Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in First National City Bank
v. Banco Nacional de Cuba 427 proposed an exception for counter-
proceedings as a secondary theory, apparently in a vain attempt
to obtain a majority for the opinion. Justice Rehnquist succeeded
in getting Justice Douglas' support for this theory, although the
latter's concurring opinion was so obscurely worded that one can-
not even be certain that it concerns the act of state doctrine rather
than foreign sovereign immunity. 428 The four dissenters, relying
425. See supra notes 397 & 399. Of the cases cited there, only three appear
to have been actually decided on the basis of a commercial act exception, and
one of those was vacated on other grounds, leaving only an unreported district
court opinion as the strongest support for the exception. See Egyptian Nav. Co.
v. Uiterwyk, No. 83-334 Civ-T-10 (M.D. Fla.Jan. 7, 1988) (WESTLAW, 1988 WL
70047); Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 396, 401 (D.N.J.
1979); Lucchino v. Foreign Countries, 82 Pa. Commw. 406, 476 A.2d 1369
(1984), vacated on other grounds after removal, 631 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Pa. 1986); see
also Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1115 n.17 (5th Cir. 1985).
426. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
427. 406 U.S. 759, 768 (1972) (plurality op. per Rehnquist, J.).
428. Id. at 770-73 (Douglas, J., concurring in result). Justice Douglas de-
clared the act of state doctrine irrelevant, and based his entire opinion on a
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on Sabbatino, strongly objected to an exception for counter-
proceedings, arguing that it confused the act of state doctrine
with foreign sovereign immunity. 429 Justice Powell adopted his
own theory without commenting on the possibility of a counter-
proceeding exception. 430
Another act of state case decided by the Supreme Court, Al-
fred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba,43 1 also involved counterclaims
against Cuban government agencies, with the majority producing
three opinions with widely differing rationales. The plurality and
concurring opinions held the act of state doctrine inapplicable
and never reached the supposed exception for counterproceed-
ings. The four dissenters, finding that the act of state doctrine
applicable, felt obliged to apply the counterproceeding exception
which they found to have been established in City Bank by a "bare
majority." 432 Noting that in City Bank the counterclaim was lim-
ited to recovery of the amount of the Cuban claim, the dissenters
would have carried the limitation forward, applying the limitation
separately to each of nine claims in the case rather than permit-
ting the claims of the different parties to be aggregated. 433 They
argued that permitting aggregation would make the outcome of a
particular claim turn on the accident of joinder or consolidation
of proceedings.
After Dunhill, eight Justices had apparently approved an ex-
ception for counterproceedings. This would appear to put the
exception on firmer ground than most other exceptions proposed
for the act of state doctrine. When the Supreme Court was next
presented with an opportunity to pass on the supposed excep-
tion, however, it chose to rest its decision on other grounds, dis-
missing the counterproceeding exception in a footnote.434
The supposed exception for counterproceedings is on shak-
ier ground than its champions believe. In City Bank, only Justice
Douglas based his decision on anything that actually resembles
single case dealing with counterclaims as negating foreign sovereign immunity,
National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
429. 406 U.S. at 778, 793-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
430. Id. at 773-74 (Powell, J., concurring).
431. 425 U.S. 682, 684-706 (plurality op. by White, J.), 715 (Stevens, J.,
concurring), 715 (Powell, J., concurring) (1976). See the text at supra notes 157-
70.
432. 425 U.S. at 733 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
433. Id. at 732-37.
434. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco para el Comercio Exterior, 462 U.S.
611, 634 n.28 (1983).
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the theory.435 The four dissenters in Dunhill embraced the coun-
terclaim exception only grudgingly and presumably would have
rejected it if they had believed they could obtain the one addi-
tional vote necessary to prevail with their "pure theory." 436 Only
one lower court decision before Dunhill had applied the counter-
proceeding exception, and that case itself was reversed in Dunhill
for limiting recovery to the amounts which the Cuban agents
claimed against each party.437
Since Dunhill was decided, courts have arguably applied the
counterclaim exception on only three occasions. In 1981 a panel
of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided four cases
on one day. In two of them the court applied the counter-
proceeding exception, along with other theories, without clearly
indicating which theory was controlling.438 The other two cases
also involved counterclaims, but were resolved without resort to a
counterproceeding exception.439 In the third case in which a
court asserted the exception, the court also suggested that there
was no act of state in the case, thus reducing its discussion of the
counterproceeding exception to dictum. 440
More recent cases have uniformly retreated from the sup-
posed counterproceeding exception. Judge Mansfield, whose
opinion in the Second Circuit in what became the Dunhill case was
the only lower court authority for the supposed exception, eight
years afterwards (five years after Dunhill came down from the
Supreme Court) wrote an opinion denying there was such an ex-
ception.44 1 Judge Kearse, who wrote the two subsequent Second
Circuit opinions supporting a counterproceeding exception, also
ignored the exception in a later decision of a companion case to
his two earlier cases. 442 Only in later proceedings of one of the
435. 406 U.S. at 770-73 (Douglas, J., concurring).
436. 425 U.S. at 733 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
437. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1373-74 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd
sub nom. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
438. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank, 658 F.2d 903, 909-13 (2d
Cir. 1981); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875,
881-85 (2d Cir. 1981).
439. Banco para el Comercio Exterior v. First Nat'l City Bank, 658 F.2d 913
(2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 462 U.S. 611 (1983); First Nat'l Bank v. Banco Nacional de
Cuba, 658 F.2d 895, 902-03 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1091 (1982).
440. The Amoco Cadiz, 491 F. Supp. 161, 169 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
441. Empresa Cubana v. Lamborn & Co., 652 F.2d 231, 237-38 (2d Cir.
1981). ForJudge Mansfield's earlier opinion, see Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485
F.2d 1355, 1372 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
442. Banco para el Comercio Exterior v. First Nat'l City Bank, 744 F.2d
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three cases in which the exception was applied did the court
(Judge Kearse again) rest on the supposed exception-but more
on "law of the case" grounds than on any further analysis of
whether such an exception exists. 443 One cannot, then, take the
counterclaim exception as definitely established.444
To accept an exception for counterproceedings, one must ac-
cept the erroneous notion that the act of state doctrine is simply a
subsidiary application of the principle of foreign sovereign immu-
nity. 44 5 There is no reason to conclude that the same solution is
appropriate to similar problems under the two doctrines-even
though a foreign state, by filing of a suit, implicitly waives some of
its sovereign immunity.446 Nor, given the differing policies be-
hind the two doctrines, does simple equity require that the act of
state doctrine be set aside when the foreign state brings a suit, no
matter how sensible that may be in the context of sovereign
immunity.447
Although a careful policy analysis of the act of state doctrine
leads to the conclusion that courts should reject an exception for
counterproceedings as such, the exception unfortunately is nearly
established in the case law. 44 8 In light of the unsettled state of the
exception in the Supreme Court, however, it is not too late to
hope that the exception might yet be disallowed.
237, 241-42 (2.d Cir. 1984), on remand from 462 U.S. 611 (1983). The issue was
also noted and ignored in Ethiopian Spice Extraction Co. v. Kalamazoo Spice
Extraction Co., 543 F. Supp. 1224, 1228-29 (W.D. Mich. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422 (6th
Cir. 1984).
443. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank, 822 F.2d 230, 236-37 (2d
Cir. 1987).
444. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, § 443 reporters' note 9.
445. See, e.g., First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S.
759, 778, 793-96 (1972) (Brennan,J., dissenting); Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comi-
saria Gen. 336 F.2d 354, 362-63 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965);
see also Cooper, supra note 30, at 193-94, 203-09, 233-35; Mathias, supra note 3,
at 372-73; Singer, supra note 1, at 296-301.
446. 28 U.S.C. § 1607 (1982); National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348
U.S. 356 (1955).
447. See the text at supra notes 261-69 & 405-10. Compare First Nat'l City
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972) with National City Bank v.
Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
448. See Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 732-37 (Marshall, J., dissenting); First Nat'l
City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 768-69 (plurality op. per
Rehnquist,J.), 770-73 (Douglas,J, concurring) (1972); Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Chemical Bank, 822 F.2d 230, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1987), afg 658 F.2d 903, 909-
13 (2d Cir. 1981); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d
875, 881-85 (2d Cir. 1981); The Amoco Cadiz, 491 F. Supp. 161, 169 (N.D. Ill.
1979).
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3. Customary international law
One might think Justice Harlan's oft-quoted opinion in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino4 49 would preclude an exception for
violations of customary international law. He not only found that
the act of state doctrine is not a rule of international law, 450 but
he also refused to except a purported violation of customary in-
ternational law from the doctrine. 45i Yet Richard Falk452 read
Justice Harlan's opinion as indicating an exception for acts in vio-
lation of clearly and widely accepted principles of customary in-
ternational law, relying on the following passage:
It should be apparent that the greater the degree of cod-
ification or consensus concerning a particular area of in-
ternational law, the more appropriate it is for the
judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the
courts can then focus on the application of an agreed
principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the sen-
sitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent
with the national interest or with international jus-
tice .... (W]e decide only that the Judicial Branch will
not examine the validity of a taking of property ... in the
absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement re-
garding controlling legal principles, even if the com-
plaint alleges that the taking violates customary
international law.453
Since Sabbatino, lawyers have seldom argued for a customary
international law exception, 45 4 perhaps because they expect sum-
mary rejection of such an argument. Only two courts have ap-
plied customary international law in the face of the act of state
doctrine, but in both cases the court relied on a different excep-
449. 376 U.S. 398 (1964); see generally supra § II(D)(1).
450. 376 U.S. at 421-23.
451. Id. at 427-35.
452. FALK III, supra note 147, at 410-11. Michael Bazyler, supra note 3, at
336 n.58, has identified Falk's earlier article criticizing the trial court's handling
of the Sabbatino case as the primary source ofJustice Harlan's opinion. See Falk,
Toward a Theory of the Participation of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order:
A Critique of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 16 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1961);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, § 443 comment d; Halberstam,
supra note 33; Lengel, supra note 52, at 72-81, 91-102.
453. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428. The paragraph containing this passage is
quoted in full supra at note 135.
454. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287,
1292-93 (3d Cir. 1979).
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tion to displace the doctrine.4 55 One might also cite cases like
Bernstein v. N. V Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschap-
p/4 56 as actually having been based on such an exception,
although the courts in those cases explained their decisions
differently.
If a customary international law exception were accepted,
there would be considerable uncertainty as to which rules of cus-
tomary international law are sufficiently established to qualify for
the exception. 4 57 One of the more candid champions of this ex-
ception frankly acknowledged that it is simply a variant form of
the purported human rights exception.458  These problems
should not prevent a court from accepting the exception.
As Justice Harlan indicated in Sabbatino, so long as the law in
question is clear enough to prevent either the foreign state or
third parties from relying on the finality or validity of the act,
American courts should not accord an irrebuttable presumption
of validity to acts violating customary international law. Such an
exception would eliminate the act of state doctrine as "the single
most important reason for the arrested development of interna-
tional law in the United States.""4 59 The analysis of the treaty ex-
ception more fully develops why this conclusion is consistent with
455. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (dictum
supporting the customary international law exception; acts held not to be acts of
a state); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F. Supp. 412,
429-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (customary international law applied because the excep-
tion for counterproceedings removes the act of state doctrine), modified, 514 F.
Supp. 5, aff'd, 658 F.2d 875, 885 (2d Cir. 1981).
456. 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949), modified per curiam, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir.
1954); see also Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
835 (1976); Kalmich v. Bruno, 450 F. Supp. 227 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Menzel v. List,
49 Misc. 2d 300, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 1966), aff'd in part, modified in part,
28 A.D.2d 516, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 24 N.Y.2d 91, 246
N.E.2d 742, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1969); see generally supra § IV(B)(4).
457. Note that although the Supreme Court found the question of an inter-
national legal duty to compensate for expropriated property to be too uncertain
to except from the act of state doctrine, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, 428-31 (1964), Judge Kearse found such a rule certain enough to
apply after having set the act of state doctrine aside under the highly questiona-
ble exception for counterproceedings. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical
Bank, 822 F.2d 230, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Buck, 690 F.
Supp. 1291, 1300-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
458. Comment, supra note 132, at 790 n.139; see infra § IV(B)(7).
459. Bazyler, supra note 3, at 329, 381-84; see also First Nat'l City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 775 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring);
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 439-72 (1964) (White, J.,
dissenting); FALK I, supra note 136; Friedman, National Courts and the International
Legal Order: Projections on the Implications of the Sabbatino Case, 34 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 443 (1966); Mathias, supra note 3, at 414; Wallace, supra note 3, at 25.
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the policies underlying act of state doctrine. 460
4. Executive suggestions (the Bernstein exception)
The concept of an exception for executive suggestions, usu-
ally known as the Bernstein exception, epitomizes the difficulties in
applying the act of state doctrine. The exception originated as a
ploy for evading the doctrihe in order to redress Nazi looting.46'
The exception has never been applied in any other case-not
even in other cases involving Nazi gangsterism. 462 The exception
was apparently twice disavowed by a majority of the Supreme
Court, but it continues to be resurrected in both judicial opinions
and scholarly writings. 463
Arnold Bernstein was arrested and held for two years by
vaguely identified Nazi officials, during which time he was coerced
into signing his property over to persons designated by those offi-
cials. 4 64 The defendants sometime later took title to the property,
allegedly with knowledge of its extortion from an imprisoned
Jew. 46 5 Although the Nazi acts apparently were illegal even under
the German law of the time, 466 the first case against ultimate hold-
ers of the property was dismissed on act of state grounds. An
American court could not sit in judgment on the acts of a foreign
state within its own territory, notwithstanding the World War
fought in part to establish the international illegality of the acts or
the Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal declaring the acts crim-
inal under international law. 4 67
Judge Learned Hand, writing for the majority, suggested that
as the act of state doctrine was created to shield the executive
460. See infra § IV(B)(9).
461. See Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-
Maatschappij, 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949), modified per curiam, 210 F.2d 375 (2d
Cir. 1954); see also Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres S.A., 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947).
462. See, e.g., Kalmich v. Bruno, 450 F. Supp. 227 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Menzel v.
List, 49 Misc. 2d 300, 313, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 818 (Sup. Ct. 1966), modified on
other grounds, 28 A.D.2d 516, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 24
N.Y.2d 91, 246 N.E.2d 742, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1969).
463. The Bernstein exception has produced more scholarly comment than
almost any other aspect of the act of state doctrine. For a reasonably complete
list of recent articles on the Bernstein exception, see Comment, supra note 337, at
690 n.74. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, § 443 reporters' note 8.
464. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres S.A., 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947).
465. Id. at 247.
466. Id. at 249.
467. Id. at 251-52.
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from embarrassment in its conduct of foreign relations, the doc-
trine might be set aside if the executive were to suggest that no
embarrassment would result from disregarding the doctrine. 468
The majority declined to infer such a suggestion from the many
formal denunciations of Nazi acts by the executive, including the
repeal of the Nazi racial laws by the occupation authorities. 469
Judge Clark dissented precisely because there could be no possi-
ble embarrassment to the executive's conduct of foreign
relations.470
Bernstein proved remarkably slow to take up Judge Hand's
suggestion. He began a second suit, Bernstein v. N. V. Neder-
landsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappj,471 against another
ultimate purchaser, only substituting a general allegation of du-
ress for any mention of Nazi action. Taking notice from the ear-
lier suit of the nature of the duress, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit again upheld a dismissal on act of state grounds.
Only after the second dismissal did Bernstein secure a letter from
the Legal Adviser to the State Department stating that there
would be no embarrassment to our conduct of foreign relations if
the suit were to proceed without regard to the act of state doc-
trine.472 Based on this letter, the Court of Appeals reversed itself
in a per curiam opinion, nearly five years later, and permitted Bern-
stein's suit to proceed. 473
The peculiar facts of the Bernstein cases might permit one to
consider the cases to fall outside the scope of the act of state doc-
trine regardless of what the State Department chose to say. In
fact, several other purported exceptions to the doctrine claim the
second Bernstein decision as the first, perhaps the only, instance of
actual application of the other exception. 474 The insistence of the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on an explicit waiver
from the State Department, however, appeared to introduce a
new and sweeping potential for executive interference of the sort
that had then recently become established for questions of for-
468. Id. at 250-51.
469. Id. at 251-52.
470. Id. at 253-55 (Clark, J., dissenting).
471. 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949), modified per curiam, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir.
1954).
472. See Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlansche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maat-
schappij, 210 F.2d 375, 376 (2d Cir. 1954) (per curiam).
473. Id. at 375.
474. The customary international law exception, supra § IV(C)(3); the gov-
ernmental extinction exception, infra § IV(C)(6); the human rights exception,
infra § IV(C)(7); and the unjust enrichment exception, infra § IV(C)(10).
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eign sovereign immunity.475 The State Department reaction to
this opportunity is suggested by the Department's refusal to issue
its second Bernstein letter until 1970, twenty-one years after the
first was issued and sixteen years after that first letter was acted
on.476 Only a handful of Bernstein letters have been issued
since.477
The Supreme Court has never definitively ruled on the exec-
utive suggestion exception. In the next Supreme Court case,
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, the Court did not reach the
issue because, after some confusion, the State Department de-
clined to issue a Bernstein letter.478 Despite Justice Harlan's ex-
press reservation of the question, his reasoning permitted some
to argue that the Court had disapproved the exception. 479 The
State Department apparently did not think so: it went on to issue
its second Bernstein letter six years after Sabbatino.480
Nor was the Supreme Court able to resolve the validity of the
executive suggestion exception when squarely confronted with it
in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba.48' Only the
plurality opinion by Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice White, unequivocally endorsed the excep-
tion.4 82 Justice Rehnquist reasoned that, as the purpose of the act
of state doctrine was to protect the conduct of foreign policy by
. 475. See, e.g., Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945); Ex parte Peru, 318
U.S. 578 (1943);J. DELLAPENNA, supra note ***, at 6-8.
476. This letter was issued on Nov. 17, 1970, and is reprinted in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 442 F.2d 530, 536-38 (2d Cir. 1971),
rev'd on other grounds, 406 U.S. 759 (1972). During the 21-year interval two let-
ters claimed by parties to be Bernstein letters were disavowed by the State Depart-
ment, Menendez v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 311 F.2d 429, 435-36 (5th Cir.
1962), vacated mem., 376 U.S. 779 (1964); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
307 F.2d 845, 857-58 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 398, 419-20 (1964).
477. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 706-11 (1976);
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 658 F.2d 895, 902 (2d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1091 (1982); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 884 (2d Cir. 1981).
478. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 420 n. 19 (1964) (State Department's ambiguous
letter held not to be a Bernstein letter); see also Bazyler, supra note 3, at 362-63.
479. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 419-20; see also Cooper, supra note 30, at 220-21;
Metzger, The State Department's Role in the Judicial Administration of the Act of State
Doctrine, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 94, 98-99 (1972); Comment, supra note 337, at 689
n.60.
480. See supra note 476. For others who considered the question still open,
see, e.g., S. REP. No. 1188 pt. 1, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., at 24, reprinted in 1964
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3829, 3852 [hereafter S. REP. No. 1188]; RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN REL. LAw § 41 reporter's note 5 (1965); Leigh
& Sandier, supra note 30, at 698.
481. 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
482. Id. at 760-70 (plurality op. per Rehnquist, J.).
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the political branches, and as the President was. the "sole organ"
of the nation for the conduct of foreign relations, 483 courts
should defer to the determinations of the President (or his dele-
gates) on the propriety of judging the validity of foreign state
acts.
Justice Brennan, joined in a dissent by Justices Blackmun,
Marshall and Stewart, equally unequivocally rejected the execu-
tive suggestion exception. 48 4 He reasoned that the exception was
more likely to hinder the executive's conduct of foreign relations
than to facilitate it. In his view, the executive branch is most likely
to suggest the inapplicability of the act of state doctrine in cases
where it strongly disapproves of the acts in question. A court
would embarrass foreign relations if it were to approve an action
which the executive branch sought to condemn. 485
The dissenters conceded political control of the recognition
of foreign governments. 486 They would also receive suggestions
from the executive branch on whether to apply the act of state
doctrine, but they would not take such a suggestion as binding on
courts.487 They saw complete deference to executive judgments
as politicizing the judiciary. 488  Such deference would require
courts to decide cases for which no clear legal standards exist,
and hence cause courts to treat similar litigants unequally. 489
Neither Justice Douglas nor Justice Powell would commit to
either camp, however, and thus both camps remained short of a
majority. Justices Douglas and Powell both criticized the Bernstein
exception, but each went on to vote with the plurality on the mer-
its. Justice Douglas criticized the Bernstein exception for reducing
courts to "errand boy[s] for the Executive Branch which may
choose to pick some people's chestnuts from the fire, but not
other's. '490 His comments remained mere dictum, however, as
he based his opinion on his view that the case involved sovereign
483. Id. at 766; cf. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 223, 229 (1942);
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 328 (1937); United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
484. City Bank, 406 U.S. at 776-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
485. Id. at 783-84. Attorney-General Katzenbach, at least, considered this
argument far-fetched. See Mathias, supra note 3, at 400-01. On the other hand,
two student commentators concluded that it was the "most convincing argument
for rejection of Executive Suggestion." Note, supra note 43, at 621.
486. City Bank, 406 U.S. at 786 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
487. Id. at 790.
488. Id. at 790-91.
489. Id. at 785-87, 792-93.
490. Id. at 773 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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immunity and not the act of state doctrine. 49 1 Justice Powell's
comments were even less pointed. He declared that he was un-
comfortable with "a doctrine which would require the judiciary to
receive the Executive's permission before invoking its jurisdic-
tion." 492 He then went on to state that courts should decide for
themselves whether the case involved a political question without,
however, indicating how courts were to decide the matter.493
Given the divisions of the Court, one is not surprised that
several different opinions emerged as to whether an exception for
executive suggestions survived the City Bank case. The four dis-
senters in the next Supreme Court case on the act of state doc-
trine, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, insisted that City Bank
had definitely repudiated the Bernstein exception. 494 Even the plu-
rality in Dunhill did not mention the exception despite the pres-
ence of a Bernstein letter for the case.4 95 On the other hand, the
State Department has continued to issue such letters, and the plu-
rality in Dunhill based its "commercial act exception" on the
"presently expressed views of those who conduct our relations
with foreign countries. 496
Confusion in the Supreme Court engendered similar confu-
sion throughout the legal system. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit relied on Bernstein letters as a significant factor in a
set of decisions not to apply the act of state doctrine, although it
did not indicate which, if any, of the several factors it considered
dispositive. 497 Similarly, scholarly and professional opinion has
491. Id. at 770.
492. Id. at 773 (Powell, J., concurring).
493. Id. at 775-76; see supra § Ill(B); see also Note, supra note 7, at 96-101.
494. 425 U.S. 682, 724-25 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 884 (2d Cir. 1981).
495. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 686-706 (plurality op. by White, J.). The letter is
reprinted in id. at 706-11.
496. Id. at 697. Michael Bazyler curiously concludes that all Justices in Dun-
hill ignored the State Department suggestion. Bazyler, supra note 3, at 343, 363-
65, 368-70.
497. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank, 822 F.2d 230, 236 (2d
Cir. 1987), afflg 658 F.2d 903, 911 (2d Cir. 1981); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 658 F.2d 895, 902 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1091 (1982); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875,
884 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Millen Indus. v. Coordination Council for N. Am. Aft.,
855 F.2d 879, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (import of Bernstein letter is to be decided on
remand); Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d
1052, 1062 (3d Cir. 1988) (State Department suggestions are entitled to "sub-
stantial respect"), rev'd on other grounds, 58 U.S.L.W. 4140 (1990); Empresa
Cubana v. Lamborn & Co., 652 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1981) (deference would be
appropriate if executive expressed a preference); compare Braniff Airways, Inc. v.
CAB, 581 F.2d 846, 851 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (deference to executive inappro-
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ranged from the view that the Bernstein exception is dead, 498 to the
view that it is still an open question, 499 to the view that it is the
law of the land.500 At this point, one can understand why courts
and attorneys are unwilling to put their primary reliance on exec-
utive suggestions. Only the Justice Department has recently at-
tempted to rely on the supposed exception, suggesting that the
initiation of an antitrust suit by the United States itself should
preclude application of the act of state doctrine. 50'
An exception for executive suggestions is really just a variant
form of Justice Powell's political question theory of the act of
state doctrine, suffering all the infirmities of that theory.50 2 The
exception politicizes the judicial process and makes the finality of
"acts" of foreign states highly uncertain. The Bernstein exception
serves no necessary purpose: even the case which gives it its
name could and should have been decided under other, more ap-
propriate exceptions. 50 3 One can easily conclude that the excep-
tion has already been disapproved by the Supreme Court,50 4 and
little would be lost in burying the exception for good.
priate) with Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 472 n.53 (S.D.
Fla. 1980) (deference appropriate), aff'd as modified, 676 F.2d 1023 (11 th Cir.
1982); cf Philippines v. Marcos, 818 F.2d 1473, 1486-88 (9th Cir. 1987) (court
disregarded statement of Undersecretary of State in an unrelated proceeding),
rev'den banc on other grounds, 862 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1933 (1989); Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 356-57 (2d Cir. 1986) (court
treated as dispositive the same statement, also not made in this proceeding, and
an appearance by the Justice Department opposing the application of the act of
state doctrine), cert. dismissed, 480 U.S. 942, cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987).
498. LEFLAR, supra note 31, at 206; Chow, supra note 25, at 417-19; Cooper,
supra note 30, at 223-25; Note, supra note 7, at 100-01; Note, supra note 43, at
620-23.
499. 2 EHRENZWEIG II, supra note 31, at 74 n.63; Bazyler, supra note 3, at
339-41; Chow, supra note 25, at 445; Conant, supra note 162, at 265; Gardner,
Foreign Relations Law, 1982 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 217, 244-46; McCormick, supra
note 50, at 500-02; Note, The Status of the Act of State Doctrine-Application to Litiga-
tion Arising from Confiscation of American Owned Property in Iran, 4 SUFFOLK TRANS-
NAT'L L.J. 89, 115-16 (1980); Note, supra note 25, at 313-16.
500. Bazyler, supra note 3, at 328, 368-70; Cooper, supra note 30, at 222-28;
Leigh & Sandier, supra note 30, at 698-700; Timberg, supra note 66, at 30-33; see
also Lengel, supra note 52, at 95-96; Comment, supra note 132, at 791-92.
501. JUSTICE DEP'T, DRAFT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, 53
Fed. Reg. 21,584 (June 8, 1988), 22,426 (June 15, 1988); see A.B.A. Sec. of Anti-
trust L. & Sec. of Int'l & Practice, Report to the House of Delegates, 23 INT'L LAW.
325, 336-37 (1989).
502. See supra § III(B).
503. See supra note 474.
504. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 724-25 (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (analyzing effect of the decision in First Nat'l City Bank
v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972)).
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5. Governmental extinctions
In Menzel v. List, 50 5 Judge Klein gave the extinction of the
Nazi government in Germany as one of four reasons for denying
application of the act of state doctrine. He made the suggestion
in a single sentence in the midst of a long discussion of the other
reasons.50 6 The point was devoid of authority except to prove (in
1966!) that the Nazi government no longer existed.
Judge Klein's suggested exception to the act of state doctrine
for acts of a government that no longer exists is not so far fetched
as the sparsity of his authority might suggest. There can be no
risk of embarrassment to the conduct of the foreign relations by
the United States if the government which would take offense no
longer exists. Justice Harlan suggested as much in the key pas-
sage of the Sabbatino decision from which this and most other the-
ories and exceptions trace their lineage:
The balance of relevant considerations may also be
shifted if the government which perpetrated the chal-
lenged act of state is no longer in existence .... for the
political interest of this country may, as a result, be mea-
surably altered. 50 7
The exception for acts of an extinct government might sim-
ply be a reciprocal of the retroactive application of the act of state
doctrine to protect acts taken by foreign governments before rec-
ognition by the United States.508 Justice Harlan and Judge Klein,
however, seemed to consider the governmental extinction to be
merely one factor to be balanced against others in deciding
whether to invoke the act of state doctrine.
Given the rarity of true governmental extinctions, with no
other government succeeding to its place, courts will have few op-
505. 49 Misc. 2d 300, 311, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 812 (Sup. Ct. 1966), aff'd in
part, modified in part, 28 A.D.2d 516, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1967), rev'd on other
grounds, 24 N.Y.2d 91, 246 N.E.2d 742, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1969). The notion of
a governmental extinction exception might be traced back less certainly to Judge
Clark's dissent in Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres S.A., 163 F.2d 246, 253 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947). In contextJudge Clark seems to be refer-
ring to non-recognition of laws, however, rather than the demise of the govern-
ment. Id. at 253-55.
506. Menzel, 49 Misc. 2d at 308-13, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 812-18.
507. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964). The
passage is quoted in full at supra note 135.
508. See generally United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942); United
States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937); Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246
U.S. 304, 309 (1918); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302-03
(1918); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
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portunities to determine whether such an exception actually ex-
ists. In recent times, only Germany after World War II was
stripped of all government and subjected to four years of military
occupation without a successor government in place. 50 9 Even af-
ter revolutions or a basic social and legal restructuring, relations
with a successor government usually will require the same defer-
ence for acts of the prior government as if that government had
continued to exist.510
The recent efforts of the Philippines to recover the assets of
former President Marcos that were located in the United States
presented the last issue. The two proceedings denominated Phil-
ippines v. Marcos511 proved no less troubling in this regard than in
others. In the end, both courts used Marcos' fall as a significant,
but not dispositive, factor in deciding against application of the
act of state doctrine. 51 2 Because the courts ultimately rested their
decisions on a conclusion that the acts in question were not acts
of the state, 51 3 these cases cannot be taken as establishing a gov-
ernmental extinction exception.
For the claim that there is a full-fledged governmental extinc-
tion exception, one must turn to the writings of Richard Falk.5 14
Falk's conclusion should not be incorporated into the act of state
doctrine. The extinction of the government that made a decision
does end concerns over affront to the sovereign from which the
decision emanated and over wasting that sovereign's decision-
making resources. The extinction, however, does not necessarily
eliminate reasonable reliance by third parties on the final validity
of the act or their commitment of resources to the decision-mak-
ing process. Therefore, courts probably should not set aside the
act of state doctrine simply because the government responsible
509. See Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and Assumption of Supreme
Authority by the Allied Powers, in THE Axis IN DEFEAT 45 (State Dep't Pub. 2423,
June 5, 1945).
510. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938); Bern-
stein v. Van Heyghen Freres S.A., 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
772 (1947); Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.
1940).
511. See the text at supra notes 4-12.
512. Philippines v. Marcos, 818 F.2d 1473, 1485-86 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'den
banc on other grounds, 862 F.2d 1355, 1360-61 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 1933 (1989); Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 359 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
dismissed, 480 U.S. 942, cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987).
513. See also W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l,
58 U.S.L.W. 4140, 4143 (1990); PerezJiminez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547 (5th
Cir. 1962).
514. FALK III, supra note 147, at 412-13.
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for the act has ceased to exist. Rather, if the validity of such an
act is to be reexamined, a court should seek some other infirmity
in the act to establish that a third party had no reasonable basis
for relying on it.
6. Human rights claims
The reporters of the Restatement (Third) have suggested that
acts in violation of the international law of human rights are not
protected by the act of state doctrine, arguing that "the accepted
international law of human rights is both well established and
contemplates external scrutiny of such acts." 5 15 In other words,
they present it as a particular application of the purported general
exceptions for treaties or for clear violations of customary inter-
national law. 5 16 Several authors have also strongly supported
such an exception.5 17
Despite this support, however, no court has ever applied an
exception for human rights violations as such.5 18 A number of
cases could be cited as exhibiting a human rights exception, but
each in fact was decided on some other basis. 5 19 Only by quoting
language out of context or by citing inapposite cases can one cre-
515. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, § 443 comment c.
516. See supra § IV(B)(3) & infra § IV(B)(9).
517. See Berman & Clark, State Terrorism: Disappearances, 13 RUTGERS L.J.
531, 568-75 (1982); Blum & Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International
Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22
HARV. INT'L L.J. 53, 82-87, 107-12 (1981); Chow, supra note 25, at 459; Halber-
stam, supra note 33, at 86-87; Paust, Federal Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Acts of
Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law Under the FSIA
and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191, 242-47 (1983); Note, Terrorism
as a Tort in Violation of the Law of Nations, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 236, 254 (1982);
Note, Federal Jurisdiction and the Protection of International Human Rights, 9 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE, 199, 234-39 (1979-80).
518. Bazyler, supra note 3, at 373-74; Chow, supra note 25, at 445-46.
519. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (no act of
state involved); Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-
Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954) (THE Bernstein letter: State Depart-
ment advised the court not to apply the act of state doctrine); Forti v. Suarez-
Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1545-47 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (no act of a state); Liu v.
Republic of China, 642 F. Supp. 297 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (no act of a state); Kalmich
v. Bruno, 450 F. Supp. 227 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (territorial limitation); Menzel v. List,
49 Misc. 2d 300, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (no act of a state; territorial
limitation; governmental extinction exception), aff'd in part, modified in part, 28
A.D.2d 516, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 24 N.Y.2d 91, 246
N.E.2d 742, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1969); see also Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24
(2d Cir.) (when Nazi laws are applied to German nationals they are not chal-
lengeable under international law), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976); Beck v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 125 Misc. 2d 771, 774 n.5, 481 N.Y.S.2d 211,
215 n.5 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
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ate the impression that a human rights exception to the act of
state doctrine has been judicially recognized. 520 No one has
made a case for such an exception in terms of the policies under-
lying the act of state doctrine.
Neither the enforcement of clear international standards nor
whether human rights violations are subject to external scrutiny
are the policy issues in determining whether there is a human
rights exception to the act of state doctrine. The policy issue is
whether an American court is the proper forum for applying such
standards and for providing such external scrutiny. For good rea-
sons, most American jurists have concluded that an American
court is not the proper forum.
If the purpose of the doctrine is to avoid having the judiciary
interfere with or embarrass the executive's conduct of foreign re-
lations, 52' there will rarely be a more sensitive or more potentially
embarrassing issue than a claim that a foreign state has violated
international standards of human rights. Therefore, courts will
probably continue to apply the act of state doctrine to treat such
"acts" as conclusive unless the courts find some more widely rec-
ognized exception applies to an egregious violation of human
rights. As long as the human rights law in question is clear
enough to prevent either a foreign state or third parties from rely-
ing on the finality or validity of the act, American courts should
apply a customary international law or treaty exception, and not
accord an irrebuttable presumption of validity to acts violating
it. 5 2 2
7. Improper motives
Two courts have suggested in dictum an exception to the act
of state doctrine when the act of the foreign state was procured by
bribery, coercion or fraud. 523 Both courts strangely offered Judge
520. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 517, at 242-47.
521. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423-25 (1964).
522. Cf. Justice Harlan's analysis in Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427-28, where he
wrote "the greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particu-
lar area of international law, the more appropriate it is for thejudiciary to render
decisions regarding it .... " The passage is quoted in full at supra note 135.
523. Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896, 909-10 (E.D.
Mich. 1981); Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus., 473 F.
Supp. 680, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see also Bazyler, supra note 3, at 372; Comment,
IAM v. OPEC: Commercial Activity-One Factor in a Balancing Approach to the Act of
State Doctrine, 14 LAw & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 215, 233 (1982); Comment, supra
note 359, at 560; Note, supra note 359, at 173-76.
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Mulligan's majority opinion in Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp.52 4 as author-
ity for a purported fraud or coercion exception to the doctrine,
even though Judge Mulligan had concluded in that case that the
act of state doctrine barred the court from inquiring into motives
behind a foreign act of state. Judge Mulligan had been careful to
emphasize in Hunt that, despite the then recent disclosures of
widespread American bribery of foreign government officials,
which had led to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 5 25 there had
been no allegation of corruption of foreign officials, and there
was no exception to the act of state doctrine for such corrup-
tion. 52 6 Judge Van Graafeiland's dissent in Hunt had gone to this
very point. 527
Recently the Supreme Court seemed to find inquiries into
the motives of the foreign state to be consistent with the act of
state doctrine. 528 Other courts have held that there was no ex-
ception for corruption or fraud. 529 By the very nature of the judi-
cial process, courts must inquire into the intent and purposes of
governments in order to interpret and apply the relevant law to
the cases before them. So long as the court is not asked to review
the validity of the act in question, they cannot contravene the act
of state doctrine,5 30 yet if the courts are to avoid embarrassing the
executive's conduct of foreign relations the courts must be cir-
cumspect about inquiring into the motives behind an act of state.
The solution to this conundrum is perhaps suggested in a suit
involving an act of a foreign state induced by the United States-
Langenegger v. United States.53'
524. 550 F.2d 68, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
525. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-2 (1982). Judge Boyle, in Sage Int'l, Ltd.
v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896, 910 n.26 (E.D. Mich. 1981), cited this
statute as support for her dictum recognizing a fraud or coercion exception.
526. Hunt, 550 F.2d at 79; see also Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 407-08 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1040 (1984); see generally infra § IV(B)(8); Rosenthal, supra note 343, at 500-02.
527. Hunt, 550 F.2d at 79-81 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
528. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l, 58
U.S.L.W. 4140 (1990).
529. O.N.E. Shipping v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 830 F.2d
449, 452-53 (2d Cir. 1987); West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820,
828-29 n.7 (9th Cir. 1987); DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 733 F.2d 701 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1159 (1985); Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 409 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040
(1984); Compania de Gas v. Entex, Inc., 686 F.2d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1041 (1983).
530. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l, 58
U.S.L.W. 4140 (1990).
531. 5 Cl. Ct. 229 (1984), aff'd, 756 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 824 (1985).
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Rosa Langenegger and others sought compensation for their
coffee plantation in El Salvador which was taken by the Salvado-
ran government as part of its land reform program. Instead of
suing El Salvador, however, they brought suit against the United
States. They claimed that the United States had instigated the
taking by threatening to withhold foreign aid if the Salvadoran
government did not undertake meaningful land reform. Judge
Kozinski of the Court of Claims had doubts about the justiciability
of the claim because it would require the court to examine in de-
tail relations between the two governments. 532 He held, however,
that there was no taking by the United States when the taking was
by, or principally for the benefit of, a foreign government. 533
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in
an opinion by Senior Judge Nichols, rejected questions about the
justiciability of the claim, noting that "courts are often presented
with questions which consider congressional or executive actions
and purposes, and have managed to decide cases without putting
the government in a fishbowl." 53 4 The court went on to empha-
size that the inquiry into purposes would be an objective one,
provable from typical sources such as committee reports, execu-
tive messages, and other nonsecret documents, rather than from
secret conversations or even floor debates in Congress that would
involve the court in examining possible ulterior motives behind
the act. As Judge Nichols concluded:
To the extent that ... motivation may be pertinent, .
the relevant facts reside in what that government "pur-
ported" to do. If the "purported" reasons for action are
not the real reasons .... the matter is not one the judicial
bench can correct; a subjective determination of a gov-
ernment's motive is beyond judicial inquiry. 535
The Federal Circuit panel went on to hold that the issue was
justiciable and not a political question, but that the United States
was not responsible for the particular taking in question. 536 This
same "objective/subjective" motivation analysis could easily be
applied to delimit the appropriate measure of inquiry into the
motives or purposes expressed in the action of a foreign state.
532. Id. at 234-36.
533. Id. at 232.
534. 756 F.2d at 1569.
535. Id.
536. Id. at 1572.
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Such a test would preclude inquiry into improper motives like
bribery, coercion or fraud, so long as these motives had been kept
hidden. Any other result would eviscerate the entire act of state
doctrine. 537
A claim of an exception for acts involving fraud or coercion
by or on a foreign government is based on simple disapproval of
the acts of the foreign state. This runs counter to every policy at
work in the act of state doctrine, producing affront to the foreign
state, embarrassment to the executive's conduct of foreign rela-
tions, waste of the foreign state's (and private) decision-making
resources, and disregard of reasonable reliance by third parties
on the finality and validity of the act.538 Ordinary errors of fact or
law simply are not a basis for disregarding the finality or validity
of an act of a foreign state. 539 Nor, when courts have been unwill-
ing to find an implied repeal of the act of state doctrine from the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 540 should courts be ready to
imply a repeal of the act of state doctrine from the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act.
8. Ministerial acts
The supposed ministerial act exception centers on two opin-
ions by Judge Weis of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
In Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,541 Judge Weis wrote
for the court that "ministerial activity is not the kind of govern-
mental action contemplated by the act of state doctrine." Two
lower federal courts and several commentators interpreted this
statement as creating yet another exception to the doctrine, ex-
cluding ministerial acts from its scope. 542
Three years after Mannington Mills, Judge Weis wrote for the
court in Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 543 in which the appeal
537. Cf W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l, 58
U.S.L.W. 4140 (1990); Bazyler, supra note 3, at 346-47.
538. See the text at supra notes 261-69.
539. Compare Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 415 n.17
(1984) with Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545 (1947); Treinies v. Sunshine Mining
Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939) and Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
540. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982); see Note, supra note 343, at 359.
541. 595 F.2d 1287, 1294 (3d Cir. 1979).
542. Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896, 904 (E.D.
Mich. 1981); Forbo-Giubasco S.A. v. Congoleum Corp., 516 F. Supp. 1210,
1217-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); McCormick, supra note 50, at 522; Comment, supra
note 359, at 559; Recent Decision, The Act of State Doctrine and U.S. Antitrust Law:
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 12 LAw & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 503,
506, 514-15 (1980).
543. 694 F.2d 300, 302, 303 (3d Cir. 1982).
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challenged the trial judge's use of the supposed ministerial act
exception. Judge Weis wrote: "Mannington Mills did not create an
exception to the act of state doctrine based on the ministerial-
discretionary dichotomy, nor does that opinion differ with the
Supreme Court's cases on point." He went on to adopt the bal-
ancing approach, 544 with the ministerial nature of the act being
merely a factor to be balanced.
Judge Weis noted that insofar as the ministerial nature of an
act indicates that it is not politically sensitive, an American court's
examination of the act's validity was not likely to seriously affect
the conduct of foreign relations. 545 The political sensitivity of an
act will not, however, always turn on whether an American court
will classify it as ministerial. His reasoning does not leave much
scope for a ministerial act exception.
The supposed ministerial act exception suffers from the same
difficulties as the proposed commercial act exception. 546 How
one decides whether an act is ministerial remains problematic. 547
Furthermore, no matter how one decides an act is ministerial, the
finality of the decision, the waste of decision-making resources,
and the potential affront to foreign sovereign dignity is not less
because the act is described as ministerial. 548 Once again, pru-
dence might well cause a court to defer absolutely to a foreign
state's decisions involving its interests within its own territory
whether the act is characterized-as ministerial or otherwise,5 49 as
long as the decision really is an "act" by the state, 550 and is not
vulnerable under any other exception to the act of state doctrine.
9. Treaties
One can trace the idea of a treaty exception to the act of state
doctrine to the same passage injustice Harlan's Sabbatino opinion
that suggests a possible exception for clear violations of custom-
544. See supra § IV(A)(3).
545. 694 F.2d at 303-04.
546. See the text at supra notes 402-15.
547. Consider the difficulties in applying the dichotomy of ministerial ver-
sus discretionary acts under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)
(1982), or under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)
(1982). SeegenerallyJ. DELLAPENNA, supra note ***, at 187-91. Compare also the
difficulties in identifying commercial acts for a commercial act exception. See the
text at supra notes 416-25.
548. That these are the relevant policies underlying the act of state doc-
trine, see the text at supra notes 261-69.
549. Cf supra § IV(A)(2).
550. See supra § IV(A)(l).
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ary international law. In his refusal to examine the validity of a
taking of property "in the absence of a treaty or other unambigu-
ous agreement regarding controlling legal principles," 55 1 he
seemed to suggest the two exceptions and to discuss the proper
allocation of competence between the judiciary and the executive
branch for determining international law. A treaty exception
would exclude from the doctrine acts covered by a treaty binding
the foreign state and the United States.
Strictly speaking, Justice Harlan neither actually recognized a
treaty exception nor indicated that a treaty would necessarily af-
fect the balancing process described in the passage as a whole. 552
In Menzel v. List,553 just twenty-two months later, Judge Klein
picked up Justice Harlan's language to posit a treaty exception to
the act of state doctrine in a case involving Nazi confiscations in
violation of the Hague Convention on the Laws of War. As Judge
Klein gave three other reasons for disregarding the act of state
doctrine, 554 however, this might have been mere dictum. There-
after, the possibility of a treaty exception lay quietly until the cri-
sis with Iran.
Unlike most other expropriations which were so prominent
in act of state litigation in the 1960s and 1970s, when Iran nation-
alized its insurance industry, including American interests, Iran
violated a treaty with the United States. 555 The American insur-
ance companies joined together in American International Group,
Inc. v. Iran.5 56 In an opinion that largely centered on questions of
sovereign immunity, with only one paragraph devoted to the act
of state doctrine, Judge Hart gave three reasons why the doctrine
should be ignored: that the validity of the taking itself was not in
question, only the failure to pay compensation; that the failure
was in violation of a treaty; and that the failure involved a com-
mercial activity.
551. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964),
quoted at supra note 135. Note that treaties will not always be "unambiguous."
See Dayton v. Czechoslovakia, 834 F.2d 203, 206-07 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 2820 (1988); see also Ebenroth & Teitz, supra note 25, at 245-47.
552. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, § 443 comment b, & reporters'
note 5.
553. 49 Misc. 2d 300, 308-13, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 812-17 (Sup. Ct. 1966),
aff'd mem., 28 A.D.2d 516, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 24
N.Y.2d 91, 246 N.E.2d 742, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1968).
554. Id. at 308-11, 313-14, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 812-16, 818.
555. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, signed Aug.
15, 1955, entered into force June 16, 1957, United States-Iran, art. IV(2), 8 U.S.T.
899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853.
556. 493 F. Supp. 522, 525 (D.D.C. 1980).
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The first and last ofJudge Hart's reasons for disregarding the
act of state doctrine were clearly wrong. Is a refusal to pay, as a
matter of state policy, not an "act"? 557 Is refusal, as a matter of
state policy, to pay for expropriated property a commercial act or
decision?55 8 Thus the only sustainable basis for his decision was
his assertion of a treaty exception to the doctrine. But the utility
of the decision as precedent for a treaty exception was undercut
both because Judge Hart included it with two clearly incorrect
theories and because his decision was vacated as a result of the
executive agreement enabling the release of the hostages held in
Tehran.5 59 Shortly afterwards, one court rejected the concept. 560
Finally, in Ethiopian Spice Extraction Co. v. Kalamazoo Spice Ex-
traction Co. ,561 a court faced the treaty exception squarely and un-
equivocally. When a government-owned Ethiopian corporation
sued for non-payment for goods sold and delivered, the defend-
ant (Kalamazoo) counterclaimed for non-payment for the earlier
expropriation of Kalamazoo's interest in the plaintiff corporation,
as well as for breach of contract by the Ethiopian corporation and
appropriation of trade secrets. 562
Judge Gibson dismissed the counterclaim against the Ethio-
pian government because of the act of state doctrine.5 63 He
noted that the Ethiopian taking was in violation of a treaty be-
tween Ethiopia and the United States, 5 64 the language of which
was virtually identical with the property protection clause in Amer-
ican International Group. Judge Gibson held that the clause did not
"provide enough in the way of controlling legal standards to re-
move the danger of conflict with the Executive Branch that under-
lies the act of state doctrine." 565 Having decided that the
557. See supra § IV(A)(1).
558. See supra § IV(B) (2); see generally J. DELLAPENNA, supra note ***, at 152-
54.
559. American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Iran, 657 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
560. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1360
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); see also Libyan Am. Oil Co. v.
Libya, 482 F. Supp. 1175, 1178-79 (D.D.C. 1980), vacated mem. after settlement, 684
F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
561. 543 F. Supp. 1224 (W.D. Mich. 1982), revd sub nom. Kalamazoo Spice
Extraction Co. v. Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984), on remand, 616 F. Supp.
660 (W.D. Mich. 1985).
562. Id. at 1225-26.
563. Id. at 1233. But see supra § IV(B)(2).
564. 543 F. Supp. at 1229-30; Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations,
signed Sept. 7, 1951, entered into force, Oct. 8, 1953, United States-Ethiopia, art.
VIII(2), 4 U.S.T. 2134, T.I.A.S. No. 2864.
565. 543 F. Supp. at 1230-31.
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purported treaty exception did not apply, he went on to hold that
neither the territorial limitation nor the Hickenlooper Amend-
ment precluded application of the act of state doctrine. 566
Judge Gibson's decision would have rendered the property
protection clauses in at least twelve treaties5 67 ineffective in pri-
vate litigation over violations of the clauses. His decision thus
precipitated a shower of protest. The American Bar Association
and the U.S. Departments of State, Treasury, and Justice filed
amicus briefs urging reversal on the basis of a treaty exception to
the act of state doctrine. 568
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed in a
unanimous opinion written by Judge Keith. He relied on Justice
Harlan's Sabbatino opinion and Judge Hart's opinion in American
International Group to find that the treaty with Ethiopia permitted
the court to examine the validity of the expropriation or of the
failure to pay compensation, notwithstanding the act of state doc-
trine.569 Judge Keith also observed that the amicus brief for the
United States removed fear ofjudicial interference with the exec-
utive's conduct of foreign relations, almost as if it were a Bernstein
letter.570 Judge Keith remanded the case for application of the
treaty to the facts of the case.571
Before the year was out, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit followed Kalamazoo and applied the treaty ex-
ception. 572 Three courts thereafter accepted the treaty exception,
but found it inapplicable to the facts in the cases before them.5 73
566. Id. at 1231-33; see supra § IV(A)(2) & infra § IV(C).
567. The court of appeals in Kalamazoo provided an appendix listing trea-
ties between the United States and Belgium, France, Greece, Ethiopia, Iran,
Israel, Japan, Korea, Nicaragua, Oman, Pakistan, Togo, and the Republic of
Vietnam, from which it quoted virtually identical property protection clauses.
729 F.2d at 428-30. The treaty with the Republic of Vietnam has now effectively
lapsed. There are other treaties with property protection clauses that are
phrased differently, and which thus might not have the same effect.
568. Id. at 425.
569. Id. at 425-28.
570. Id. at 427-28; see supra § IV(B)(4).
571. 729 F.2d at 426 n.5, 428, on remand, 616 F. Supp. 660 (W.D. Mich.
1985).
572. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1540-41 (D.C.
Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985); see also Dayton v. Czech-
oslovakia, 834 F.2d 203, 206-07 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2820
(1988); Von Dardel v. USSR, 623 F. Supp. 246, 260-63 (D.D.C. 1985).
573. Callejo v. Bancomer, 764 F.2d 1101, 1116-21 (5th Cir. 1985); Em-
presa Cubana v. Lamborn & Co., 652 F.2d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 1981); Siderman de
Blake v. Argentina, No. CV 82-1772-RMT (MCx) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1984)
(WESTLAW, 1984 WL 9080).
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Kalamazoo thus seems to have established a treaty exception, at
least until the Supreme Court rules directly on the question. 574
One might think that a treaty exception would depend on a
finding of a waiver by the foreign state of the protection of the act
of state doctrine. When one reads the treaties in question,575
however, one finds no waiver of the doctrine, but an agreement
on the applicable law. The courts which suggested or held that
there is a treaty exception also stressed the agreement on the ap-
plicable law rather than any implicit waiver of the act of state doc-
trine.576 A treaty exception therefore could more easily be
explained if the act of state doctrine were a "super choice-of-law"
rule and not a rule of compulsory recognition of final
decisions.5 77
Careful analysis of the policies relating to recognition of
judgments, however, also supports a treaty exception in terms
somewhat similar to the waiver exception. 578 Several courts sup-
ported a treaty exception by stressing that agreement on the ap-
plicable law removed the risk of embarrassment to the executive's
conduct of foreign relations. 579 This is a simple acknowledge-
ment that international agreement defuses the recognition policy
of avoiding affront to foreign sovereigns. Unacknowledged, but
perhaps just as important, is that a treaty sufficiently warns third
parties against reliance on the finality or validity of covered acts of
the foreign state. The only policy remaining would be a reluc-
tance to see the decision-making resources of the foreign state or
of private parties wasted. This concern carries little weight when
574. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, § 443, reporters' note 5; see also
FALK III, supra note 147, at 409; Bazyler, supra note 3, at 371-72; Chow, supra
note 25, at 445.
575. See the treaties cited supra in notes 555, 564 & 567.
576. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964); see
also Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1540-41 (D.C. Cir.
1984), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985); Kalamazoo Spice Extraction
Co. v. Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422, 425-28 (6th Cir. 1984); Empresa Cubana v. Lam-
born & Co., 652 F.2d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 1981); Siderman de Blake v. Argentina,
No. CV 82-1772-RMT (MCx) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1984) (WESTLAW, 1984 WL
9080); American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Iran, 493 F. Supp. 522, 525 (D.D.C. 1980),
vacated on other grounds, 657 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Menzel v. List, 49 Misc. 2d
300, 311-13, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 816-17 (Sup. Ct. 1966), aff'd mem., 28 A.D.2d
516, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 24 N.Y.2d 91, 246 N.E.2d
742, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1968); Chow, supra note 25, at 459.
577. See supra §§ III(B), (C).
578. See infra § IV(B) (11).
579. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964);
Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1540 (D.C. Cir. 1984), va-
cated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985); Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v.
Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422, 427-28 (6th Cir. 1984).
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the foreign state has applied those resources in a manner clearly
inconsistent with the state's solemn international
commitments. 580
One can only argue against the validity of the treaty excep-
tion if one sees the violation of the treaty as a simple error of fact
or law, and, like all such errors, irrelevant to the validity of ajuris-
dictionally sound final decision. 58' Refusal to re-examine the
merits of the foreign state's "act," however, is judicial abdication
of any role in creating or perfecting the rule of law in the affairs of
nations. 58 2 Giving effect to an error of fact or law at the price of
sacrificing the rule of law is hardly justified if neither the state
making the error nor any third parties have, or could have, justifi-
ably relied on the finality of the decision. 583 The treaty exception
is consistent with the policies underlying the proper functioning
of the act of state doctrine. Courts ought to develop and apply it
despite the relatively sparse actual authority for it.
10. Unjust enrichment
In First National Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,584 Judge
Breiant reached the remarkable conclusion that the act of state
doctrine did not apply if a foreign state unjustly enriched itself by
refusing to pay for expropriated assets. Judge Breiant cited Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba 585 as support for his conclusion, on
a vague theory that under these circumstances no act of the state
was involved. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit took
him as suggesting the strangest exception thus far proposed for
the act of state doctrine: an exception for unjust enrichment.
The Second Circuit had considered such an argument in an
earlier case, rejecting it as without authority and without a sound
basis. 586 This time a unanimous panel, writing through Judge
580. That the policies discussed in this paragraph are the relevant policies,
see the text supra notes 261-69.
581. See supra note 252.
582. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 447-56 (1964)
(White, J., dissenting); Bazyler, supra note 3, at 329, 381-84; Goldie, supra note
147; Halberstam, supra note 33, at 74-87; Lengel, supra note 52, at 72-81, 91-
102; Lillich, supra note 147.
583. Cf Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 263-86 (1980)
(plurality op. per Stevens, J.).
584. 505 F. Supp. 412, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 658 F.2d 895 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1091 (1982).
585. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
586. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1370 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'don
other grounds sub nom. Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
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Kearse, noted that an unjust enrichment exception would wholly
eliminate the act of state doctrine in expropriation cases, "for vir-
tually every taking will enrich the sovereign, and to the extent that
compensation is not paid that enrichment will have been un-
just."58 7 This Court of Appeals decision should put an end to the
idea of an unjust enrichment exception.
Any other conclusion would defeat every policy involved in
the act of state doctrine. 588 An unjust enrichment exception
would affront the sovereignty of the foreign state, waste the for-
eign state's and private decision-making resources, and upset reli-
ance by third parties on the finality of the decision. Even so, one
commentator seemingly concluded that there might be such an
exception despite noting the language of the Court of Appeals
decisions rejecting the possibility. 58 9
11. Waivers
In Compania de Gas v. Entex, Inc. ,590 the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit confronted a claim that a foreign state had re-
moved the act of state doctrine from the case by consenting to the
court's determination of the validity of the state's act, even
though the state itself was not directly involved in the suit. This
might be thought of as a waiver exception, perhaps as an ana-
logue to the Bernstein (executive suggestion) exception. 59' Judge
Thornberry, on behalf of a unanimous panel, refused to read the
letter as addressed to the act of state doctrine and thus did not
actually reach the question of what effect, if any, should be given
to such a letter. He did acknowledge that such a letter could in-
fluence a U.S. court, but stated that the letter would be only one
of many factors to be considered.
Apart from an inconclusive comment in one other case,5 92 a
waiver exception to the act of state doctrine finds its only support
in the comments to the Restatement (Third). 593 The reporters con-
cluded that such an exception would be contrary to the rationale
587. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 895, 901
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1091 (1982).
588. See the text at supra notes 261-69.
589. See Comment, supra note 359, at 560 n.92.
590. 686 F.2d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1041 (1983).
591. See supra § IV(B)(4).
592. Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 359 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed,
480 U.S. 942, cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987).
593. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, § 443 comment e; see also Com-
ment, supra note 523, at 233.
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of the doctrine of deference to the executive's conduct of foreign
relations, 594 yet they also concluded that the consent of a foreign
state to the litigation or arbitration of claims against the state it-
self could amount to a waiver of the act of state defense. 595
The reporters were too cautious. If the purpose of the act of
state doctrine is to avoid embarrassment to the State Department,
then a clear indication that the foreign state would not be of-
fended by judicial examination of its acts ought to remove that
concern even in cases not directly involving the foreign state it-
self, at least if the State Department has not expressed a concern
about the case on some other grounds. Such a waiver should also
remove any concern about waste of the foreign state's decision-
making resources because the foreign state itself is not concerned
about such waste. 596
The only legitimate concern, then, would be over possible
waste of third-party decision-making resources and third-party re-
liance on the finality of the "act." As an express waiver by a for-
eign state amounts to a withdrawal of any claim of finality for the
act, the concern over third-party reliance should carry no more
weight than it would after a court judgment has been vacated or
otherwise overturned. 597 Thus, despite the slender authority for
an exception for express waivers, such an exception should be
upheld in a case where the waiver can be proven, even if the liti-
gation does not directly involve the foreign state itself.
The primary authority against such conclusions is DeRoburt v.
Gannett Co.,598 in which the Ninth Circuit applied the act of state
doctrine to bar a suit brought by the Prime Minister of a foreign
state who objected to the invocation of the act of state defense by
the defendant. Assuming, as is almost certainly the case, that the
Prime Minister had authority to waive the doctrine, the court's
conclusion has been rightly characterized as "absurd. ' 599 In-
deed, courts should be more willing to adopt such a waiver excep-
tion than they are to consider a customary international exception
to the doctrine. 600 Opportunities for a court to consider the
594. See Bazyler, supra note 3, at 345.
595. See Ebenroth & Teitz, supra note 25, at 253-54.
596. For a fuller explanation of the policies underlying the act of state doc-
trine, see the text at supra notes 261-69.
597. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comment o (1982).
598. 733 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1159 (1985).
599. Bazyler, supra note 3, at 346-47 n. 123; see also Chow, supra note 25, at
472.
600. See supra § IV(B)(3).
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waiver exception will be rare at best, however, as courts undoubt-
edly will not find such a waiver unless the foreign state has ex-
pressed itself in the clearest possible terms. 60'
C. The Hickenlooper Amendment
The Hickenlooper Amendment is unique among the various
exceptions to the act of state doctrine, as it alone certainly is law,
having been adopted by Congress as an amendment to the For-
eign Assistance Act of 1964.602 The label "amendment" has
stuck to the provision in part because it was a very late addition to
the Foreign Assistance Act, 60 3 and in part because it provoked
such strong opposition when it was enacted. Curiously, the
Supreme Court has never considered applying the statute,
although it has been analyzed in numerous lower court cases and
might have been applied in either of the badly divided decisions
in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba 604 and Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba.60 5
Senator Hickenlooper introduced his Amendment promptly
after the Supreme Court's decision of Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino,606 in order to reverse part of that decision to enable
injured property owners to challenge foreign expropriations (par-
ticularly in Cuba) for violations of international law. 60 7 The
Amendment therefore has also been variously called the Sabbatino
Amendment, 60 8 the Second Hickenlooper Amendment, 60 9 or the
601. Cf Argentina v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 109 S. Ct. 683, 691-92
(1989) (implicit waivers by treaty are disfavored under Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act).
602. Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-633, § 30 1(d), 78 Stat.
1009, 1013 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982)).
603. CONF. REP. No. 1925, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1964 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3880, 3890; H.R. REP. No. 321, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2945, 2975-76.
604. 406 U.S. 759 (1972). See supra notes 150-56.
605. 425 U.S. 682 (1976). See supra notes 157-71.
606. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
607. S. REP. No. 1188, supra note 480, at 24, 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS at 3852; Bleicher, The Sabbatino Amendment in Court: Bitter Fruit, 20
STAN. L. REV. 858 (1968); Halberstam, supra note 33, at 69-71; Henkin, supra
note 50; Lowenfeld, The Sabbatino Amendment: International Law Meets Civil Proce-
dure, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 899 (1965). Sabbatino remains the controlling precedent
in most respects. See supra note 119.
608. See, e.g., Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 462 F.2d 1021, 1024 n.2
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1060 (1972); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383
F.2d 166, 171 n.5 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
609. See, e.g., West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 829 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987); Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745
F.2d 1500, 1541-42 n.180 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S.
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"Rule of Law Amendment."' 610 The Hickenlooper Amendment
reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in
the United States shall decline on the ground of the fed-
eral act of state doctrine to make a determination on the
merits giving effect to the principles of international law
in a case in which a claim of title or other right to prop-
erty is asserted by any party including a foreign state (or
a party claiming through such state) based upon (or
traced through) a confiscation or other taking after Janu-
ary 1, 1959, by an act of that state in violation of the
principles of international law, including the principles
of compensation and the other standards set out in this
subsection: Provided, That this subparagraph shall not be
applicable (1) in any case in which an act of a foreign
state is not contrary to international law or with respect
to a claim of title or other right to property acquired pur-
suant to an irrevocable letter of credit of not more than
180 days duration issued in good faith prior to the time
of confiscation or other taking, or (2) in any case with
respect to which the President determines that applica-
tion of the act of state doctrine is required in that partic-
ular case by the foreign policy interests of the United
States and a suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf
in that case with the court. 6 11
Congress enacted the Hickenlooper Amendment despite
strong opposition from the State Department and heavy criticism
by legal scholars. 612 Enactment seemed immediately to carry the
1113 (1985). The First Hickenlooper Amendment was enacted three years ear-
lier to direct the President to withhold foreign aid from governments that expro-
priate American property without proper compensation. Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 620, 75 Stat. 442, 444, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1)
(1982).
610. See, e.g., West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 830 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987); Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745
F.2d 1500, 1541-42 n.180 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S.
1113 (1985); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 171 n.5 (2d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
611. Foreign Assistance Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-171, 79 Stat. 653 (em-
phasis in original). This text reflects certain minor changes made in 1965 to the
original, hastily enacted Second Hickenlooper Amendment. The original ver-
sion would have expired on Jan. 1, 1966. These changes made the Amendment
permanent law and added the words "to property" after the phrase "other
right." See infra notes 616-25 for the significance of the latter change.
612. For the State Department's position, see Hearings on the Foreign Assist-
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day. The Hickenlooper Amendment was applied to the Sabbatino
case itself on remand, despite the Amendment's retroactive
change in the law of a case already decided by the Supreme
Court, and despite an argument that the Amendment violated
due process and separation of powers. 61 3 The State Department
switched to supporting the Amendment, 614 never invoking the
power to suggest that a court refrain from determining the valid-
ity of a taking under the "principles of international law." No
court has ever declared the Amendment invalid for any reason. 615
However, courts have decided no other case on the basis of the
Hickenlooper Amendment.
Courts have refused to apply the Hickenlooper Amendment
through an extremely close and hostile reading of its complex
language. 61 6 As the Amendment applies to every court "in" the
United States, and not just to courts "of" the United States, no
one could argue that it does not apply in state courts. Courts
could seize upon other phrases in the Amendment to narrow its
scope to the point that it could only apply to a case through ex-
treme carelessness by the expropriating state or by someone trac-
ing title through an expropriating foreign state.
Courts seized particularly on the phrase "claim of title or
other right to property," holding that it limits the application of
the Hickenlooper Amendment to what are in effect in rem pro-
ceedings based on the presence of the specific property, or its
traceable proceeds, 61 7 within the territorial jurisdiction of the
ance Act of 1964 before the Sen. Comm. on For. Rel., 88th Cong., 2d Sess., App. at
618-19 (1964) [hereafter Hearings]. For scholarly criticism, see FALK III, supra
note 147, at 424; Domke & Henkin, supra note 147; Golbert & Bradford, supra
note 30, at 27-33; Goldie, supra note 147; Henkin, supra note 50, at 107-15;
Kirgis, supra note 50, at 182-88; Lillich, supra note 147, at 35-37; Lowenfeld,
supra note 607; Mazaroff, supra note 147; Reeves, supra note 147. See generally
Comment, Limiting the Act of State Doctrine: A Legislative Initiative, 23 VA. J. INT'L L.
103, 113 (1982).
613. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 173-83 (2d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
614. See id. at 181 n.16; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, § 444 report-
ers' note 3.
615. Two courts suggested that, but did not decide whether, the Amend-
ment was unconstitutional. Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain
Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F.2d 1196, 1201 n.6 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 928 (1979); MOL, Inc. v. Bangladesh, 572 F. Supp. 79, 83 (D. Or. 1983),
aff'don other grounds, 736 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984);
see also FALK III, supra note 147, at 424.
616. Bazyler, supra note 3, at 392-94; Conant, supra note 162, at 267;
Halberstam, supra note 33, at 70-71; Comment, supra note 149, at 124-28.
617. The only case in which a court applied the Amendment involved trace-
able proceeds of expropriated property, rather than the property itself. Banco
111
Dellapenna: Deciphering the Act of State Doctrine
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1990
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
court when the proceedings began, with recovery limited to the
property or its value. 61 8 When the defendant is a foreign state,
however, a court cannot attach the property or prevent the prop-
erty's removal from the jurisdiction prior to judgment. 619 Thus,
true in rem proceedings under the Hickenlooper Amendment are
only possible against a private party who invokes the act of state
doctrine.
Courts have also interpreted the same phrase narrowly in
construing what rights qualify as a "claim to title or other right to
property." Several courts have concluded that "other right to
property" does not include claims based on contract rights. 620
Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956
(1968).
618. Compania de Gas v. Entex, Inc., 686 F.2d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1041 (1983); Empresa Cubana v. Lamborn & Co., 652 F.2d
231, 237 (2d Cir. 1981); Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 462 F.2d 1021,
1024-25 n.2 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1060 (1972); Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 431 F.2d 394, 399-402 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd on other
grounds, 406 U.S. 759 (1972); Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. Cities Ser-
vice Oil Co., 396 F. Supp. 461,471 n.5 (W.D. La. 1975), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577
F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928 (1979); Perez v. Chase Man-
hattan Bank, 61 N.Y.2d 460, 471-72, 463 N.E.2d 5, 10, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689, 694,
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984); French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d
46, 58, 242 N.E.2d 704, 712-13, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433, 445 (1968); Hunt v. Coastal
States Gas Producing Co., 583 S.W.2d 322, 330 n.6 (Tex.) (Steakley,J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979); Mexico v. Ashley, 556 S.W.2d 784, 786-87
(Tex. 1977); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, § 444 comment e; see generally
Hearings on H.R. 7550 before the House Comm. on Foreign Af., 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
576, 608 (1965) (statement of Cecil Omstead). Mr. Olmstead has denied the
standard reading of his statement, indicating that he had sovereign immunity,
not the act of state doctrine, in mind in the passage in question. See Halberstam,
supra note 33, at 71-72 n.15.
619. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(b), 1609, 1610(d), 1611 (1982).
620. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1372 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'don
other grounds sub nom. Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); Libyan
Am. Oil Co. v. Libya, 482 F. Supp. 1175, 1179 (D.D.C. 1980), vacated mem. after
settlement, 684 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1981); French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23
N.Y.2d 46, 59-62, 242 N.E.2d 704, 713-15, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433, 446-48 (1968);
Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 583 S.W.2d 322, 325-26 (Tex.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979); see Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. Cities
Service Oil Co., 396 F. Supp. 461, 472 (W.D. La. 1975) (violation of a conces-
sion agreement only a breach of contract with neither the oil nor oil wells being
confiscated), rev'd sub nom. Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain
Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F.2d 1196, 1202 (5th Cir. 1978) ("Shorn of its factual
complexity .... a tortious conversion of oil."), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928 (1979);
see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir.
1970), rev'd on other grounds, 406 U.S. 759 (1972); De Sanchez v. Banco Central
de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1395 (5th Cir. 1985) ("property" in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(3) (1982) does not include "contract rights"); City of Oakland v. Oak-
land Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 68, 646 P.2d 835, 840, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 678
(1982) ("For eminent domain purposes, neither the federal nor the state Consti-
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Yet "contract rights" frequently are considered property in other
contexts; 62' and there is some authority that contracts qualify as
property under international law as well.6 22 While one might
make a good argument for excluding claims for breach of the for-
eign state's own contracts from the term "property" under the
Hickenlooper Amendment, it seems peculiar to do so for contract
rights expropriated from one party and conveyed to a third
party.623
Moreover, to make the phrase "to property" serve to exclude
all contract rights from the Hickenlooper Amendment one would
have to conclude that Congress intended the addition of the
phrase to narrow the scope of the Amendment as first enacted, 62 4
but the legislative history is explicitly contrary. 625 The accompa-
nying Senate Report stated that the phrase "to property" was ad-
ded. solely to protect financial institutions from multiple liability
on contracts or insurance policies taken over by a foreign state by
tution distinguishes between property which is real or personal, tangible or
intangible.").
621. See, e.g., United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16
(1977); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 336 (1935); French v. Banco Na-
cional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 77-87, 242 N.E.2d 704, 724-30, 295 N.Y.S.2d
433, 461-69 (1968) (Keating, J., dissenting); Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Produc-
ing Co., 583 S.W.2d 322, 330-34 (Tex.) (Steakley,J., dissenting), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 992 (1979).
622. Panel Op. No. 1, 14th Semiann. Rep. to Congress for the Period End-
ingjune 30, 1961 at 124-25 (Fl. Cl. Settlem't Comm'n); Christie, What Constitutes
a Taking of Property under International Law?, 38 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 307, 318-19
(1964).
623. For cases involving a breach of contract by a foreign state, see Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd on
other grounds, 406 U.S. 759 (1972); Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Libya, 482 F. Supp.
1175 (D.D.C. 1980), vacated mem. after settlement, 684 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d 704, 295 N.Y.S.2d
433 (1968); Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 583 S.W.2d 322 (Tex.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979). For cases involving contracts which were con-
veyed to others, see Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), revd
on other grounds sub nom. Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); Occi-
dental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. Cities Service Oil Co., 396 F. Supp. 461
(W.D. La. 1975), rev'd sub nom. Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain
Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928
(1979); Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 583 S.W.2d 322 (Tex.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979).
624. Congress added the phrase "to property" after the phrase "claim of
title or other right" a year after the Hickenlooper Amendment was first enacted.
See supra note 611.
625. See French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 80-86, 242
N.E.2d 704, 726-29, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433, 463-68 (1968) (Keating, J., dissenting);
Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 583 S.W.2d 322, 331-32 (Steakley,J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
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enabling the institutions to invoke the act of state doctrine. 626 In
the hearings on the proposal, Cecil Olmstead, one of the drafters
of the change, reported: "I would think that a contract right
would [be covered] because there is a property interest in the
contractual right of course. We certainly intended that a contrac-
tual right would be covered here." 6 27
These statements are uncontradicted in the legislative rec-
ord. Thus the phrase "to property" seems to have been added
more as a clarification than as a change in the Hickenlooper
Amendment. The phrase was not meant to exclude contract
rights generally from the reach of the Amendment. Two courts
recently concluded in dictum, therefore, that the phrase "to prop-
erty" included contract rights, but declined to apply the Amend-
ment on other grounds.628
Courts have also used the requirement of a "confiscation or
other taking . . . in violation of international law" to limit the
reach of the Hickenlooper Amendment. Courts have consistently
strained to avoid a finding that a taking had occurred. 629 They
also have taken a narrowing view of what constitutes a violation of
international law in this context.
This second Hickenlooper Amendment cross-refers to the
first Hickenlooper Amendment for the international law standard
to be applied: usually summarized as prompt, adequate and ef-
fective compensation. 630 There has been hot debate, both inter-
626. S. REP. No. 170, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2945, 3002.
627. Statement of Cecil Olmstead, supra note 618.
628. West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 829-31 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987); Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d
1500, 1541-42 n.180 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113
(1985).
629. West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 831-32 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987); Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222, 224
n.l (2d Cir. 1985); Braka v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 589 F. Supp. 802, 804
n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Libya, 482 F. Supp. 1175, 1179
(D.D.C. 1980), vacated mer. after settlement, 684 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Occi-
dental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. Cities Service Oil Co., 396 F. Supp. 461,471-
72 (W.D. La. 1975), rev'd sub nom. Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A
Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
928 (1979); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp.
92, 112 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd mem., 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 950 (1972); Present v. United States Life Ins. Co., 96 N.J. Super. 285, 303,
232 A.2d 863, 872 (1967); French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 59,
242 N.E.2d 704, 713, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433, 446 (1968).
630. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1) (1982) includes the phrase: "such country,
government agency, or government subdivision fails within a reasonable time
... to take appropriate steps.., to discharge its obligations under international
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nationally and domestically, over whether this standard is in fact
required by international law. 63 ' As Congress has the power to
define "Offenses against the Law of Nations" for courts in the
United States, 632 the pair of Hickenlooper Amendments ought to
be sufficient to define the standard for courts confronting foreign
expropriations. 633 Nonetheless, whether Congress intended this
statute to be merely declarative, changing as international law
changes, or constitutive, fixing the definition so long as Congress
does not amend the statute, is not entirely clear.6 34
Failure to provide prompt, adequate, and effective compen-
sation does not exhaust the relevant criteria for violations of in-
law toward such citizen or entity, including speedy compensation for such prop-
erty in convertible foreign exchange, equivalent to the full value thereof, as re-
quired by international law .....
The "prompt, adequate, effective" formula is found in many places, includ-
ing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN REL. §§ 188-90 (1965). See also
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428-29 nn.26-30 (1964);
H.R. REP. 94-1487, supra note 398, at 6618; see generallyJ. DELLAPENNA, supra note
* at 172-74.
631. For the international debate, see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabba-
tino, 376 U.S. 398, 426-31 (1964); Sedco, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co., ITL
59-129-3 (Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Mar. 27, 1986), noted at 80 AM. J. INT'L L.
969 (1986); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Iran, AWD 184-161-1 (Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal Aug. 15, 1985), noted at 80 AM.J. INT'L L. 181 (1986); Tippets v. Iran,
AWD 141-7-2 (Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal June 29, 1984); American Int'l Group
v. Iran, AWD 93-2-3 (Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Dec. 19, 1983), reprinted in 4
IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 96 (1985 III). See also 3 R. LILLICH, THE VALUATION OF NATION-
ALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 14-21 (1975); Tschanz, The Contributions
of the Aminoil Award to the Law of State Contracts, 18 INT'L LAW. 245, 278-81 (1984);
Yao, Legal Protection of International Investment, 1 CHINA Y.B. INT'L L. 147, 181-86
(Eng. ed. 1983); Comment, The Act of State Doctrine-Its Relation to Private and
Public International Law, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1299-1300 (1962). For the do-
mestic debate, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, § 712(1); RESTATEMENT
(REVISED) OF FOREIGN REL. LAw [now RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] § 712 reporters'
note 1 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982); Kirgis, supra note 50, at 182-88; Mendelson,
What Price Expropriation?, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 414 (1985); Schachter, Compensation
Cases-Leading and Misleading, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 420 (1985); Note, International
Law: An "Appropriate" Compensation Standard for Nationalized Property: Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 66 MINN. L. REV. 931 (1982). Compare Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426-37 (1964) with Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 183-85 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956
(1968) (same case on remand).
632. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32,
§ 115.
633. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 183-85 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1956); see also West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807
F.2d 820, 829 n.8 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987); De Sanchez v.
Banco Central de Nicaragua, 515 F. Supp. 900, 910 n.10 (E.D. La. 1981), sum-
mary judgment reversing prior order aff'd, 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985); Libyan Am.
Oil Co. v. Libya, 482 F. Supp. 1175, 1179 (D.D.C. 1980), vacated mem. after settle-
ment, 684 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
634. See generally J. DELLAPENNA, supra note * at 173-74.
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ternational law. The United States has traditionally also required
that the taking be for a public purpose and non-discriminatory. 63 5
Courts have shown little interest in these requirements as they
would serve to enlarge, rather than to restrict, the possible scope
of the Hickenlooper Amendment. Instead, courts have seized on
the now obsolete tradition that a state's acts towards its own citi-
zens cannot be in violation of international law as a further means
of excluding claims from the reach of the Amendment. 63 6 No
court has applied the more modern approach to the Hick-
enlooper Amendment. 63 7
One might find yet more traps in the language of the Hick-
enlooper Amendment, although courts have not been receptive
to others that have been proposed: they have not needed them.
One court rejected an argument that the Amendment did not
reach suits directly against the foreign state. 63 8 Another court re-
635. West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 832 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987); President's Policy Statement, 8 COMp. PRES. Doc. 64
(1972); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, § 712(1).
636. Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, No. 77 Civ. 1251 (RLC)
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 1980), rev'don other grounds, 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp.
481, 486-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd mem., 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 830 (1967); Present v. United States Life Ins. Co., 96 N.J. Super. 285, 303-
04, 232 A.2d 863, 872-73 (1967), aff'd mem., 51 N.J. 407, 241 A.2d 237 (1968);
Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 61 N.Y.2d 460, 471, 463 N.E.2d 5, 10, 474
N.Y.S.2d 689, 694 (1984); see also De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua,
770 F.2d 1385, 1395-98 (5th Cir. 1985); The Tellech Claim (United States v.
Austria & Hungary), Tripartite Claims Comm'n, 1928 Dec. & Ops. 71, 6 U.N.
Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 248; The Canevaro Case (Italy v. Peru), Hague Ct. Rep.
(Scott) 284 (P.C.A. 1912); 8 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 1223-
27, 1233-61 (1967). For the growing recognition that international law does
reach relations between a state and its citizens, see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32, §§ 701-703;Jes-
sup, Responsibility of States for Injuries to Individuals, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1946);
Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, 63 L.Q. REV. 438 (1947).
637. The closest case is Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 185
(2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968) (corporate veil was pierced to
provide a remedy for American stockholders of a Cuban corporation expropri-
ated because of its American ownership). Other courts have provided a remedy
for nationals of the expropriating state when the property was located in the
United States at the time of the expropriation, but because of the territorial limi-
tation, not because of the Hickenlooper Amendment. See supra § IV(A)(2); Mal-
tina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 462 F.2d 1021, 1025 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1060 (1972); Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392
F.2d 706, 714-16 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968); F. Palicio y Compa-
nia, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481, 486-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd mem., 375
F.2d 1011 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967).
638. Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. Cities Service Oil Co., 396 F.
Supp. 461, 468 (W.D. La. 1975), rev'd sub nom. Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn,
Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 928 (1979).
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jected the dubious suggestion that the Amendment only protects
American plaintiffs. 63 9 Nor have the express limitations in the
Amendment figured prominently in the decided cases. With the
sweeping limitations the courts have read into the Amendment,
the narrow express limitations have not been necessary to restrict
its reach. Thus, only one court has considered the temporal limi-
tation, and no court has dealt with property acquired in exchange
for short-term letters of credit. 640
Despite the almost complete judicial evisceration of the Hick-
enlooper Amendment, courts continue to assert that the Amend-
ment is valid. 64 1 Congress included an analogue in the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act,64 2 presumably to make suits easier
under the Amendment. (The Amendment did not address the ju-
risdiction or competence of courts.) Still, few judges have advo-
cated a broader reading for the Amendment.
Among the handful of reported arguments for a broader
reading of the Hickenlooper Amendment, Judge Keating's dis-
sent in French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba 643 is the most developed.
Judge Steakley's dissent in Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Producing
Co. 644 also presented a cogent and powerful argument. The hold-
ing which comes closest to supporting a broader reading of the
Amendment is Judge Wilkey's majority opinion in Ramirez de Arel-
639. Compania de Gas v. Entex, Inc., 686 F.2d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1041 (1983). Contra RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32,
§ 444 reporters' note 6; Hearings, supra note 612, at 1076 (statement of Louis
Henkin).
640. D'Angelo v. PEMEX, 317 A.2d 38, 42 (Del. Ch. 1973) (taking must
have occurred on or after January 1, 1959-the day Castro entered Havana),
rev'd on other grounds, 331 A.2d 388 (Del. 1974); see also CONF. REP. No. 1925,
supra note 603, at 3890.
641. West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 829 n.8 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987); Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d
1500, 1541 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985);
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 882 n.10 (2d
Cir. 1981); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1294
n.4 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 n.4 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968). Remember, the Amendment has been applied only
in the very case that prompted its enactment. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr,
383 F.2d 166, 172-83 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
642. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(3), 1610(a)(3) (1982); see also National Exposi-
tions, Inc. v. Dubois, 605 F. Supp. 1206, 1211-12 (W.D. Pa. 1985); De Sanchez v.
Banco Central de Nicaragua, 515 F. Supp. 900, 910 n. 10 (E.D. La. 1981), af'd on
other grounds, 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985); American Hawaiian Ventures, Inc. v.
M.V.J. Latuharhary, 257 F. Supp. 622, 626 (D.N.J. 1966); see generally J. DEL-
LAPENNA, supra note ***, at 168-76.
643. 23 N.Y.2d 46, 76-93, 242 N.E.2d 704, 723-34, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433, 460-
74 (1968) (court divided 4-3).
644. 583 S.W.2d 322, 326-37 (Tex.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 993 (1979).
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lano v. Weinberger,645 on behalf of a 6-4 majority in an en banc re-
hearing reversing an earlier decision by Judge (now Justice)
Scalia. Judge Wilkey rejected the alleged restrictions without sig-
nificant discussion, dropping the point to a footnote. This deci-
sion, however, was vacated and reversed on other grounds,
leaving the opinion little weight as authority, although Judge
Reinhardt quoted Judge Wilkey's opinion with approval in West v.
Multibanco Comermex, S.A. 646
One might suspect that the dearth of opinions applying the
Hickenlooper Amendment is because the Amendment accom-
plished one of its supporters' major goals: to prevent the United
States from becoming a "thieves' market" for expropriated prop-
erty.6 4 7 Perhaps direct application of the Hickenlooper Amend-
ment is unnecessary because the Amendment completely
discouraged the marketing or processing of improperly expropri-
ated property or its proceeds in the United States. If so, one
might well consider the Amendment a success. Depriving a for-
eign state of a U.S. market for the fruits of its violation of interna-
tional law often might deter the violation. Unfortunately, the
Amendment does not seem to have had this effect.
When there are at least fifty-eight separate, identifiable ship-
ments of oil from a single confiscated oil field to the United
States, title to all of which shipments are held to be shielded from
judicial scrutiny by the act of state doctrine notwithstanding the
Hickenlooper Amendment, 648 the Amendment definitely does
645. 745 F.2d 1500, 1541-42 n.180 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds,
471 U.S. 1113 (1985), rev'd on other grounds, 788 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
646. 807 F.2d 820, 830 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987).
647. The floor debates are set forth at 110 CONG. REC. 19,546-60, 23,674-
82. See particularly 110 CONG. REC. 19,548, 19,555, 19,559 (statements by Sen.
Hickenlooper); 110 CONG. REC. 23,680 (statements of Rep. Adair); see also State-
ment of Cecil Olmstead, supra note 618; Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383
F.2d 166, 175 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968); French v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 60, 83, 242 N.E.2d 704, 713-14, 728, 295
N.Y.S.2d 433, 446 (1968); Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 583
S.W.2d 322, 331 (Tex.) (Steakley, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992
(1979). The several statements are quoted and analyzed in Halberstam, supra
note 33, at 71-72 n.15.
648. Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. Cities Service Oil Co., 396 F.
Supp. 461, 464 (W.D. La. 1975), rev'd sub nom. Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn,
Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 928 (1979). A similar problem was confronted in Hunt v. Coastal
States Gas Prod. Co., 583 S.W.2d 322 (Tex.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979).
Related cases were cast as antitrust suits rather than as suits to recover con-
verted oil, but with no difference in outcome. Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v.
Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1983); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977); Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya), 492
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not prevent the marketing, transhipment or processing of the
fruits of improper expropriations in the United States. Results
such as these oil cases suggest that courts have also frustrated the
other major purpose of the Amendment: to assure persons
whose property has been taken of a "day in court" to determine
whether the taking was consistent with international law. 64 9 This
goal is so central to the Amendment that it has been termed the
"Legality Corollary to the Act of State Doctrine," and the "Rule
of Law Amendment." 650 Decisions such as these shield the for-
eign taking from judicial scrutiny and avoid saying anything about
the legality of the taking under international law. 651
Judicial hostility to the Hickenlooper Amendment stands in
stark contrast to the care with which courts consider the other
purported exceptions to the act of state doctrine. Whether one
believes the Hickenlooper version of international legal standards
is a proper basis for resolving these disputes or not, Congress
directed courts to play a major role in developing and applying
these standards. 652 Courts have refused to accept the role, proba-
bly under a misguided fear of setting themselves up as interna-
tional policemen. 653
On the other hand, as the Hickenlooper Amendment is a
statute, it cannot be completely buried unless it is found to be
F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Libya, 482 F. Supp. 1175
(D.D.C. 1980), vacated mem. after settlement, 684 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also
D'Angelo v. PEMEX, 422 F. Supp. 1280 (D. Del. 1976), aff'd mem., 564 F.2d 89
(3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v.
Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal.), aff'd mem., 461 F.2d 1261 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972); D'Angelo v. PEMEX, 331 A.2d 388 (Del.
1974).
649. Statements by Senator Hickenlooper, supra note 647, at 18,936; see
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 431 F.2d 394, 402 (2d Cir.
1970), rev'd on other grounds, 406 U.S. 759 (1972); Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 175 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968); Hunt v.
Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 583 S.W.2d 322, 332 (Tex.) (Steakley,J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979); see also Mazaroff, supra note 147, at
793-97.
650. See Note, supra note 43, at 614 (legality corollary); and the sources
cited in supra note 610 (rule of law amendment).
651. Even the few courts which gave nonviolation of international law as a
reason for not applying the Hickenlooper Amendment seemed to be providing
more of an excuse to avoid close scrutiny of the taking rather than to be actually
engaging in such scrutiny. See supra notes 629-37.
652. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 439-72
(1964) (White, J., dissenting); Golbert & Bradford, supra note 30, at 29-33; Hen-
kin, supra note 50, at 182-83; Kirgis, supra note 50, at 182-88.
653. See, e.g., West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 833 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987); see also Leigh & Sandier, supra note 30, at
700-09; Comment, supra note 149, at 133, 145.
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unconstitutional. 654 Whether thejudiciary's fear of being an inef-
fective international police force is valid ought to have been seen
as resolved by Congress through the statute. Nor should applica-
tion of the Amendment to takings in violation of international law
as many as five years before its enactment trouble the courts. 655
Congress simply clarified the misconstruction of international law
in Sabbatino;656 it did not change the law to catch unaware those
who had relied on the validity of the act of a foreign state.
The major objection to the Hickenlooper Amendment ought
not to be its elevating of international law above the protection
offered acts of foreign states by the act of state doctrine. Objec-
tions ought to center on the Amendment's limitations both in
commanding courts to defer to the President or his delegate in
determining whether to apply the doctrine, and in applying it
only to a limited class of claims. The Hickenlooper Amendment,
in permitting the President to determine whether the doctrine
should be applied,657 is really a variation of Justice Powell's polit-
ical question theory, suffering all the infirmities of that theory. 658
It politicizes the judicial process and makes the finality of acts of
foreign states highly uncertain, certainly contrary to the basic pol-
icies involved in the act of state doctrine. 659
In any event, due to the evisceration of the statute, the execu-
tive branch has not had to undertake a role under this Hick-
enlooper Amendment. Judging from the attitude of the executive
branch towards the First Hickenlooper Amendment (which re-
quires the executive branch to terminate foreign aid to offending
countries-a power seldom invoked, and then only reluctantly,
654. The constitutionality of the amendment was upheld in Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 173-83 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956
(1968). See also West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 829 n.8 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987). Contra MOL, Inc. v. Bangladesh, 572 F.
Supp. 79, 83 (D. Or. 1983) (dictum), aff'd on other grounds, 736 F.2d 1326 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984); Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A
Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F.2d 1196, 1201 n.6 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 928 (1979).
655. Passed in 1964, the Amendment applied retroactively to Jan. 1, 1959
(the day Castro entered Havana).
656. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428-31 (1964).
657. The President is given the power to certify that application of the act
of state doctrine is necessary for the foreign policy of the United States, in which
case courts must apply the doctrine notwithstanding any violation of interna-
tional law. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982).
658. See supra § III(B).
659. See the text at supra notes 261-69.
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under political pressure),660 there is little reason to believe the
executive wants to play a role under this, the Second Hick-
enlooper Amendment. 661
If the judicial interment of the Hickenlooper Amendment re-
flects fear of confronting these failings, which clash with the poli-
cies of the act of state doctrine, it could be best for the
Hickenlooper Amendment to remain ignored. Yet, the Amend-
ment is not so different from situations where Congress, in defin-
ing the scope of full faith and credit to be accorded to sister-state
judgments, has give other values priority over the finality of a de-
cision. 662 Here Congress has exercised its power to define "Of-
fenses against the Law of Nations" and to give prevention of
those offenses priority over the finality of foreign state "acts. '663
Thus, while I also fear the politicization of the judiciary through
the Hickenlooper Amendment, I ultimately agree with Judge
Keating's dissent in which he argued that the courts have unfairly
read the Amendment to render the labor of Congress in vain. 664
D. Section 15 of the Arbitration Act
After several unsuccessful attempts in Congress to amend or
abolish the act of state doctrine in the 1980s, 6 6 5 Congress at last
passed its second statute limiting the application of the doctrine.
This act, S. 2204, added a new section 15 to title 9 of the U.S.
Code. The new section simply states:
660. See generally Vandevelde, Reassessing the Hickenlooper Amendment, 29 VA. J.
INT'L L. 115 (1988).
661. Cf Golbert & Bradford, supra note 30, at 33; Mathias, supra note 3, at
414; Timberg, supra note 66, at 33.
662. Cf U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1738, 1738A (1982); Mc-
Donald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984); Chandler v. Roudebush,
425 U.S. 840 (1976); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454
(1975); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Implied repeals are disfavored
because of the potential effect on the rights of third parties. Kremer v. Chemical
Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
663. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 10; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 32,
§ 115. This is the correct understanding ofJudge Reinhardt's observation that
in the Hickenlooper Amendment "Congress has determined ... that the courts
are competent to resolve such claims .... ." West v. Multibanco Comermex,
S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 829 n.8 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987).
664. French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 85, 242 N.E.2d 704,
729, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433, 468 (1968) (Keating, J., dissenting); see also Halberstam,
supra note 33, at 69-72. On fears of politicization, see Golbert & Bradford, supra
note 30, at 29; Leigh & Sandier, supra note 30, at 700; Comment, supra note 149,
at 132-35.
665. See infra § VII.
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Enforcement of arbitral agreements, confirmation of ar-
bitral awards, and execution upon judgments based on
orders confirming such awards shall not be refused on
the basis of the Act of State doctrine. 666
The intent of this statute is both clear and limited, and it is
not likely to pose serious interpretive problems. The new statute
precludes invocation of the act of state doctrine in any suit involv-
ing arbitration with a foreign state, leaving any possible defenses
based on sovereign state action (whether by way of the act of state
doctrine or the foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine) to the ar-
bitrators to resolve.
The new section 15 was intended 667 to reverse the decision
in Libyan American Oil Co. ("LIAMCO") v. Libya.668 In LIAMCO,
Libya had agreed in a concession agreement to arbitrate any dis-
pute under the agreement. Judge Smith held that Libya's repudi-
ation of its concession agreement constituted an act of state. By
his reasoning, the act of state doctrine prevented any recognition
of the repudiated concession agreement, including the agreement
to arbitrate, thus barring enforcement of a Swiss arbitral award
based on the repudiated agreement. 669
The State Department and the American Arbitration Associa-
tion strongly opposed this reasoning, and prevailed upon the
Court of Appeals to vacate Judge Smith's opinion even after the
parties settled (after oral argument before the Court of Ap-
peals).670 Still, as no other court considered the question of the
role of the act of state doctrine in arbitral cases arising under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 6 7 1 Judge Smith's opinion re-
mained as the only reasoned precedent on point. To prevent the
666. P.L. No. 100-669, § 1, 102 Stat. 3969 (1988) (codified at 9 U.S.C. § 15
(Supp. VI 1988)).
667. Feldman, Arbitration Law Strengthened by Congress, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 10,
1988, at 1, col. 1. Mark Feldman then held the chair of the ABA Section on
International Law and Practice Committee on Sovereign Immunity; as such he
was principally responsible for drafting S. 2204 and shepherding it through
Congress.
668. 482 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980), vacated mem. after settlement, 684 F.2d
1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
669. SeeJ. DELLAPENNA, supra note ***, at 399.
670. 684 F.2d at 1032.
671. See, e.g., Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Guinea, 693 F.2d
1094 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983); Sperry Int'l Trade, Inc. v.
Israel, 689 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1982); Ipitrade Int'l, S.A. v. Nigeria, 465 F. Supp.
824 (D.D.C. 1978).
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possibility that his opinion would be followed by another court, S.
2204 was proposed.
Gaging the effect of the new statute is easier than explaining
how it fits with a correct understanding of the act of state doc-
trine. One could simply see it as a statutory repeal of the doctrine
by a Congress that values American ideas of proper state conduct
over the finality of decision and other values expressed by the
doctrine. 672 Mark Feldman, who is principally responsible for the
new statute,673 chose to explain the purpose of the statute some-
what differently:
Neither the comity, separation of powers nor choice of
law rationales applies to [arbitration] proceedings, be-
cause the court does not pass upon the validity of the
foreign sovereign's act. It merely enforces the agree-
ment of the foreign state to binding adjudication by a
third party.674
Despite displaying a somewhat muddled concept of how the
act of state doctrine functions, ultimately equating the doctrine
with the concept of sovereign immunity, Feldman's statement
does suggest a kernel of understanding of what the act of state
doctrine is about. The doctrine, absent some relevant exception,
requires courts to treat the act of the foreign state as valid. As
Mr. Feldman explains, such issues as the validity of the acts of a
foreign state are not to be judged by the court; such issues are to
be judged by the arbitrators in the fashion the .foreign state itself
has designated for resolving such questions. Thus, the statute ef-
fectively codifies a limited version of the "waiver exception" to
the act of state doctrine. 675 As such, it is consistent with the
proper understanding of the doctrine.
V. MAKING SENSE OF THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE: A
SUMMARY OF JUDICIAL ANALYSIS
With so many exceptions, limitations, and general or special
theories proposed for the act of state doctrine, anyone seeking to
apply the doctrine must develop a thorough understanding of the
basic policies underlying the doctrine. One must then examine
672. See the text at supra notes 261-69 for the policies underlying the act of
state doctrine.
673. See supra note 667.
674. Feldman, supra note 667, at 2, col. 3.
675. See generally supra § IV(B) (11).
123
Dellapenna: Deciphering the Act of State Doctrine
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1990
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
each proposed theory, exception, or limitation to determine in
light of this understanding whether and how it should be used. In
this article I have attempted to show that the purpose of the act of
state doctrine is to serve as a rule of repose. It assures the finality
in the United States of certain decisions, expressed in "acts" of
foreign states, in much the same fashion as the full faith and
credit clause of the Constitution 676 assures finality throughout the
United States for judgments from sister-state courts. 677 The doc-
trine does not serve as a rule of abstention, a special application
of the political question doctrine, or a "super choice-of-law"
rule.6
7 8
Given that the act of state doctrine functions as a rule of re-
pose, the policies which ought to inform the application of the
doctrine are four:679 preventing affront to the sovereignty of for-
eign states; preventing waste of a foreign state's decision-making
resources; preventing waste of private decision-securing re-
sources; and protecting reliance of third parties on the finality of
"acts" of a foreign state. Thus, the oft-expressed concern that
the doctrine be used to prevent embarrassment to the executive's
conduct of foreign relations 680 reflects two of the policies under-
lying the doctrine. This concern highlights the "constitutional
underpinnings" of the doctrine, 681 underpinnings which suggest
that courts generally should not carve exceptions out of the rele-
vant policies unless directed to do so by the proper steps within
the political branches. The executive will always focus primarily
on possible affront to a foreign sovereign 682 and will be much less
concerned about waste of decision-making and decision-securing
resources and reliance by third parties. Therefore, the ideal place
676. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
677. See supra § III(D).
678. See supra § III(A)-(C).
679. See the text at supra notes 261-69.
680. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697-705 (plural-
ity op. by White, J.), 726-28 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (1976); First Nat'l City
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762-66 (plurality op. per Rehn-
quist, J.), 785-88 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (1972); Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-30, 437-39 (1964).
681. See the text at supra notes 130-34.
682. Consider the analogous experience when the executive branch was
vested with the power to "suggest" (or suggest withholding) sovereign immu-
nity from a foreign state. SeeJet Line Services, Inc. v. M/V Marsa El Hariga, 462
F. Supp. 1165, 1169 (D. Md. 1978); H.R. REP. 94-1487, supra note 398, at 6606-
07; see generallyJ. DELLAPENNA, supra note ***, at 3-8; Cardozo, Sovereign Immunity:
The Plaintiff Deserves a Day in Court, 67 HARV. L. REv. 608, 613-14 (1954);Jessup,
Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of Its Functions?, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 168, 170
(1946); Timberg, supra note 66, at 11.
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to decide the priorities among these policies (the proper place to
balance the various political factors, if you will) should be Con-
gress, and not a mere suggestion by the State Department. 683
Courts should not undertake on their own to balance these
or other factors on a case-by-case basis. To decide through a ju-
dicial balancing process whether to recognize as final a decision
by a foreign state destroys the very values the act of state doctrine
should achieve, regardless of whether the balancing process is
called "comity," the "pure theory," or a "phenomenological ap-
proach. ' 684 Judicial balancing destroys the certainty without
which no one could safely rely on a decision. The process of ana-
lyzing the extent of the foreign state's interest and weighing it
against the interests of others would itself be an affront to the
foreign state's sovereignty.
It is perhaps unfortunate that the first decision to announce
the doctrine 685 involved a dispute over a specific act, for the use
of the term "act" can be misleading. An "act of state" is a deci-
sion which determines legal rights and duties and which ex-
presses (determines or carries out) the central policies of the
state.686 Thus, an "act" can include total nonaction, 687 and can
be (but need not always be) in the form of an executive, a legisla-
tive, or a judicial decision.688 It is not a decision involving only
routine management of government 689 or the resolution of
strictly private controversies. 690
As with any rule of repose, a central question in the applica-
tion of the act of state doctrine is whether the "act" was under-
taken in a proper exercise of jurisdiction. While this issue is
resolved in perhaps too cautious a way for today's world, one of
the few well-established features of the doctrine is that it does not
apply to "acts" which cannot be given initial effect within the ter-
ritory of the foreign state from which the relevant decision
emanates. 69
1
683. As Justice Douglas put it, courts should not be merely an "errand boy
for the Executive Branch." First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406
U.S. 759, 773 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring in the result); see generally supra
§ IV(B)(4).
684. See supra § IV(A)(3), (4), (5).
685. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
686. See supra § IV(A)(1).
687. See the text at supra notes 245, 279, & 311.
688. See the text at supra notes 277, 278, 287, 288, & 312.
689. See the text at supra note 308.
690. See the text at supra notes 231 & 268.
691. See supra § IV(A)(2).
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In addition to the territorial limitation, courts ought to adopt
exceptions which ensure that a foreign state will feel no affront to
its sovereignty and has no concern about the possible waste of its
decision-making resources, and under circumstances in which
third persons have not expended their decision-securing re-
sources and could not reasonably rely on the decision as final.
These exceptions are: the customary international law excep-
tion;692 the treaty exception; 693 and the waiver exception. 694 All
other proposed exceptions ought to be rejected. 695
VI. THE NEED TO CODIFY-NOT TO REPEAL-THE ACT OF
STATE DOCTRINE
Congress, under its authority to define "Offenses against the
Law of Nations," 696 could define answers to any question consid-
ered in this article. Should Congress indicate by statute that
courts are to prefer other values, courts must follow the com-
mand of Congress. The two statutory "exceptions" to the act of
state doctrine adopted thus far, however, actually express two
limited versions of the judicially-proposed exceptions supported
here-the customary international law exception, and the waiver
exception. 697
With these notions in mind, beginning in 1980 Senators
Domenici and Mathias introduced an "International Rule of Law
Act" several times in an attempt to codify and limit the act of state
doctrine. 698 The core of the Domenici/Mathias proposal would
have been a new section 1657 for title 28 of the U.S. Code:
No court in the United States shall decline on the
ground of the Federal act of state doctrine to make a de-
termination on the merits in any case in which the act of
state is contrary to international law. 69 9
692. See supra § IV(B)(3).
693. See supra § IV(B)(9).
694. See supra § IV(B) (11).
695. See supra § IV(B)(1), (2), (4)-(8), (10).
696. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
697. See supra § IV(C), (D).
698. S. 1434, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), originally introduced as S. 2633,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereafter IRLA]; see also Hearings on S. 1434 before the
Subcomm. on Crim. L. of the Sen. Jud. Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); Bazyler,
supra note 3, at 394; Mathias, supra note 3; Ebenroth & Teitz, supra note 25, at
252-53; Comment, supra note 149, at 132-35; Comment, supra note 226, at 129-
33. Senator Mathias has now retired from public office.
699. IRLA, supra note 698, § 3.
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Additional provisions would have defined international law
by incorporating the definition found in the Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice along with acts of Congress defining in-
ternational law for the United States, and apparently would have
preserved the exculpation of a state for violations of international
law against its own nationals. 700 The proposal also would have
preserved the foreign sovereign compulsion defense.70' The pro-
posal would have repealed the Hickenlooper Amendment 70 2 as
superfluous if the International Rule of Law Act were enacted.
Finally, the proposal would have applied retroactively to any case
"where final judgment has not been rendered." 70 3
The core of this proposal was later incorporated in a pro-
posed section 1606(b) which was meant to have been added to
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act by S. 1071. This proposal
was introduced on May 3, 1985, as part of a proposed reform of
the Immunities Act.7 0 4 While this latest proposal was less de-
tailed, the most important difference from the proposed Interna-
tional Rule of Law Act was that the new section 1606(b) would
have controlled the act of state doctrine only in proceedings
against foreign states. Finally, Michael Bazyler has recently ar-
gued that the act of state doctrine be repealed completely.70 5
Congress as a whole has shown little inclination to enact any
of these proposals. The International Rule of Law Act would cre-
ate an exception to the act of state doctrine virtually identical to
the proposed customary international law exception properly un-
derstood.70 6 It would avoid the pitfalls of the present Hick-
enlooper Amendment which accords excessive deference to the
executive branch and contains unsupportable restrictions to par-
ticular classes of wrongs. 70 7 One should not, however, entirely
discount the danger that courts, through hostile construction,
700. Id. § 4.
701. Id. § 4(b).
702. Id. § 5.
703. Id. § 6(b).
704. S. 1071, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S5363 (daily ed. May 3,
1985), reprinted in 79 AM.J. INT'L L. at 787 (1985); see generally Augulo & Wing,
Proposed Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 and the Act of State
Doctrine, 14 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 299 (1986); Atkeson & Ramsey, Proposed
Amendment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 770 (1985);
Bazyler, supra note 3, at 395-96; Hoagland, The Act of State Doctrine: Abandon It, 14
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 317 (1986); Comment, supra note 226, at 133-36.
705. Bazyler, supra note 3, at 396-98.
706. See generally supra § IV(B)(3).
707. See the text at supra notes 535-54 & 574-79.
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might render such a statute ineffective. 70 8 The proposed section
1606(b) would have a much more limited, and more easily lim-
ited, further impact. 70 9 Michael Bazyler himself justified his pro-
posed total repeal on grounds that the courts could accomplish
much the same goals through other legal doctrines. 710
The power of Congress to preclude the application of the act
of state doctrine is similar to the power of Congress to preclude
full faith and credit to particular classes of interstate judgments.
Congress has done so in a number of contexts, usually related to
civil rights. 711 At least for acts occurring after the effective date of
the statute, no third party can claim reasonable reliance on the
validity of the act in question. If Congress has directed that
courts risk affront to foreign sovereigns, duplicate decision-mak-
ing and decision-securing efforts, and ignore reliance by third
parties, courts should no longer attend to those concerns.
A statute could shape the doctrine into a coherent and work-
able rule entirely compatible with the correct understanding of
the policies and functions of the doctrine. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, as most relevant rules of customary international law are
likely to involve basic human rights, 712 such a statutory version of
the act of state doctrine would impair the finality of foreign state
decisions only in the face of egregious wrongs, and would return
the United States to its accustomed role among the leaders in
shaping the international rule of law.
In considering the International Rule of Law Act in its sev-
eral proposed forms, however, Congress should focus on special
situations where risks to innocent third parties might require rec-
ognition of the final validity of certain foreign acts even if the acts
violate international law. For example, Congress added a limited
exception to the Hickenlooper Amendment to protect against lia-
bility on certain short-term letters of credit. 71 3 Whether such ex-
clusions are really necessary is debatable; the need to carefully
consider such protections is not.
Even bearing in mind the risks of judicial nullification of any
proposed codification of the act of state doctrine, given the per-
sistent inability of courts to clarify the meaning and effect of the
708. Bazyler, supra note 3, at 394-95 n.405; Ebenroth & Teitz, supra note
25, at 253; Comment, supra note 226, at 130-32.
709. Comment, supra note 226, at 134-35.
710. Bazyler, supra note 3, at 384-92.
711. See supra note 682.
712. See supra § IV(B)(3), (7).
713. See the text at supra notes 611 & 640.
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doctrine, Congress should intervene by adopting a statute that
would clarify rather than replace the doctrine and the important
policies which it serves. If courts were to analyze the act of state
doctrine carefully, they would recognize that such a statutory cod-
ification of the doctrine would further the ends they have sought
in the judicially-constructed doctrine. If courts so recognize, one
could more confidently expect courts to apply the new statute
rather than to nullify it. Consistent with the analysis in this arti-
cle, as well as the caveats expressed in this part, I suggest that
Congress consider a statute along the lines suggested below. Al-
ternate language is suggested within brackets that would broaden
or narrow the scope of the doctrine. If such a statute were
adopted, the Arbitration Act 7 14 amendment and the Hick-
enlooper Amendment 71 5 would both be superfluous and ought to
be repealed.
(a) For this section, "act of a foreign state" means any
action or nonaction which embodies a decision taken
under the authority of a state and carried into effect
within the territory [under the jurisdiction] of the for-
eign state, when that decision expresses central sover-
eign concerns of the foreign state, including, but not
limited to:
(1) a complete change in the political structure of
the state,
(2) a fundamental change in the economic struc-
ture of the state, or
(3) basic policy decisions concerning the manage-
ment of the society or the economy of the state.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c), courts in the
United States must accept any act of a foreign state as
valid and final, and use that act to preclude reexamina-
tion of any issue, the resolution of which is necessarily
expressed by that act.
(c) Subsection (b) does not preclude reexamination of
an issue, the resolution of which was necessarily ex-
pressed by an act of state if:
(1) the act of state violates a treaty to which the
United States is a [and the foreign state are]
party[ies];
714. 9 U.S.C. § 15 (Supp. VI 1988); see generally supra § IV(D).
715. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982); see generally supra § IV(C).
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(2) the act of state violates [a clear rule of] custom-
ary international law; or
(3) the foreign state responsible for the act has
[expressly] waived, either before or after the act was
taken, the protection of subsection (b) for an act.
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